google-like-a-spy

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Search operators

搜索运算符

Operators turn a search box into a filter over a crawled index. The cost is that you are querying somebody's index, not the web — coverage, freshness and operator fidelity vary enormously between engines. The mistake beginners make is assuming their query ran as typed. Google routinely drops, stems, and synonym-expands your terms, so a zero-result dork and a silently-rewritten dork look nothing alike but are equally useless.
运算符把搜索框变成对已抓取索引的筛选器。代价在于,你查询的是某家搜索引擎的索引,而不是整个 Web——不同引擎之间的覆盖范围、时效性和运算符执行准确度差异极大。初学者常犯的错误是假设查询会按输入原样执行。Google 经常删除词项、执行词干还原和同义词扩展,因此,零结果的 dork 与被静默重写的 dork 表面上完全不同,却同样无用。

Which engine for which job

各种任务应选择哪个引擎

You wantGo toWhy
Broad coverage of mainstream webGoogleLargest index, worst operator fidelity
Reliable
site:
enumeration, IP/host pivots
BingHonours operators more literally; has
ip:
and
contains:
Non-Latin script, Russian/CIS/Turkish content, image-adjacent workYandexDifferent crawl priorities; strongest image matching
Anonymous querying, quick engine-hoppingDuckDuckGo, StartpageProxies other indexes; bangs jump between engines
Independent crawl (things the big three never indexed)Mojeek, Marginalia, BraveOwn crawlers, small but genuinely different
Code, buckets, hosts, archivesSpecialised indexesThe general web index never crawled most of it
Never run a dork on one engine only. Different crawlers found different pages, and an engine that never crawled a URL cannot be operator-coaxed into it. Which operator survives where, and where the same operator means something different, is in reference/engine-operators.md.
目标推荐引擎原因
广泛覆盖主流 WebGoogle索引最大,但运算符执行准确度最差
可靠地枚举
site:
、围绕 IP/主机进行 pivot
Bing更严格地按字面支持运算符;提供
ip:
和
contains:
非拉丁文字、俄语/俄语国家及土耳其语内容,以及与图片相关的工作Yandex抓取优先级不同;图片匹配能力最强
匿名查询、快速切换搜索引擎DuckDuckGo、Startpage代理其他搜索引擎的索引;bangs 可在引擎之间跳转
独立抓取(大型三巨头从未索引的内容)Mojeek、Marginalia、Brave拥有自己的爬虫,规模较小,但内容确实不同
代码、存储桶、主机和归档专业索引常规 Web 索引从未抓取过其中大多数内容
不要只在单一引擎上运行 dork。不同爬虫发现的是不同页面,而某个引擎从未抓取过的 URL,不可能通过运算符迫使它进行抓取。哪些运算符在哪些引擎上仍然有效,以及同一运算符在不同引擎中是否存在含义差异,请参阅 reference/engine-operators.md。

Operators that still behave

仍然有效的运算符

  • "exact phrase"
    — the single most useful operator. Still subject to rewriting (see below), but the strongest signal you can give.
  • site:
    — accepts a full host, a registrable domain (matches subdomains), or a TLD (
    site:gov.uk
    ). Also usable as
    -site:
    to exclude.
  • filetype:
    — Google's documented form. Bing accepts both
    filetype:
    and
    ext:
    ;
    ext:
    matches the URL extension rather than the sniffed content type, which is what you usually want for
    .env
    ,
    .bak
    ,
    .sql
    .
  • intitle:
    /
    allintitle:
    ,
    inurl:
    /
    allinurl:
    ,
    intext:
    /
    allintext:
    . The
    all*
    forms apply to every following term but do not mix well with other operators — use them alone.
  • before:
    /
    after:
    with
    YYYY-MM-DD
    — filters on Google's estimated document date, which is inferred and often wrong. A coarse sieve, not evidence.
  • -term
    to exclude,
    OR
    (capitalised) or
    |
    for alternation, parentheses to group,
    *
    as a single-token wildcard inside a phrase.
  • "exact phrase"
    ——最有用的单个运算符。它仍可能受到重写影响(见下文),但也是能够提供的最强信号。
  • site:
    ——接受完整主机名、可注册域名(会匹配其子域名)或 TLD(
    site:gov.uk
    )。也可使用
    -site:
    排除结果。
  • filetype:
    ——Google 有文档说明的形式。Bing 同时接受
    filetype:
    和
    ext:
    ;
    ext:
    匹配 URL 扩展名,而不是通过内容嗅探识别的类型,对于查找
    .env
    、
    .bak
    、
    .sql
    通常正是所需行为。
  • intitle:
    /
    allintitle:
    、
    inurl:
    /
    allinurl:
    、
    intext:
    /
    allintext:
    。
    all*
    形式适用于后续每个词项,但与其他运算符混用效果不佳——应单独使用。
  • before:
    /
    after:
    配合
    YYYY-MM-DD
    ——按 Google 估算的文档日期过滤。该日期是推断得出的,而且经常错误。它只是粗筛工具,不能作为证据。
  • 使用
    -term
    排除词项,使用大写的
    OR
    或
    |
    表示择一,使用括号分组,使用
    *
    作为短语内部的单词项通配符。

