threat-hunting
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ChineseThreat Hunting & Detection Engineering
Threat Hunting & Detection Engineering
ACTION REQUIRED(读完后立刻执行)
ACTION REQUIRED(Execute immediately after reading)
- : 确认蓝队/狩猎授权与数据源范围(SIEM、EDR 导出)
NOW - : 明确假说(hypothesis)再查数,避免无脑刷告警
NOW - : 工具与数据接入方式
NEXT - : 假说 → 查询 → 验证 → 规则化
ACT
- : Confirm blue team/threat hunting authorization and data source scope (SIEM, EDR exports)
NOW - : Define a hypothesis before querying data to avoid mindless alert browsing
NOW - : Tool and data access methods
NEXT - : Hypothesis → Query → Validation → Rule formalization
ACT
适用场景
Application Scenarios
- 威胁狩猎(hypothesis-driven)
- Sigma / YARA 检测工程
- 告警调优、误报分析
- 与 :样本侧 IOC → 本 skill 落地检测
malware-analysis/ - 与 :案件伪影 → 横向狩猎
digital-forensics/
- Hypothesis-driven threat hunting
- Sigma/YARA detection engineering
- Alert tuning, false positive analysis
- With : Sample-side IOC → Implementation of detection with this skill
malware-analysis/ - With : Case artifacts → Lateral threat hunting
digital-forensics/
工作流
Workflow
1. 建假说
1. Develop a Hypothesis
text
例:攻击者用 living-off-the-land 做横向
→ 数据源:Sysmon 1/3/10、Windows Security 4624/4648
→ 成功标准:发现异常父进程或罕见账户日志源text
Example: Adversaries use living-off-the-land techniques for lateral movement
→ Data sources: Sysmon 1/3/10, Windows Security 4624/4648
→ Success criteria: Detect abnormal parent processes or rare account log sources2. 查询与堆叠
2. Query and Stacking
text
□ 基线:正常管理员行为时段与主机
□ 异常:新服务、编码 PowerShell、异常出站
□ 关联:同账号多主机短时登录text
□ Baseline: Normal administrator behavior time periods and hosts
□ Anomalies: New services, encoded PowerShell, abnormal outbound traffic
□ Correlation: Short-time logins of the same account across multiple hosts3. 规则化
3. Rule Formalization
yaml
undefinedyaml
undefinedSigma 骨架见 malware-analysis;本 skill 强调:
See malware-analysis for Sigma skeleton; this skill emphasizes:
- 误报面
- False positive scope
- 数据源字段映射
- Data source field mapping
- 响应 playbook 链接
- Response playbook links
undefinedundefined4. 验证
4. Validation
text
□ 原子测试(Atomic Red Team)仅在授权实验室
□ 回放历史日志验证召回text
□ Atomic Red Team tests are only allowed in authorized laboratories
□ Replay historical logs to verify recall rate工具链
Toolchain
| 工具 | 用途 |
|---|---|
| Sigma CLI / sigmac | 规则转换 |
| YARA | 文件/内存 |
| SIEM(ELK/Splunk 等) | 查询 |
| osquery | 端点狩猎 |
| Atomic Red Team | 检测验证(实验室) |
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Sigma CLI / sigmac | Rule conversion |
| YARA | File/memory scanning |
| SIEM (ELK/Splunk, etc.) | Querying |
| osquery | Endpoint threat hunting |
| Atomic Red Team | Detection validation (laboratory) |
参考
References
references/hunting-loop.md../malware-analysis/references/yara-sigma-rules.md../digital-forensics/
references/hunting-loop.md../malware-analysis/references/yara-sigma-rules.md../digital-forensics/
路由上下文
Routing Context
上游: MASTER R27
下游: 确认入侵 → forensics;恶意样本 → malware-analysis
MUST NOT: 在无授权生产环境跑攻击模拟
下游: 确认入侵 → forensics;恶意样本 → malware-analysis
MUST NOT: 在无授权生产环境跑攻击模拟
Upstream: MASTER R27
Downstream: Confirm intrusion → forensics; Malicious samples → malware-analysis
MUST NOT: Run attack simulations in unauthorized production environments
Downstream: Confirm intrusion → forensics; Malicious samples → malware-analysis
MUST NOT: Run attack simulations in unauthorized production environments
任务完成自检
Task Completion Self-Check
- 是否有明确假说与结论?
- 规则是否注明误报与数据源?
- Checklist?
- Is there a clear hypothesis and conclusion?
- Does the rule note false positives and data sources?
- Completed checklist?