UiPath Admin

Administrative operations on UiPath via

uip admin

— Identity Server, Authorization, OMS, IP Restriction, Audit. Per-area workflows, command references, and procedures are in the linked files below — this file is the entry contract.

When to Use This Skill

Identity

Manage identity users — list, create, invite, update, delete
Manage groups — CRUD + add/remove members
Manage robot accounts — create, update, delete unattended robot identities
Manage external apps — OAuth2 clients, secrets, federated credentials
Manage personal access tokens (PATs) — create, list, revoke, regenerate
Configure SMTP — get, update, test, delete email settings
Browse OAuth2 scopes — list available scopes for external apps and PATs
Onboard human user — invite, assign to groups
Onboard robot account — create account, assign to groups

Authz

Manage custom roles — CRUD on Authorization service role definitions (scope shapes:
```
Organization
```
,
```
TenantGlobal
```
,
```
Tenant
```
,
```
Project
```
)
Manage role assignments — assign roles to users/groups/robot accounts at
```
Organization
```
,
```
Tenant
```
,
```
TenantGlobal
```
,
```
Project
```
,
```
Folder
```
, or
```
App
```
scope
List permission definitions — read-only catalog of permissions across services
Check effective access — compute what a principal can actually do at a given scope (Policy Decision Point)
Grant permission(s) to a principal — ad-hoc "grant me X" / "give <user> Y, Z" requests resolved via the scope/service intersection flow

OMS

Inspect / update the current organization —
```
uip admin organizations
```
(read + update only; no CLI create/delete)
Manage tenant lifecycle — create, enable, disable, delete tenants in the caller's org
Provision org-level or tenant-level services —
```
services list
```
,
```
list-available
```
,
```
add
```
,
```
enable
```
,
```
disable
```
,
```
remove
```
Poll async OMS operations —
```
tenants
```
mutations return
```
operationId
```
; poll via
```
organizations operation get <id>
```
(the canonical poll endpoint)
List available regions — discover provisioning regions before
```
tenants create
```

IP Restriction

Manage IP allowlisting — add / update / delete CIDR entries that gate inbound access
Toggle IP-restriction enforcement — turn the org-wide allowlist switch on or off (with lockout safety)
Manage bypass rules — URL-pattern exceptions to IP allowlisting
Look up the caller's public IP — answer "what's my IP?" / "what public IP does the platform see for me?" directly with
```
ip-restriction my-ip
```
; also the safety pre-flight before enabling enforcement

Audit

Activate on both explicit audit requests and natural-language investigation intent — users rarely say "audit events" by name.

Surface boundary — this is
uip admin audit
, not
uip or audit-logs
. Every org/tenant audit ask below — including bare "audit logs", "audit history", "export the audit trail", "login history", "who did what" — is served by
uip admin audit <scope>
. Do not fall back to
uip or audit-logs
(Orchestrator-operational audit, a different schema; that's the
uipath-platform
skill), even when the user's wording is generic. When the user asks what audit events / sources are available or visible, answer by running
uip admin audit <scope> sources
— discover live, never describe from memory or the docs.

Explicit —
```
uip admin audit
```
commands; list sources / targets / types; query, filter, paginate, or export events; CSV or per-day-JSON dump of audit history for a window.
Query audit events — list event sources, filter events by source / target / type / user / status / time window at org or tenant scope
Export audit events — chunked download from the long-term store (one call per UTC day, atomic abort on any chunk failure) as a folder of day-wise JSON files (default) or a single merged CSV via
```
--file-format csv
```
Membership / license phrasings — "who joined / left the organization", "who was made an admin", "license changes", "cross-tenant audit"
Sign-in / authentication phrasings — "failed/successful logins", "login history for user X", "who's been signing in"
Tenant-activity phrasings — "what happened on tenant X", "asset/queue/folder edits", "queue items processed", "job failures", "Action Center task changes", "Apps / AgentHub / Document Understanding / Integration Service / Test Manager activity"
Cross-scope phrasings — "everything everywhere" (run the flow once per scope and present combined)
Investigation intent (full-sentence form) — "Who deleted the X folder last Tuesday?", "Show me failed logins for user Y this month.", "What changed on tenant Z between Jan 1 and Feb 1?", "Give me the audit log for the last 30 days.", "Was the API key rotated by someone in our org?", "Export everything for compliance for Q4."