Operators people still cite that no longer earn their place

仍被引用、但已不再有价值的运算符

cache:
and
info:
were retired,
link:
was withdrawn long ago and any residual behaviour is noise, and
related:
is inconsistent.
inanchor:
and
AROUND(n)
were never documented and behave unpredictably.
+
for forced inclusion and
~
for synonym expansion were removed outright, quotes replacing the former, and
daterange:
was superseded by
before:
/
after:
. A dork library using these returns general results, not an error.
cache:
和
info:
已被移除,
link:
很早就已撤回,任何残余行为都只是噪声;
related:
的表现也不一致。
inanchor:
和
AROUND(n)
从未有官方文档,行为不可预测。用于强制包含的
+
和用于同义词扩展的
~
已被彻底移除,前者现在应改用引号;
daterange:
也已被
before:
/
after:
取代。仍使用这些运算符的 dork 库只会返回普通结果,而不会报错。

Forcing literal matching

强制进行字面匹配

Google's retrieval layer is a semantic matcher with a keyword filter bolted on. It will drop a term it judges unproductive, substitute a synonym, or correct what it thinks is a typo — which is exactly what you do not want when hunting a username or an error string.
  1. Read the result header. Google prints "Missing:
    <term>
    " with a "Must include:" link when it dropped something. That link re-runs with the term forced. If you see this, your dork did not run.
  2. Quote every non-obvious token individually, not just the phrase.
  3. Switch to Verbatim mode (Tools, then the "All results" dropdown), which disables stemming, synonyms, spell correction and personalisation. Dorking without it is guesswork.
  4. Expand the duplicate filter. Google collapses "very similar" results and offers a link at the end of the last page to repeat the search including them. On a
    site:
    enumeration this commonly doubles the visible set.
  5. If the corrected spelling still wins, the query was read as navigational intent. Add a second rare token to break that.
Google 的检索层本质上是一个语义匹配器,外加了一层关键词过滤。它会删除自己判断为无产出的词项、替换同义词,或纠正它认为是拼写错误的内容——而搜索用户名或错误字符串时,恰恰不能出现这些情况。
  1. 查看结果标题。当 Google 删除某个词项时,会显示“Missing:
    <term>
    ”,并提供一个“Must include:”链接。该链接会重新运行搜索,并强制包含该词项。如果看到此提示,说明你的 dork 并未按输入执行。
  2. 对每个不明显的词项分别加引号,而不只是给整个短语加引号。
  3. 切换到 Verbatim 模式(依次进入“工具”和“所有结果”下拉菜单)。该模式会禁用词干还原、同义词、拼写纠正和个性化。不启用它进行 dork 无异于瞎猜。
  4. 展开重复项过滤结果。Google 会折叠“非常相似”的结果,并在最后一页末尾提供一个链接,用于在包含这些结果的情况下重复搜索。在枚举
    site:
    时,这通常会使可见结果数量翻倍。
  5. 如果纠正后的拼写仍然占据优势,说明查询被理解为导航意图。添加第二个罕见词项来打破这种判定。

