axios-security-check

Compare original and translation side by side

🇺🇸

Original

English

🇨🇳

Translation

Chinese

Axios Supply Chain Attack — Security Check

Axios 供应链攻击 — 安全检查

Attack summary: On March 31, 2026, axios versions

1.14.1

and

0.30.4

were published via a compromised maintainer account. They silently injected

plain-crypto-js@4.2.1

as a dependency, which ran a postinstall script deploying a cross-platform Remote Access Trojan (RAT). Both versions were removed by 03:29 UTC but may remain in local caches or lockfiles.

Run all four phases below and produce the report at the end.

攻击概要： 2026年3月31日，攻击者通过被入侵的维护者账号发布了

1.14.1

和

0.30.4

版本的axios。这两个版本会静默注入

plain-crypto-js@4.2.1

作为依赖，该依赖会运行postinstall脚本部署跨平台远程访问木马（RAT）。两个恶意版本均在UTC时间03:29被下架，但可能仍残留在本地缓存或锁文件中。

请依次执行以下四个阶段的操作，并在最后生成报告。

Phase 1: Vulnerability Scan

阶段1：漏洞扫描

Search for malicious axios versions in package manifests, lockfiles, and global caches.

Malicious versions:

1.14.1

and

0.30.4

在包清单文件、锁文件和全局缓存中搜索恶意axios版本。

恶意版本号：

1.14.1

和

0.30.4

1a. Project files under

1a. 用户目录下的项目文件

Search for lockfiles and

package.json

files (limit depth to avoid excessive crawling):

bash

undefined

搜索锁文件和

package.json

文件（限制搜索深度避免过度遍历）：

bash

undefined

Find package.json files containing axios (depth ≤ 8, skip .git and common noise)

find ~ -maxdepth 8
-not ( -path '/.git/' -o -path '/node_modules//node_modules/*' )
-name "package.json"
-exec grep -l '"axios"' {} ;


For each match, check if `axios` is pinned to `1.14.1` or `0.30.4`:
```bash
grep -E '"axios":\s*"[^"]*1\.14\.1|[^"]*0\.30\.4"' <path>/package.json

Search lockfiles for the malicious versions:

bash

undefined

find ~ -maxdepth 8
-not ( -path '/.git/' -o -path '/node_modules//node_modules/*' )
-name "package.json"
-exec grep -l '"axios"' {} ;


对每个匹配的文件，检查axios是否固定为`1.14.1`或`0.30.4`版本：
```bash
grep -E '"axios":\s*"[^"]*1\.14\.1|[^"]*0\.30\.4"' <path>/package.json

在锁文件中搜索恶意版本：

bash

undefined

package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock

grep -r --include="package-lock.json" --include="yarn.lock"
--include="pnpm-lock.yaml" --include="bun.lock"
-l "axios" ~ 2>/dev/null | head -50


For each lockfile found:
```bash
grep -A2 '"axios"' <lockfile> | grep -E "1\.14\.1|0\.30\.4"

grep -r --include="package-lock.json" --include="yarn.lock"
--include="pnpm-lock.yaml" --include="bun.lock"
-l "axios" ~ 2>/dev/null | head -50


对每个找到的锁文件执行：
```bash
grep -A2 '"axios"' <lockfile> | grep -E "1\.14\.1|0\.30\.4"

1b. Global caches

1b. 全局缓存

Check global package manager caches for cached malicious tarballs:

bash

undefined

检查全局包管理器缓存中是否存在缓存的恶意安装包：

bash

undefined

npm cache

find ~/.npm/_cacache -name "*.json" 2>/dev/null | xargs grep -l '"axios"' 2>/dev/null |
xargs grep -l '"1.14.1"|"0.30.4"' 2>/dev/null

pnpm store (macOS)

find ~/Library/pnpm/store -maxdepth 6 -name "package.json" 2>/dev/null |
xargs grep -l '"axios"' 2>/dev/null |
xargs grep -l '"1.14.1"|"0.30.4"' 2>/dev/null

pnpm store (Linux)

find ~/.local/share/pnpm/store -maxdepth 6 -name "package.json" 2>/dev/null |
xargs grep -l '"axios"' 2>/dev/null |
xargs grep -l '"1.14.1"|"0.30.4"' 2>/dev/null

bun cache

find ~/.bun/install/cache -maxdepth 6 -name "package.json" 2>/dev/null |
xargs grep -l '"axios"' 2>/dev/null |
xargs grep -l '"1.14.1"|"0.30.4"' 2>/dev/null

