security

Original：🇺🇸 English

Translated

Use when the user requests a security audit workflow (vulnerability scan and verification) for sensitive code.

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Sourcealeister1102/skills

Added on2026-02-09

NPX Install

npx skill4agent add aleister1102/skills security

SKILL.md Content

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/security - Security Audit Workflow

Use this skill to run a security audit workflow on sensitive code, prioritizing findings that can realistically become CRITICAL or HIGH impact.

When to Use

The user asks for a security audit / vulnerability review ("is this secure?", "check for vulns").
The code touches authn/authz, payments, secrets, PII, file upload/download, webhooks, admin actions, deserialization, or command execution.
The user wants a scan + verification loop (audit findings → fixes → re-check).

When NOT to Use

The user wants a general code review, debugging, refactor, or style improvements.
The code is clearly non-sensitive (toy scripts, local-only utilities) and the user isn’t asking about security.

Defaults / Guardrails

Report CRITICAL/HIGH only. If none exist, explicitly report none.
Treat "possession implies compromise" as non-finding unless you show a feasible token/secret acquisition path.
Prefer exploit-chain depth over breadth. Drop noise that can’t reach material impact.

For deeper triage/prerequisite rules and consistent output formats, read:

```
references/triage-and-prereqs.md
```
```
references/report-templates.md
```

Workflow

0) Confirm Scope

Determine one of:

Full codebase:
```
/security
```
Area:
```
/security auth
```
(or similar)
Single file:
```
/security path/to/file
```
Dependencies only:
```
/security --deps
```

1) Static Audit (Phase 1)

Goal: find and explain only CRITICAL/HIGH issues with clear attacker prerequisites.

Prioritize:

Injection: SQL/NoSQL, command/OS, template injection, SSRF, XSS.
Authz failures: IDOR, missing checks, privilege escalation.
Authn/session: token validation mistakes that increase attacker capability.
Secrets: hardcoded credentials, leaked tokens/keys, unsafe secret handling.
Insecure deserialization, unsafe file handling (path traversal), dangerous eval.
Supply chain: obviously vulnerable deps or unsafe install/build hooks.

Evidence required per finding:

Attacker-controlled source → security-sensitive sink (show the path).
Concrete exploit narrative and prerequisites.
Containment + long-term remediation steps.

2) Runtime Verification (When Runnable)

If there is a runnable target, verify with minimal, safe steps.

Rules:

Only test instances you control / are authorized to test (prefer
```
localhost
```
).
Avoid DoS-like loops, mass writes, or destructive behavior.
Prefer repo-native commands (README, Makefile, Docker, package scripts).

Verification checklist:

Find how to run: README, Dockerfile, docker-compose, Makefile, package scripts.
Start the service in minimal config.
Prove impact with 1–3 deterministic requests/steps.

3) Fix Guidance

Recommend changes that eliminate the root cause:

Parameterize queries; avoid shell; escape/encode; strong allowlists for URLs/paths.
Enforce deny-by-default authorization.
Remove secrets from repo; use env/secret store; rotate compromised keys.

4) Re-Verify (Phase 2)

After fixes, re-run minimal repros and any relevant security checks.

Triage Rules (Noise to Skip Unless Chained)

Skip by default unless you can chain to data loss/auth bypass/priv-esc with evidence:

CORS/OPTIONS “bypass” without protected response body or state change.
Missing rate limiting/lockout by itself.
Account enumeration without a takeover/privileged action path.
Timing side-channels without a feasible remote measurement model.
Swagger/UI exposure gated to non-prod.
Token-type confusion unless it meaningfully increases capability beyond intended flows.

If a borderline issue is showing up repeatedly, apply the stricter escalation criteria in

references/triage-and-prereqs.md

Subagent Prompts

Phase 1:

aegis

(Audit)

text

Security audit: [SCOPE]

Find CRITICAL/HIGH only. For each finding include:
- severity (CRITICAL/HIGH)
- attacker prerequisites
- source → sink evidence (file/function references)
- minimal repro steps (safe)
- remediation (containment first, then long-term)

If no CRITICAL/HIGH exist, explicitly output: NONE.

Deprioritize noise categories unless chained to material impact.

Phase 2:

arbiter

(Verify)