Finding a target's material outside its own site

在目标站点之外寻找相关材料

Most of what an organisation leaks is hosted by someone else, so sweep the hosts rather than hoping a dork on the target domain catches it: paste and dead-drop hosts, code sandboxes, published-to-web office documents, full-text document repositories, cloud object storage on provider-owned hostnames such as
s3.amazonaws.com
or
blob.core.windows.net
, and third-party SaaS with public sharing defaults — kanban boards, wikis, form backends, status pages.
site:
the provider, not the customer.
组织泄露的大多数材料都托管在第三方站点,因此应广泛排查相关主机,而不是指望对目标域名执行 dork 就能找到:paste 与 dead-drop 主机、代码沙箱、发布到 Web 的办公文档、全文文档存储库、使用服务商自有主机名的云对象存储(如
s3.amazonaws.com
或
blob.core.windows.net
),以及默认公开共享的第三方 SaaS——看板、wiki、表单后端和状态页。应对服务商使用
site:
,而不是客户域名。

Discovery dorking, defensively framed

以防御性视角开展发现型 dork

Run these against domains you are authorised to assess, or your own estate. Reading a search result is passive — the engine already crawled the page. Fetching the file, downloading the backup, or logging into the panel you found is not, and that is where the legal line sits.
The high-yield shapes, in rough order of hit rate: directory listings left on after a migration (
intitle:"index of"
), config and environment files by extension, database dumps and backup artefacts, credential-shaped strings in indexed text, object storage on provider hostnames, and admin or monitoring interfaces exposed by hostname. The full set, with the person- and document-hunting queries, is in reference/dork-cookbook.md.
Engines only index what something linked to, so unlinked panels and bucket listings are badly under-represented — for live services scan with
find-exposed-servers
. A hit that now 404s is still evidence: take the URL to
read-deleted-pages
.
仅对你获授权评估的域名或自有资产运行这些查询。阅读搜索结果属于被动行为——搜索引擎已经抓取过该页面;获取文件、下载备份或登录所发现的管理面板则不属于,而法律界限正位于此处。
按大致命中率排序,高收益的查询形态包括:迁移后遗留的目录列表(
intitle:"index of"
)、按扩展名查找的配置和环境文件、数据库导出及备份残留、已索引文本中的凭据形态字符串、服务商主机名下的对象存储,以及通过主机名暴露的管理或监控界面。完整集合以及针对人员和文档的搜索查询见 reference/dork-cookbook.md。
搜索引擎只会索引被某些内容链接到的页面,因此,无链接的面板和存储桶列表很少被收录。对于在线服务,请使用
find-exposed-servers
进行扫描。即使某个命中现在返回 404,仍然可以作为证据:将该 URL 交给
read-deleted-pages
。

Rate limits, CAPTCHAs, and why automation breaks

速率限制、CAPTCHA,以及自动化为何会失效

Detection is not primarily about request rate. Engines fingerprint the client: TLS handshake characteristics, header ordering, whether JavaScript executed, timing behaviour, and the reputation of the source IP. A datacentre IP that has never rendered JavaScript trips the check on its first request, while a residential IP driving a real browser at human pace can dork all day. That is why slowing your loop down often fails when hand-typing the same query works.
The nastiest failure is not the CAPTCHA but a degraded result set that looks normal: operators silently ignored, results truncated, no indication. Never assume a scripted query returned what the browser would.
Sanctioned routes, in preference order. Official search APIs where an engine sells one: within terms, but expect quotas and no parity with the consumer UI, because the API's index and ranking are frequently a different product. Commercial SERP providers, which run the proxy infrastructure and return structured results — paid, and still scraping under someone's terms. Your own SearXNG instance, which normalises results across engines; never a public one, where you inherit strangers' rate-limit reputation and hand your selectors to its operator. And by hand in a browser, which for the twenty to fifty queries a real investigation needs beats building the automation.
Rotating IPs to evade detection is circumvention of a technical access control — a materially different legal posture from scraping, and out of bounds here. The query itself is also logged and attributable, so route sensitive selectors through a non-logging engine or an isolated environment, per
investigate-without-getting-made
.
风控检测的主要依据并不是请求频率。搜索引擎会识别客户端指纹:TLS 握手特征、标头顺序、是否执行了 JavaScript、时间行为,以及源 IP 的信誉。一个从未渲染过 JavaScript 的数据中心 IP 会在第一次请求时就触发检查;而使用住宅 IP、通过真实浏览器以人类速度操作,则可能一整天都能进行 dork。这正是为什么放慢脚本循环经常失败,而手动输入相同查询却能正常工作。
最麻烦的故障并不是 CAPTCHA,而是结果集已经降级,却看起来一切正常:运算符被静默忽略、结果被截断,而且没有任何提示。绝不要假设脚本查询返回的结果与浏览器执行时相同。
合规路径按优先顺序如下。首先是官方搜索 API——前提是引擎提供该服务:这种方式在条款范围内,但需要预期配额限制,而且通常无法与消费者界面保持一致,因为 API 的索引和排序经常属于另一种产品。其次是商业 SERP 提供商,它们运行代理基础设施并返回结构化结果;这类服务需要付费,而且仍在依据他人的条款进行抓取。再次是自建的 SearXNG 实例,它可以统一不同引擎的结果;绝不要使用公共实例,否则你会继承其他用户的限流信誉,并把检索标识符交给实例运营者。最后是在浏览器中手动查询;对于一次真实调查所需的二十到五十次查询,这通常比构建自动化更有效。
轮换 IP 以规避检测属于规避技术访问控制,与普通抓取相比,在法律性质上存在实质性差异,不在允许范围内。查询本身也会被记录并可归因,因此,应按照
investigate-without-getting-made
的建议,通过不留日志的搜索引擎或隔离环境处理敏感检索标识符。