---

find ~/.bun/install/cache -maxdepth 6 -name "package.json" 2>/dev/null |
xargs grep -l '"axios"' 2>/dev/null |
xargs grep -l '"1.14.1"|"0.30.4"' 2>/dev/null

---

Phase 2: Malware Artifact Check

阶段2：恶意软件残留检查

2a.

plain-crypto-js

presence

2a. 排查

plain-crypto-js

是否存在

The malicious dependency used as the attack vector:

bash

find ~ -maxdepth 10 -type d -name "plain-crypto-js" 2>/dev/null

Any result here means

plain-crypto-js

was installed — the install-time RAT dropper ran.

这是攻击载体使用的恶意依赖：

bash

find ~ -maxdepth 10 -type d -name "plain-crypto-js" 2>/dev/null

任何返回结果都说明

plain-crypto-js

已被安装，安装时的RAT投放脚本已执行。

2b. Platform-specific RAT artifacts

2b. 各平台专属RAT残留文件

Check for files dropped by the RAT dropper. These are fixed paths.

macOS:

bash

ls -la /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond 2>/dev/null && echo "FOUND — potential RAT binary" || echo "Not found"

Linux:

bash

ls -la /tmp/ld.py 2>/dev/null && echo "FOUND — potential RAT script" || echo "Not found"

Windows (if running in WSL or checking a Windows path):

bash

ls -la /mnt/c/ProgramData/wt.exe 2>/dev/null && echo "FOUND — potential RAT binary" || echo "Not found"

检查RAT投放脚本释放的文件，这些文件的路径是固定的。

macOS：

bash

ls -la /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond 2>/dev/null && echo "FOUND — potential RAT binary" || echo "Not found"

Linux：

bash

ls -la /tmp/ld.py 2>/dev/null && echo "FOUND — potential RAT script" || echo "Not found"

Windows（如果运行在WSL或检查Windows路径）：

bash

ls -la /mnt/c/ProgramData/wt.exe 2>/dev/null && echo "FOUND — potential RAT binary" || echo "Not found"

2c. Active C2 connections

2c. 活跃C2连接

Check for live connections to the attacker's command-and-control server:

bash

undefined

检查是否存在与攻击者命令与控制（C2）服务器的活跃连接：

bash

undefined

By IP

lsof -i @142.11.206.73 2>/dev/null || echo "No connections to C2 IP"

By domain (if DNS resolves)

lsof -i 2>/dev/null | grep -i sfrclak || echo "No connections to sfrclak.com"

By port 8000 (C2 port used)

lsof -i :8000 2>/dev/null | grep -v "localhost|127.0.0" || echo "No suspicious :8000 connections"

---

lsof -i :8000 2>/dev/null | grep -v "localhost|127.0.0" || echo "No suspicious :8000 connections"

---

Phase 3: Package Manager Security Audit

阶段3：包管理器安全审计

Detect which package managers are installed and check their security-relevant configuration. Read global config files and project-level config/manifest files in the current directory.

检测已安装的包管理器，检查其与安全相关的配置。读取全局配置文件，以及当前目录下的项目级配置/清单文件。

3a. Detect installed package managers

3a. 检测已安装的包管理器

bash

which npm && npm --version
which pnpm && pnpm --version
which bun && bun --version
which yarn && yarn --version

bash

which npm && npm --version
which pnpm && pnpm --version
which bun && bun --version
which yarn && yarn --version

3b. npm

Config files to read:

Global:
```
~/.npmrc
```
Project:
```
.npmrc
```
in current directory

bash

npm config get ignore-scripts
npm config get min-release-age
npm config get audit

Setting	Secure value	Default	Effect
`ignore-scripts`	`true`	`false`	Disables all lifecycle scripts for all packages
`min-release-age`	e.g. `259200` (3 days in seconds)	unset	Refuses to install package versions published more recently than the threshold — blocks day-zero malicious publishes
`audit`	`true`	`true`	Checks installed packages against known vulnerability advisories

Note: npm has no per-package script allowlist —

ignore-scripts

is all-or-nothing.