Scope routing (which phrasing →
org
vs
tenant
, and why) lives in audit-workflow-guide.md → Audit scope disambiguation. Critical Rule 23 governs the stop-and-ask requirement when scope is ambiguous.

Troubleshoot

Activate on access/auth/identity troubleshooting — users report symptoms, not audit verbs.

Diagnose access denied — "user can't access X", "403 on API", "new hire has no permissions" → resolve principal, check-access, inspect role assignments. Playbook: identity-troubleshoot-guide.md → Playbook 1
Investigate login failures — "failed login attempts", "account compromised?", "suspicious sign-ins" → org-scoped audit login-history investigation. Playbook: identity-troubleshoot-guide.md → Playbook 2
Diagnose role misconfiguration — "custom role doesn't work", "user has role but can't do X" → inspect role actions, verify scope alignment. Playbook: identity-troubleshoot-guide.md → Playbook 3
Diagnose IP restriction lockout — "can't access platform from new office", "all users blocked" → my-ip + ip-ranges list + enforcement get. Playbook: identity-troubleshoot-guide.md → Playbook 4
Diagnose PAT / external app failures — "API returns 401", "PAT stopped working", "external app can't authenticate" → check expiry, scopes, audit for revocation. Playbook: identity-troubleshoot-guide.md → Playbook 5
Diagnose SMTP email delivery failures — "invitations not sending", "SMTP broken" → smtp get + smtp test
Investigate stuck tenant operations — "tenant create not completing", "operation stuck" → poll operation status
Identify service provisioning no-ops — "service still enabled after remove" → platform-pinned services
Triage robot account authentication issues — "robot not authenticating" → identity vs credential model confusion

Structured diagnose capability index with failure-mode lookup and diagnostic priority ladder: diagnose/CAPABILITY.md. Quick investigation playbooks: identity-troubleshoot-guide.md.

Critical Rules

Each rule is the agent contract. Per-area detail is in the linked reference files.

Universal

Route Orchestrator-specific role/permission requests to
uip or roles
(
```
uipath-platform
```
skill).
```
uip admin authorization
```
does NOT own Orchestrator's role catalog. Conversely, all organization/tenant audit is owned HERE and served by
uip admin audit <scope>
(
sources
/
events
/
export
) — NEVER use
uip or audit-logs
for audit events, audit history, audit export, login history, compliance dumps, or "who did what/where" requests.
```
uip or audit-logs
```
is a different surface (Orchestrator-operational audit —
```
Component,User,Action,Operation,Time
```
columns,
```
--export
```
returns a CSV; the
```
uipath-platform
```
skill). If you reach for
```
uip or audit-logs
```
on any org/tenant audit ask, stop and switch to
```
uip admin audit
```
.
Verify login first.
```
uip login status --output json
```
. If not logged in, stop and ask the user to run
```
uip login
```
— it opens an interactive browser flow, so never launch it yourself in an automated or non-interactive session (sessions authenticated via env vars are already logged in). Org id is resolved from the active session.
Use
--output json
on every command. Parse programmatically; present conversationally.
Stop on error. Show the error verbatim. Never retry auth failures — ask the user to
```
uip login
```
.
Resolve every named principal before high-risk ops. Any command that touches a named user / group / robot account / external app —
```
roles assignments create/delete
```
,
```
users delete
```
,
```
groups delete
```
,
```
groups members add/revoke
```
,
```
robot-accounts delete
```
,
```
external-apps delete
```
,
```
external-apps generate-secret
```
— MUST first search the directory and echo
```
Principal: <displayName> (<userName>) — <id>
```
back before the mutation runs. Zero matches → stop and ask; never fall back to the current login user. Multiple matches → numbered list, wait for a digit. Procedure: role-assignment-management.md → Resolving Principal IDs.