Specialised indexes

专业索引

Each of these ingests a different corpus and answers a question Google cannot.
  • Code search. GitHub code search covers public repos; grep.app and searchcode index across hosts. Search internal hostnames, key prefixes and the target's email domain, not its name. See
    secrets-in-git-history
    .
  • Cloud storage indexes. Bucket indexes such as Grayhat Warfare enumerate far more open object storage than engines reach, because listing pages are rarely linked from anywhere crawlable.
  • Document repositories. Scribd, Issuu, SlideShare, DocumentCloud and the academic aggregators full-text index uploads, surfacing a company name buried in a PDF that appears nowhere on its own domain.
  • Raw-HTML indexes. Publicwww and similar search page source, letting you pivot on analytics IDs and tag-manager containers. A shared tracker ID beats a shared IP as co-ownership evidence: one account configured both.
  • Archive indexes. The Wayback CDX API and Common Crawl index are queryable URL corpora rather than ranked search, enumerating paths a crawler observed including long-removed ones (
    read-deleted-pages
    ). Scanners index hosts, not pages (
    find-exposed-servers
    ); leak corpora,
    find-leaks-in-the-wild
    .
以下每种索引都摄取不同的语料库,能够回答 Google 无法回答的问题。
  • 代码搜索。 GitHub 代码搜索覆盖公开仓库;grep.app 和 searchcode 则跨多个主机建立索引。应搜索内部主机名、密钥前缀和目标组织的邮箱域名,而不是目标名称。参见
    secrets-in-git-history
    。
  • 云存储索引。 Grayhat Warfare 等存储桶索引枚举出的开放对象存储远多于常规搜索引擎能够发现的数量,因为存储桶列表页面很少被可抓取内容链接。
  • 文档存储库。 Scribd、Issuu、SlideShare、DocumentCloud 和学术聚合平台会为上传内容建立全文索引,从而找出嵌在 PDF 中、却未出现在目标自身域名上的公司名称。
  • 原始 HTML 索引。 Publicwww 等服务会搜索页面源代码,使你能够围绕 analytics ID 和 tag manager 容器代码进行 pivot。共享 tracker ID 比共享 IP 更能作为共同所有权的证据:同一个账户同时配置了二者。
  • 归档索引。 Wayback CDX API 和 Common Crawl 索引是可供查询的 URL 语料库,而非排序式搜索,可枚举爬虫观察到的路径,包括早已删除的路径(
    read-deleted-pages
    )。扫描器索引的是主机而非页面(
    find-exposed-servers
    );泄露语料则使用
    find-leaks-in-the-wild
    。