需要读取的配置文件：

全局：
```
~/.npmrc
```
项目：当前目录下的
```
.npmrc
```

bash

npm config get ignore-scripts
npm config get min-release-age
npm config get audit

配置项	安全值	默认值	作用
`ignore-scripts`	`true`	`false`	禁用所有包的所有生命周期脚本
`min-release-age`	例如 `259200` （3天，单位秒）	未设置	拒绝安装发布时间短于阈值的包版本，可拦截零日恶意发布
`audit`	`true`	`true`	对照已知漏洞通告检查已安装的包

注意：npm没有包粒度的脚本允许列表，

ignore-scripts

是全有或全无的配置。

3c. pnpm

Config files to read:

Global:
```
~/.npmrc
```
(pnpm reads this too) and
```
pnpm config list
```
Project:
```
.npmrc
```
,
```
pnpm-workspace.yaml
```
```
package.json
```
→
```
pnpm
```
field

bash

pnpm config get ignore-scripts 2>/dev/null
pnpm config get ignoreDepScripts 2>/dev/null
pnpm config get minimumReleaseAge 2>/dev/null
pnpm config get blockExoticSubdeps 2>/dev/null
pnpm config get onlyBuiltDependencies 2>/dev/null
pnpm config get neverBuiltDependencies 2>/dev/null
pnpm config get strictDepBuilds 2>/dev/null
pnpm config get dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds 2>/dev/null

Setting	Secure value	Default	Effect
`minimumReleaseAge`	e.g. `1440` (1 day, in minutes)	`0`	Refuses packages published more recently than the threshold — blocks day-zero attacks like this one
`minimumReleaseAgeExclude`	scoped list	unset	Packages exempt from the age check
`blockExoticSubdeps`	`true`	`false`	Transitive deps must come from a registry; blocks git/tarball URL subdependencies injected by attackers
`ignoreDepScripts`	`true`	`false`	Skips lifecycle scripts in dependencies only; project scripts still run
`ignoreScripts`	`true`	`false`	Skips all lifecycle scripts (dependencies and project)
`onlyBuiltDependencies`	Explicit allowlist	unset	Only listed packages may run install scripts — all others blocked
`allowBuilds`	Per-package map	unset	Newer alternative to `onlyBuiltDependencies` ; supports version constraints and explicit `false` entries
`neverBuiltDependencies`	Blocklist of known-bad packages	unset	Explicitly prevents listed packages from running scripts
`strictDepBuilds`	`true`	`false`	Install fails if any dependency has unreviewed build scripts — forces explicit approval
`dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds`	`false`	`false`	Flag if this is `true` — it bypasses all script controls

配置项	安全值	默认值	作用
`minimumReleaseAge`	例如 `1440` （1天，单位分钟）	`0`	拒绝发布时间短于阈值的包，可拦截本次这类零日攻击
`minimumReleaseAgeExclude`	限定范围的列表	未设置	不受年龄检查限制的包列表
`blockExoticSubdeps`	`true`	`false`	传递依赖必须来自注册表，拦截攻击者注入的git/压缩包URL形式的依赖
`ignoreDepScripts`	`true`	`false`	仅跳过依赖的生命周期脚本，项目脚本仍可运行
`ignoreScripts`	`true`	`false`	跳过所有生命周期脚本（包括依赖和项目）
`onlyBuiltDependencies`	显式允许列表	未设置	仅列表中的包可以运行安装脚本，其余全部拦截
`allowBuilds`	包粒度映射	未设置	`onlyBuiltDependencies` 的新版替代方案，支持版本约束和显式 `false` 条目
`neverBuiltDependencies`	已知风险包的拦截列表	未设置	显式禁止列表中的包运行脚本
`strictDepBuilds`	`true`	`false`	如果任何依赖存在未审核的构建脚本，安装就会失败，强制显式审批
`dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds`	`false`	`false`	如果该值为 `true` 需要标记，它会绕过所有脚本控制

3d. bun

Config files to read:

