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Apply Tit for Tat strategy for negotiations, relationships, and repeated interactions. Use when navigating workplace dynamics, building partnerships, handling conflicts, or designing systems with reciprocal interactions.
npx skill4agent add flpbalada/my-opencode-config game-theory-tit-for-tatTit for Tat Rules:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ RULE 1: COOPERATE first │
│ Start every new relationship with trust │
│ │
│ RULE 2: MIRROR their last move │
│ If they cooperated → Cooperate │
│ If they defected → Defect │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘Why TFT Wins:
┌──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ NICE │ Never defects first │
│ │ Starts with cooperation and good faith │
├──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ RETALIATORY│ Immediately punishes defection │
│ │ Prevents exploitation │
├──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ FORGIVING │ Returns to cooperation after one punishment │
│ │ Enables recovery of relationships │
├──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ CLEAR │ Pattern is easy to recognize │
│ │ Opponents learn cooperation is rewarded │
└──────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────────┘Prisoner's Dilemma Payoffs:
Partner's Choice
┌─────────────┬─────────────┐
│ COOPERATE │ DEFECT │
┌──────────┼─────────────┼─────────────┤
Your │COOPERATE │ Win-Win │ You Lose │
Choice│ │ (3, 3) │ (0, 5) │
├──────────┼─────────────┼─────────────┤
│ DEFECT │ You Win │ Lose-Lose │
│ │ (5, 0) │ (1, 1) │
└──────────┴─────────────┴─────────────┘
In single games: Defection seems better (5 > 3)
In repeated games: Mutual cooperation wins (3+3+3... > 5+1+1...)Is TFT appropriate?
Repeated interaction?
├── YES → TFT applies
└── NO → One-shot game (different strategy needed)
Shadow of the future?
├── Will interact again → TFT works well
└── No future interaction → Less effective
Can they observe your response?
├── YES → TFT signals clearly
└── NO → Communication neededFirst Move Decision:
New relationship?
└── COOPERATE (be nice)
Existing relationship?
├── Their last action was cooperative → COOPERATE
└── Their last action was defection → DEFECT (once)
After punishment?
└── If they cooperate again → COOPERATE (forgive)| Situation | Action | Communication |
|---|---|---|
| New relationship | Cooperate | "I'm starting with trust" |
| They cooperated | Cooperate | Reinforce positive cycle |
| They defected | Defect | "This response is to [specific action]" |
| After punishment | Cooperate | "Let's move forward" |
## Tit for Tat Analysis
**Situation:** [Description]
**Date:** [Date]
### Relationship Assessment
| Factor | Status |
| --------------------- | -------------------------------------------- |
| Repeated interaction? | Yes/No |
| History | [Cooperative/Mixed/Adversarial] |
| Their last move | [Cooperate/Defect] |
| Current state | [In good standing/Punishment phase/Recovery] |
### Recommended Action
**Action:** [Cooperate/Defect]
**Rationale:** [Based on which TFT principle]
### Communication Plan
**If Cooperating:**
- [What to say/do]
- [How to reinforce positive dynamic]
**If Defecting (Retaliating):**
- [Specific response to their defection]
- [Clear signal that cooperation will resume if they cooperate]
- [Avoid over-punishment]
### Exit Conditions
| If They... | Then I... |
| --------------------- | ---------------------------- |
| Return to cooperation | Immediately forgive |
| Continue defecting | Continue matching |
| Escalate | [Boundary for disengagement] |Scenario: Coworker missed deadline affecting your work
TFT Response:
Be Nice (initially):
├── Assume competence and good faith
├── Give benefit of doubt first time
└── Don't preemptively retaliate
Be Retaliatory (this incident):
├── Address directly: "The report wasn't sent as agreed"
├── Ask what happened
├── Set clear expectation for next time
└── Don't let it slide (prevents exploitation)
Be Forgiving (after):
├── Once addressed and they commit to improve
├── Drop the issue completely
├── Don't bring it up in future interactions
└── Don't hold a grudge
Be Clear:
├── Your response should be predictable
├── They should know: cooperate = good, defect = consequences
└── Make pattern obvious so they can adjustScenario: Partnership negotiation
TFT Approach:
Opening (Nice):
├── Make first good-faith offer or concession
├── Signal you want win-win outcome
└── Don't start with extreme position
Response to Their Move:
If they make reasonable offer:
└── Match with reasonable counter
If they lowball aggressively:
├── Match their firmness
├── Don't concede further
└── Show you won't be exploited
Recovery Path:
├── Moment they move to reasonable position
├── You move to reasonable position too
└── Signal: cooperation = path to dealScenario: Friend cancelled plans last minute
TFT Application:
Nice (default):
├── Assume good reason
├── Don't catastrophize
└── Be understanding this time
Retaliatory (if pattern emerges):
├── Set boundary: "When plans change last minute, it affects me"
├── Communicate clearly
├── Reduce investment in future plans with them
Forgiving (if they adjust):
├── When they make effort to be reliable
├── Immediately return to full engagement
├── Don't "echo" past cancellations
Handle Noise:
├── Clarify intent before retaliating
├── "When you cancelled, was something wrong?"
├── Miscommunication shouldn't start death spiralThe Death Spiral:
Misunderstanding occurs:
├── You cooperated, they perceived defection
├── They defect in response
├── You defect in response
├── Alternating defections continue
└── Both lose, neither recovers
Solution: Generous Tit for Tat
├── Occasionally forgive defection (10% random)
├── Breaks accidental cycles
├── Better in "noisy" environments
└── Communicate to clarify perceived defectionsThe Punishment Paradox:
After they defect:
├── TFT says: retaliate
├── But: retaliation is costly to you too
├── Rational choice: forgive and return to cooperation
└── If they know this, threat isn't credible
Solution: Commit to retaliation
├── Make punishment automatic
├── Reputation for following through
├── Short-term cost for long-term credibility| Variant | Modification | Best For |
|---|---|---|
| Generous TFT | Randomly forgive some defections | Noisy environments |
| Tit for Two Tats | Only retaliate after 2 defections | Cautious approach |
| Suspicious TFT | Start with defection | Hostile environments |
| Gradual TFT | Escalating punishment | Repeat offenders |
| Method | Combined Use |
|---|---|
| Five Whys | Why did they defect? |
| Loss Aversion | Defection = loss framing |
| Trust Psychology | TFT builds/maintains trust |
| Negotiation | TFT as negotiation backbone |
| Conflict Resolution | Framework for de-escalation |
TIT FOR TAT DECISION TREE
New interaction?
└── COOPERATE (be nice)
They just cooperated?
└── COOPERATE (reward)
They just defected?
├── DEFECT once (retaliate)
└── Then if they cooperate → COOPERATE (forgive)
Unclear if defection was intentional?
├── COMMUNICATE first
└── "Was that intentional?" before retaliating
Stuck in defection cycle?
├── Unilaterally cooperate once
├── See if they break cycle
└── If not, reassess relationship