Identity

Discover before creating.
```
list
```
before
```
create
```
to avoid duplicates (robot accounts, groups, external apps —
```
users invite
```
excepted).
Secrets shown only once on external-app create and
```
generate-secret
```
— warn the user to save immediately.
External apps require scopes at creation —
```
--app-scope
```
or
```
--user-scope
```
is required (e.g.,
```
--app-scope "OR.Folders"
```
).
Group membership uses user IDs. Resolve via
```
users list
```
per Rule 5, then
```
groups members add/revoke
```
.
Confirm before delete on users / groups / robot accounts / external apps — after resolving the named target per Rule 5.

Authz

Built-in roles are read-only. Only
```
Custom
```
roles can be created / updated / deleted. CLI also rejects authoring against service-managed and platform-level services. Service lists: role-management.md → Services That Manage Their Own Roles.
roles create
/
roles update
are PUT-style upserts. Body is assembled from inline flags +
```
--file ./actions.json
```
. Always
```
roles get
```
first before updating — omitted flags overwrite that field.
--service
infers scope (e.g.,
```
--service studio
```
→
```
Tenant
```
;
```
--service apps
```
→
```
Organization
```
). Combine with
```
--scope
```
only to override. Never guess a
serviceName
— the valid values and the command that re-derives them:
permission-catalog.md →
```
--service
```
serviceNames
.
Listing works for every service; authoring is what's blocked.
```
roles list --service <svc>
```
and
```
roles assignments list --service <svc>
```
accept every service. For effective access on a principal use
```
check-access
```
(PDP).

Scope vocab differs across verbs.

roles create --scope

Organization|TenantGlobal|Tenant|Project

roles assignments create --scope

: those +

Folder|App

roles assignments list --scope

: excludes

TenantGlobal

check-access --scope

: only

Tenant|Folder

roles assignments create/delete
MUST resolve the principal first per Rule 5 —
```
--identity-id
```
is a raw UUID the CLI does not name-check.
roles assignments create
MUST match the role's
ownerServiceName
to the scope-path service segment.
```
CentralizedAccess
```
→ no service segment (
```
/
```
or
```
/tenant/<tid>
```
); anything else → path must include
```
lowercase(ownerServiceName)
```
. Display-name mapping (e.g.,
```
Reinfer
```
→ "IXP") + full procedure: role-assignment-management.md → Validate Role's Owning Service.

OMS

Async lifecycle: auto-poll, then hand off.
```
tenants create/update/delete/enable/disable
```
return
```
operationId
```
. Auto-poll
```
organizations operation get <OP_ID>
```
3× at 5 s; on terminal status stop and report; still in-progress after 3 polls → numbered menu, never indefinite loop. organizations create
and
organizations delete
are not exposed by the CLI — Portal / support flow only. Procedure: organization-management.md → Polling procedure.
tenants delete
is soft-only. No hard-delete flag; restoration is via support.
Tenant commands default to the login tenant. Always pass an explicit
```
<TENANT_ID>
```
for destructive ops (
```
tenants delete
```
,
```
tenants disable
```
,
```
tenants services remove
```
).
Resolve region before tenant create.
```
--region
```
is required on
```
tenants create
```
— run
```
organizations regions list
```
first. Tenant service catalog is region-aware.
services disable
/
remove
may no-op despite Success on certain services. Always re-list after mutating. Gap list: tenants-commands.md → Concepts.