Global:
```
~/.bunfig.toml
```
Project:
```
bunfig.toml
```
Project
```
package.json
```
→
```
trustedDependencies
```
field

bash

cat ~/.bunfig.toml 2>/dev/null || echo "No global bunfig.toml"
cat bunfig.toml 2>/dev/null || echo "No project bunfig.toml"
cat package.json 2>/dev/null | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(json.dumps(d.get('trustedDependencies','not set'), indent=2))" 2>/dev/null

Setting	Location	Secure value	Default	Effect
`trustedDependencies`	`package.json`	Explicit allowlist	Top-500 npm packages auto-trusted	Only listed packages may run lifecycle scripts; any package not on this list is blocked
`[install].minimumReleaseAge`	`bunfig.toml`	e.g. `259200` (seconds)	unset	Refuses packages newer than the threshold
`[install].lifecycle-scripts`	`bunfig.toml`	Scoped allowlist	unset	Alternative/additional script execution control

Note: Bun's default is more secure than npm — scripts are blocked for packages not in the built-in top-500 allowlist. An explicit

trustedDependencies

field in

package.json

overrides this and should be reviewed carefully.

需要读取的配置文件：

全局：
```
~/.bunfig.toml
```
项目：
```
bunfig.toml
```
项目
```
package.json
```
→
```
trustedDependencies
```
字段

bash

cat ~/.bunfig.toml 2>/dev/null || echo "No global bunfig.toml"
cat bunfig.toml 2>/dev/null || echo "No project bunfig.toml"
cat package.json 2>/dev/null | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(json.dumps(d.get('trustedDependencies','not set'), indent=2))" 2>/dev/null

配置项	位置	安全值	默认值	作用
`trustedDependencies`	`package.json`	显式允许列表	自动信任npm前500热门包	仅列表中的包可以运行生命周期脚本，不在列表中的包全部被拦截
`[install].minimumReleaseAge`	`bunfig.toml`	例如 `259200` （单位秒）	未设置	拒绝发布时间短于阈值的包
`[install].lifecycle-scripts`	`bunfig.toml`	范围限定的允许列表	未设置	替代/补充的脚本执行控制机制

注意：Bun的默认配置比npm更安全，不在内置前500允许列表中的包的脚本会被拦截。

package.json

中显式的

trustedDependencies

字段会覆盖默认配置，需要仔细审核。

3e. Yarn (Berry)

Config files to read:

Global:
```
~/.yarnrc.yml
```
Project:
```
.yarnrc.yml
```

bash

cat ~/.yarnrc.yml 2>/dev/null | grep -E "enableScripts|dependenciesMeta" || echo "No global .yarnrc.yml"
cat .yarnrc.yml 2>/dev/null | grep -E "enableScripts|dependenciesMeta" || echo "No project .yarnrc.yml"

Setting	Secure value	Default	Effect
`enableScripts`	`false`	`true`	Disables all lifecycle scripts globally; re-enable per-package via `dependenciesMeta`

需要读取的配置文件：

全局：
```
~/.yarnrc.yml
```
项目：
```
.yarnrc.yml
```

bash

cat ~/.yarnrc.yml 2>/dev/null | grep -E "enableScripts|dependenciesMeta" || echo "No global .yarnrc.yml"
cat .yarnrc.yml 2>/dev/null | grep -E "enableScripts|dependenciesMeta" || echo "No project .yarnrc.yml"

配置项	安全值	默认值	作用
`enableScripts`	`false`	`true`	全局禁用所有生命周期脚本，可通过 `dependenciesMeta` 针对单个包重新启用

3f. CI/CD workflow check

3f. CI/CD 工作流检查

.github/workflows/

exists, check install commands for hardening flags:

bash

grep -r --include="*.yml" --include="*.yaml" \
  -E "npm install|npm ci|pnpm install|bun install|yarn install" \
  .github/ 2>/dev/null | head -20

Flags to look for:

--ignore-scripts

npm ci

(vs

npm install

--frozen-lockfile

如果存在

.github/workflows/

目录，检查安装命令的安全加固 flags：

bash

grep -r --include="*.yml" --include="*.yaml" \
  -E "npm install|npm ci|pnpm install|bun install|yarn install" \
  .github/ 2>/dev/null | head -20