Where this goes wrong

容易出错之处

  • The query you typed is not the query that ran. Stemming, synonyms, spell correction and term dropping are the default; without Verbatim a null result is meaningless.
  • Zero results means one index said no — a statement about that engine's crawl and operator support, not about the web. Absence needs three engines and an archive before you write it down.
  • site:
    never enumerates completely.
    Google truncates and deduplicates hard, Bing goes deeper, neither is exhaustive. Result counts are estimates you may never quote — page to the end if you need a real one.
  • The index is a stale mirror. A hit describes the page at crawl time; the live page may differ or be gone, and the snippet may be the only surviving copy. Verify against the live URL and archive it immediately.
  • before:
    /
    after:
    filters an inferred date.
    CMS-driven sites restamp pages on render. Never use it to establish when something was published.
  • Personalisation and geography change results. Two investigators running an identical dork get different pages, so record engine, query and date.
  • Copied dork libraries rot silently. A retired operator becomes a search term rather than an error, so the query returns plausible general results and you never notice the filter stopped applying.
  • Cloaking and index poisoning. Crawlers can be served different content than users, and SEO spam seeds a target's name into unrelated pages. A mention is not a relationship.
  • 你输入的查询并不是实际执行的查询。 词干还原、同义词、拼写纠正和词项删除都是默认行为;不启用 Verbatim 时,零结果毫无意义。
  • 零结果只意味着某一个索引表示没有。 这是对该引擎抓取范围和运算符支持情况的陈述,而不是对整个 Web 的陈述。在记录某项内容不存在之前,至少应查询三个引擎并检查归档。
  • site:
    无法完整枚举。
    Google 会大幅截断和去重,Bing 覆盖得更深,但两者都不完整。结果数量只是估算值,不应直接引用;如果需要真实数量,必须翻到最后一页。
  • 索引是陈旧的镜像。 命中结果描述的是抓取时的页面;实时页面可能已经变化或消失,而摘要可能是仅存的副本。应对实时 URL 进行验证,并立即归档。
  • before:
    /
    after:
    过滤的是推断日期。
    由 CMS 驱动的站点会在页面渲染时重新标记日期。绝不能用它确定内容最初发布时间。
  • 个性化和地理位置会改变结果。 两名调查人员运行完全相同的 dork,也可能得到不同页面,因此应记录引擎、查询和日期。
  • 复制的 dork 库会悄然过时。 已移除的运算符会变成普通搜索词,而不是错误,因此查询会返回看似合理的一般结果,你也不会察觉过滤条件已经失效。
  • Cloaking 和索引投毒。 爬虫可能获得与用户不同的内容,SEO 垃圾信息也会将目标名称植入无关页面。提及并不意味着存在关系。

Confidence grading

置信度分级

  • Confirmed — you retrieved the live document or its archived capture, read it, and its content states the fact directly, with its metadata or host corroborating origin.
  • Probable — a distinctive exact-match string on an authoritative host, or the same fact from two independent crawls. A snippet you could not open is at best probable.
  • Unconfirmed — a snippet only; a hit on a site that republishes others' content; a common-word match; anything from a query not run in Verbatim.
  • Rejected — a match that survives only without Verbatim, or a mention on a page whose content is machine-generated name-scraping.
Cite URL, engine, query string and retrieval date. A result nobody can re-run is not evidence.
  • 已确认——你已获取实时文档或其归档快照并阅读内容,文档直接陈述了该事实,且其元数据或托管主机能够佐证来源。
  • 较可信——权威主机上存在具有辨识度的精确匹配字符串,或两次独立抓取都给出了同一事实。无法打开的摘要最多只能达到这一等级。
  • 未确认——只有摘要;命中的是转载其他内容的网站;仅匹配常见词;或查询未在 Verbatim 模式下运行。
  • 已排除——只有在未启用 Verbatim 时才能匹配的结果,或出现在用于机器生成、批量抓取姓名页面的内容中的提及。
引用时应记录 URL、引擎、查询字符串和获取日期。任何人都无法重新运行的搜索结果不能作为证据。