Audit

Disambiguate
org
vs
tenant
scope before querying. If the prompt is vague AND no prior turn fixed the scope, stop and ask once (a single clarifying question — use AskUserQuestion when available) — never silently default to
```
tenant
```
or any single scope. If you genuinely cannot get an answer (non-interactive run) and must proceed, query both scopes and combine the results rather than guessing one — silently picking a single scope is the failure mode. Scope is a positional subgroup, NOT a flag: write
```
uip admin audit org sources
```
/
```
uip admin audit tenant events
```
— there is no
```
--scope
```
option (
```
audit sources --scope organization
```
is invalid). Routing table (user-phrasing → scope + why it lives where) and investigation playbooks: audit-workflow-guide.md → Audit scope disambiguation.
audit <scope> events
returns an object, not a bare array. Shape is
```
{auditEvents, next, previous}
```
. Do not index
```
Data[0]
```
; read
```
Data.auditEvents[]
```
. Cursor semantics are chronological:
```
next
```
= newer events,
```
previous
```
= older events. The default newest-backward walk follows
```
previous
```
.
--limit
paginates internally — never loop on
--from-date
/
--to-date
to "paginate". The server clamps
```
maxCount
```
to
```
[10, 200]
```
per request; when the user wants more than 200, the CLI fetches
```
ceil(N/200)
```
pages under the hood. Pass
```
--limit 500
```
(or larger, up to the 10000 maximum) — do NOT re-implement pagination in the agent.
```
--limit
```
must be in
```
[1, 10000]
```
; a bigger value is rejected up front with
```
Result: "ValidationError"
```
, so never pass an arbitrarily huge number to mean "everything" — for that, omit
```
--limit
```
or stay within the range.
Discover via
audit <scope> sources
first — never invent source / target / type GUIDs. The catalog response gives the GUIDs you pass to
```
events --source / --target / --type
```
. This is also the answer to "what audit events / sources can I see?" — run
audit <scope> sources
and report the live catalog; do not answer conceptually from memory or the reference docs.
Bound the time window, ISO 8601 in UTC. Don't call
```
audit <scope> events
```
without
```
--from-date
```
and
```
--to-date
```
on a noisy tenant. Accepted formats: date-only (
```
2026-04-01
```
) or with time (
```
2026-04-01T14:30:00Z
```
). --to-date
is inclusive of the exact instant — to capture a full final day, pass the start of the next day or
```
T23:59:59.999Z
```
. This next-day trick is for
```
events
```
only —
```
export
```
bounds are whole days (Rule 30). Resolve relative phrases ("yesterday", "last 7 days") against the actual current UTC date (e.g.
```
date -u
```
) — never guess dates — and echo the resolved window in your reply. 27b. "No matching event" is a complete answer — never name an actor the evidence does not support. An audit trail is evidence, so attributing an action to the wrong person is worse than returning nothing. If the targeted query comes back empty, say so plainly, state what you searched (scope, source/target/type, window), and offer a next step (widen the window, try the other scope, check the resource ever existed). Never promote an actor from an adjacent event — a different resource, a different event type, or a broad
```
--search
```
hit — into the answer, and do not keep loosening filters until something returns and then present that as the culprit. Only name an actor when the cited event matches both the resource and the verb asked about, quoting
```
createdOn
```
plus the identifying
```
eventDetails
```
field so the user can verify it. Detail: audit-workflow-guide.md → Step 5.
--tenant-id
is silently ignored on
org
-scoped audit commands. If you find yourself reaching for it on
```
audit org events
```
, switch to
```
audit tenant
```
instead.
On 401 from audit, do NOT retry. The token is missing the
```
Audit.Read
```
scope; tell the user to
```
uip logout && uip login
```
. 29b. On a 5xx from audit, DO retry — the envelope tells you so.
```
ErrorCode: server_error
```
/
```
Retry: RetryLater
```
(e.g.
```
HTTP 503: no healthy upstream
```
,
```
HTTP 504
```
) is a transient, not a bad request. Re-run the same query up to two more times with a few seconds of backoff before reporting failure — changing
```
--limit
```
or the window between attempts is not a fix and only obscures the cause. Retry immediately-and-once is usually not enough; wait between attempts. Never write or present an error envelope as if it were the result — if the user asked you to save the JSON, saving
```
{"Result":"Failure",...}
```
to that file is a failed retrieval, not a result. Report the failure explicitly instead.
audit <scope> export
writes into a base directory (
--output-path
): a uniquely-named folder of day-wise JSON files (default) or a single merged CSV.
```
--from-date
```
,
```
--to-date
```
, and
```
--output-path
```
are all required. Export dates are whole UTC days, inclusive on both ends (the server truncates times to the calendar day):
```
--from-date 2026-01-01 --to-date 2026-01-31
```
exports all of January; a single day is
```
--from-date X --to-date X
```
with the same date. Do not apply the
```
events
```
next-day trick here — a next-day
```
--to-date
```
exports an extra full day.
```
--output-path
```
is a base directory (created if missing) — pass a directory only, never a filename or extension; the CLI creates a uniquely-named
```
audit_<from>_<to>_<generated-at>
```
output inside it (folder for
```
json
```
,
```
.csv
```
for
```
csv
```
), so repeated exports of the same window never collide. Do not hand-craft the per-export name. --file-format <json|csv>
selects the shape:
```
json
```
(default) = a folder of
```
<YYYY-MM-DD>.json
```
files;
```
csv
```
= one merged CSV — pick
```
csv
```
for a flat spreadsheet/Excel-friendly dump,
```
json
```
for per-day files. If the user named a destination folder, pass it verbatim as
```
--output-path
```
— no confirmation needed; confirm first only when you had to pick a default (e.g.
```
./audit-exports
```
) yourself. Then report the generated
```
Path
```
(and
```
GeneratedAt
```
) from the result.