需要关注的flags：

--ignore-scripts

、

npm ci

（对比

npm install

）、

--frozen-lockfile

。

Phase 4: Report

阶段4：报告

Produce a clean report with the following structure. Be explicit about each finding — "not found" is a valid and important result.

undefined

按照以下结构生成清晰的报告，每个结果都要明确说明，「未找到」是有效且重要的结果。

undefined

Axios Supply Chain Attack — Security Report

Axios 供应链攻击 — 安全报告

Generated: <date>

生成时间：<date>

Vulnerability Scan

漏洞扫描结果

Affected axios versions found in project files: <list paths or "None found">
Affected axios versions found in global caches: <list or "None found">

项目文件中发现的受影响axios版本：<列出路径或「未找到」>
全局缓存中发现的受影响axios版本：<列出路径或「未找到」>

Malware Artifacts

恶意软件残留结果

plain-crypto-js present: <Yes — <path> | No>
macOS RAT binary (/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond): <Found | Not found>
Linux RAT script (/tmp/ld.py): <Found | Not found>
Windows RAT binary (%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe): <Found | Not found>
Active C2 connections (sfrclak.com:8000 / 142.11.206.73): <Active | None detected>

plain-crypto-js是否存在：<是 — <路径> | 否>
macOS RAT二进制文件（/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond）：<已找到 | 未找到>
Linux RAT脚本（/tmp/ld.py）：<已找到 | 未找到>
Windows RAT二进制文件（%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe）：<已找到 | 未找到>
活跃C2连接（sfrclak.com:8000 / 142.11.206.73）：<活跃 | 未检测到>

Package Manager Security Audit

包管理器安全审计结果

For each installed package manager, report the key settings. Use "✓ set", "✗ unset", or the actual value.

npm <version>:

```
ignore-scripts
```
: <value>
```
min-release-age
```
: <value or "not set">
```
audit
```
: <value>

pnpm <version>:

```
minimumReleaseAge
```
: <value or "not set">
```
blockExoticSubdeps
```
: <value>
```
ignoreDepScripts
```
: <value>
```
onlyBuiltDependencies
```
/
```
allowBuilds
```
: <set with N packages | not set>
```
strictDepBuilds
```
: <value>
```
dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds
```
: <value — flag if true>

bun <version>:

```
trustedDependencies
```
in package.json: <explicit list | using defaults>
```
[install].minimumReleaseAge
```
in bunfig.toml: <value or "not set">

yarn <version>:

```
enableScripts
```
: <value or "not set (defaults to true)">

对每个已安装的包管理器，报告关键配置。使用「✓ 已设置」、「✗ 未设置」或实际值填写。

npm <版本号>：

```
ignore-scripts
```
：<值>
```
min-release-age
```
：<值或「未设置」>
```
audit
```
：<值>

pnpm <版本号>：

```
minimumReleaseAge
```
：<值或「未设置」>
```
blockExoticSubdeps
```
：<值>
```
ignoreDepScripts
```
：<值>
```
onlyBuiltDependencies
```
/
```
allowBuilds
```
：<已设置N个包 | 未设置>
```
strictDepBuilds
```
：<值>
```
dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds
```
：<值 — 若为true请标记>

bun <版本号>：

package.json中的
```
trustedDependencies
```
：<显式列表 | 使用默认配置>
bunfig.toml中的
```
[install].minimumReleaseAge
```
：<值或「未设置」>

yarn <版本号>：

```
enableScripts
```
：<值或「未设置（默认为true）」>

Recommendations

修复建议

[Prioritized list based on findings above — see guidance below]

undefined

[根据上面的发现给出优先级排序的建议，参考下方指南]

undefined

Recommendation guidance (include relevant items only)

建议指南（仅包含相关项）

If compromised (artifacts found or C2 connections detected):

Treat as full system breach — isolate immediately
Rotate all credentials: API keys, SSH keys, cloud credentials, npm tokens, GitHub tokens
Rebuild from a clean snapshot if possible
Review logs for C2 traffic to
```
sfrclak.com:8000
```
/
```
142.11.206.73
```
between March 31 00:00–04:00 UTC 2026

If malicious axios version found (no artifacts):

Remove from lockfile: downgrade to
```
axios@1.7.9
```
(last safe 1.x) or
```
axios@0.29.0
```
(last safe 0.x)
Delete
```
plain-crypto-js
```
from
```
node_modules
```
and lockfile
Run fresh install:
```
pnpm install
```
/
```
npm ci
```
/
```
bun install
```