Worked example

实例

Objective: identify who handles procurement at Example Corp, for a supplier due-diligence file. The website lists no names below board level.
site:example.com filetype:pdf procurement
in Verbatim returns four documents. One is a supplier onboarding pack whose PDF properties carry an author string,
m.okafor
, and a template path under a departmental network share — two new selectors out of a document that names nobody in its body.
The dead end:
"m.okafor" site:linkedin.com/in
returns nothing, and neither does the bare handle. No profile, or not in the index.
Rewriting to the email shape works.
"m.okafor@example.com"
hits a public mailing-list archive on an unrelated domain, where the same person signed a technical question with a full name and job title. A Bing
ext:xlsx
sweep of the target host then surfaces a supplier register corroborating the role.
Grade: role confirmed, on two documents both retrieved and read. Identity probable — the handle-to-name mapping rests on one self-signed post.
目标:识别 Example Corp 中负责采购的人员,以充实供应商尽职调查档案。该网站未列出董事会以下层级的任何姓名。
在 Verbatim 模式下运行
site:example.com filetype:pdf procurement
会返回四份文档。其中一份是供应商入驻资料包,其 PDF 属性中包含作者字符串
m.okafor
,还包含部门网络共享下的模板路径——这份正文未列出任何人姓名的文档提供了两个新的检索标识符。
此路不通:
"m.okafor" site:linkedin.com/in
没有任何结果,仅使用该账号名也一样。没有个人资料页,或者该页面未被索引。
改用邮箱形式后便可奏效。
"m.okafor@example.com"
命中了一个无关域名上的公开邮件列表归档,同一个人曾在一个技术问题帖中以全名和职位署名。随后使用 Bing
ext:xlsx
扫描目标主机,又发现了一份供应商名册,进一步佐证其职责。
评级:职责已确认,依据是两份均已获取并阅读的文档。身份较可信,因为账号名到姓名的映射仅依据本人署名的一篇帖子。

Pivots

Pivot

New selectorGoes to
Document files found by
filetype:
secrets-in-file-metadata
Hostnames and subdomains in indexed URLs
find-hidden-subdomains
,
who-owns-this-domain
Live services and buckets behind a hit
find-exposed-servers
Repositories, gists, key prefixes
secrets-in-git-history
Handles and usernames in indexed text
hunt-a-handle
Email addresses harvested from documents
what-an-email-reveals
Names and roles from staff pages
find-anyone
,
x-ray-a-company
Paste-host hits and leaked selectors
find-leaks-in-the-wild
Any result that now 404s
read-deleted-pages
The resulting cluster of hosts and identities
graph-the-network
新检索标识符下一步
通过
filetype:
找到的文档文件
secrets-in-file-metadata
已索引 URL 中的主机名和子域名
find-hidden-subdomains
、
who-owns-this-domain
命中结果背后的在线服务和存储桶
find-exposed-servers
仓库、gists 和密钥前缀
secrets-in-git-history
已索引文本中的账号名和用户名
hunt-a-handle
从文档中收集的邮箱地址
what-an-email-reveals
员工页面中的姓名和职责
find-anyone
、
x-ray-a-company
Paste 主机命中结果和泄露的检索标识符
find-leaks-in-the-wild
现在返回 404 的任何结果
read-deleted-pages
最终形成的主机与身份关系簇
graph-the-network

Legal and ToS notes

法律与 ToS 说明

Automated querying breaches the terms of every major engine. That is a contract matter and the usual consequence is a block — but defeating those blocks by rotating IPs or solving CAPTCHAs programmatically is circumvention of a technical access control, a more serious question in several jurisdictions.
Finding an exposed file confers no authorization to retrieve it. The result is public; the file behind it may still be a protected computer under computer-misuse law, and "it was in Google" has failed as a defence. Inside an authorized assessment, document it, do not exfiltrate it, report through the agreed channel. Outside one, notify the operator or a national CERT and stop.
Indexed personal data is still personal data — search does not launder it. De-indexing requests also make material deliberately absent from European result sets while present elsewhere, so compare regions before concluding anything is gone. Minimise per ../../ETHICS.md.
自动查询会违反所有主流搜索引擎的服务条款。这属于合同层面的问题,通常后果是遭到封禁;但通过轮换 IP 或以程序自动解决 CAPTCHA 来绕过这些封禁,属于规避技术访问控制,在多个司法管辖区是更严重的问题。
发现暴露文件并不等于获得取回该文件的授权。搜索结果可能是公开的,但其背后的文件仍可能属于计算机滥用法律保护范围内的受保护计算机,“它出现在 Google 搜索结果中”不能作为有效抗辩。在授权评估中,应记录发现,但不要将文件带出目标环境,并按约定渠道报告。在授权范围之外,则应通知运营方或国家 CERT,并停止操作。
已索引的个人数据仍然是个人数据——搜索不会改变其法律性质。要求取消索引还会使相关材料不出现在欧洲部分结果集中,却可能继续存在于其他地区,因此,在断定某项内容已经消失之前,应比较不同地区的结果。同时,应按照 ../../ETHICS.md 尽量减少数据处理范围。