For pnpm users:

Set
```
minimumReleaseAge
```
in
```
pnpm-workspace.yaml
```
— even 24h (1440 min) would have blocked this attack, which published and was removed within ~3 hours:
yaml
```
minimumReleaseAge: 1440  # 1 day in minutes
```
Enable
```
blockExoticSubdeps: true
```
— the injected
```
plain-crypto-js
```
could have been delivered via tarball URL; this blocks non-registry transitive deps:
yaml
```
blockExoticSubdeps: true
```

Use

onlyBuiltDependencies

allowBuilds

to allowlist only packages that legitimately need scripts. Prefer

allowBuilds

(pnpm 9+) as it supports version constraints:

yaml

# pnpm-workspace.yaml
onlyBuiltDependencies:
  - esbuild
  - sharp
  - "@swc/core"

Enable
```
strictDepBuilds: true
```
so installs fail loudly if an unknown package tries to run scripts:
yaml
```
strictDepBuilds: true
```
Use
```
ignoreDepScripts: true
```
if you need to run your own project scripts but want to block all dependency scripts (more surgical than
```
ignoreScripts
```
)
Verify
```
dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds
```
is not set to
```
true
```
— if it is, remove it immediately

For npm users:

Set
```
min-release-age
```
in
```
.npmrc
```
— this is the single most effective preventive control for day-zero attacks:
```
min-release-age=259200
```
(259200 seconds = 3 days; even 3600 = 1 hour would have blocked this attack)
Add
```
ignore-scripts=true
```
to
```
.npmrc
```
for CI environments (may break packages with legitimate build steps — test first)
Use
```
npm ci
```
instead of
```
npm install
```
in CI — it respects lockfiles exactly and fails on drift
Run
```
npm audit --audit-level=high
```
in CI pipelines

For bun users:

Set an explicit
```
trustedDependencies
```
in
```
package.json
```
rather than relying on bun's default top-500 list. Review which packages in your dependency tree genuinely need scripts:
json
```
{
  "trustedDependencies": ["esbuild", "sharp"]
}
```

Set

minimumReleaseAge

bunfig.toml

toml

[install]
minimumReleaseAge = 259200  # 3 days in seconds

For yarn users (Berry):

Add to
```
.yarnrc.yml
```
:
```
enableScripts: false
```
Re-enable per package via
```
dependenciesMeta
```
for packages with legitimate build scripts

General (all users):

Always commit lockfiles to version control — they are the source of truth for installed versions
Use
```
--frozen-lockfile
```
/
```
--ci
```
flags in CI to prevent lockfile drift
Consider Socket.dev or Snyk for continuous supply chain monitoring that catches malicious packages before they install

如果已被入侵（发现恶意残留或C2连接）：

视为完整系统入侵，立即隔离
轮换所有凭证：API密钥、SSH密钥、云凭证、npm令牌、GitHub令牌
尽可能从干净快照重建系统
排查2026年3月31日UTC 00:00–04:00期间到
```
sfrclak.com:8000
```
/
```
142.11.206.73
```
的C2流量日志

如果发现恶意axios版本（无恶意残留）：

从锁文件中移除恶意版本，降级到
```
axios@1.7.9
```
（1.x最新安全版）或
```
axios@0.29.0
```
（0.x最新安全版）
从
```
node_modules
```
和锁文件中删除
```
plain-crypto-js
```
执行全新安装：
```
pnpm install
```
/
```
npm ci
```
/
```
bun install
```

pnpm用户建议：

在
```
pnpm-workspace.yaml
```
中设置
```
minimumReleaseAge
```
，即使是24小时（1440分钟）也能拦截本次攻击，本次攻击从发布到下架仅用了约3小时：
yaml
```
minimumReleaseAge: 1440  # 1天，单位分钟
```
启用
```
blockExoticSubdeps: true
```
，注入的
```
plain-crypto-js
```
可能通过压缩包URL投放，该配置可拦截非注册表来源的传递依赖：
yaml
```
blockExoticSubdeps: true
```

使用

onlyBuiltDependencies

或

allowBuilds

仅允许确实需要运行脚本的包，优先使用

allowBuilds

（pnpm 9+），支持版本约束：

yaml

# pnpm-workspace.yaml
onlyBuiltDependencies:
  - esbuild
  - sharp
  - "@swc/core"

启用
```
strictDepBuilds: true
```
，如果有未知包尝试运行脚本，安装会明确报错：
yaml
```
strictDepBuilds: true
```
如果需要运行项目自身的脚本但要拦截所有依赖脚本，可以使用
```
ignoreDepScripts: true
```
，比
```
ignoreScripts
```
更灵活
确认
```
dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds
```
未设置为
```
true
```
，如果已设置请立即删除

npm用户建议：

在
```
.npmrc
```
中设置
```
min-release-age
```
，这是防范零日攻击最有效的单一控制措施：
```
min-release-age=259200
```
（259200秒=3天，即使设置3600=1小时也能拦截本次攻击）
在CI环境的
```
.npmrc
```
中添加
```
ignore-scripts=true
```
（可能会破坏有合法构建步骤的包，请先测试）
在CI中使用
```
npm ci
```
替代
```
npm install
```
，它会严格遵循锁文件，出现漂移时直接失败
在CI流水线中运行
```
npm audit --audit-level=high
```

bun用户建议：

在
```
package.json
```
中设置显式的
```
trustedDependencies
```
，不要依赖bun默认的前500热门包列表，审核依赖树中确实需要运行脚本的包：
json
```
{
  "trustedDependencies": ["esbuild", "sharp"]
}
```

在

bunfig.toml

中设置

minimumReleaseAge

：

toml

[install]
minimumReleaseAge = 259200  # 3天，单位秒

Yarn（Berry）用户建议：

在
```
.yarnrc.yml
```
中添加：
```
enableScripts: false
```
对有合法构建脚本的包，通过
```
dependenciesMeta
```
单独启用脚本

通用建议（所有用户）：

始终将锁文件提交到版本控制，它们是已安装版本的唯一可信来源
在CI中使用
```
--frozen-lockfile
```
/
```
--ci
```
flags防止锁文件漂移
考虑使用Socket.dev或Snyk进行持续供应链监控，在恶意包安装前就完成拦截

axios-security-check

Original

Translation

Axios Supply Chain Attack — Security Check

Axios 供应链攻击 — 安全检查

Phase 1: Vulnerability Scan

阶段1：漏洞扫描

1a. Project files under ~

1a. 用户目录下的项目文件

Find package.json files containing axios (depth ≤ 8, skip .git and common noise)

Find package.json files containing axios (depth ≤ 8, skip .git and common noise)

package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock

package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock

1b. Global caches

1b. 全局缓存

npm cache

npm cache

pnpm store (macOS)

pnpm store (macOS)

pnpm store (Linux)

pnpm store (Linux)

bun cache

bun cache

Phase 2: Malware Artifact Check

阶段2：恶意软件残留检查

2a. plain-crypto-js presence

2a. 排查plain-crypto-js是否存在

2b. Platform-specific RAT artifacts

2b. 各平台专属RAT残留文件

2c. Active C2 connections

2c. 活跃C2连接

By IP

By IP

By domain (if DNS resolves)

By domain (if DNS resolves)

By port 8000 (C2 port used)

By port 8000 (C2 port used)

Phase 3: Package Manager Security Audit

阶段3：包管理器安全审计

3a. Detect installed package managers

3a. 检测已安装的包管理器

3b. npm

3b. npm

3c. pnpm

3c. pnpm

3d. bun

3d. bun

3e. Yarn (Berry)

3e. Yarn (Berry)

3f. CI/CD workflow check

3f. CI/CD 工作流检查

Phase 4: Report

阶段4：报告

Axios Supply Chain Attack — Security Report

Axios 供应链攻击 — 安全报告

Vulnerability Scan

漏洞扫描结果

Malware Artifacts

恶意软件残留结果

Package Manager Security Audit

包管理器安全审计结果

Recommendations

修复建议

Recommendation guidance (include relevant items only)

建议指南（仅包含相关项）

1a. Project files under
`~`

2a.
`plain-crypto-js`
presence

2a. 排查
`plain-crypto-js`
是否存在