IP Restriction

enforcement enable
is lockout-sensitive — prompt + impact statement required. Run
```
ip-restriction my-ip
```
and verify the caller's IP is covered by an entry in
```
ip-ranges list
```
. Then prompt the user with the impact before flipping: "After enabling IP restriction, any caller (Portal, CLI, robot, external app) whose source IP is not in
ip-ranges list
will be blocked from this org. Misconfiguration locks you out and requires platform-side recovery. Proceed?"
```
--confirm
```
is required;
```
ip-ranges delete
```
while enforcement is on also requires
```
--confirm
```
. Procedure: enforcement-management.md.
Recovery from IP lockout requires platform-side action. No CLI bypass — either access from an in-allowlist IP and
```
enforcement disable
```
, or use the Portal recovery flow.
"APMS" is internal — never expose to the user. "APMS" (Access Policy Management Service) is the platform's internal name for IP Restriction. Use "IP Restriction" in every user-facing surface.

What NOT to Do

Never delete built-in groups.
```
type: "BuiltIn"
```
groups cannot be deleted. Only custom groups.
Never pass IDs as flags. Resource IDs and names are positional arguments:
```
groups members add <GROUP_ID> --user-ids ...
```
, NOT
```
--group-id <GROUP_ID>
```
. Same for all
```
get
```
,
```
update
```
,
```
delete
```
,
```
create
```
subcommands.
Do NOT assume audit
events
returns a bare array. It's
```
{auditEvents, next, previous}
```
.
Do NOT loop on
--from-date
/
--to-date
to "paginate". Bump
```
--limit
```
and the CLI handles cursor pagination internally.
Do NOT silently default audit scope to
```
tenant
```
or
```
org
```
when the prompt is ambiguous. Ask once, then proceed.
Do NOT invent audit source/target/type GUIDs. Always discover via
```
sources
```
first.
Do NOT call audit
events
with no time bound on a noisy tenant — default to a bounded window.
Do NOT pass
--tenant-id
to
org
-scoped audit commands — it's silently ignored.
Do NOT retry on 401 auth errors. The token is missing the required scope (
```
Audit.Read
```
for audit). Tell the user to
```
uip logout && uip login
```
. 9a. Do NOT save or report an audit error envelope as data. A
```
{"Result":"Failure"|"ValidationError", ...}
```
payload is a failed call — retry a 5xx (Rule 29b), fix a
```
ValidationError
```
, and never leave it in a file the user asked you to fill with results. 9b. Do NOT name a culprit an audit query did not return. If the targeted search is empty, report "no matching event found" — never borrow an actor from an adjacent or broader-search event (Rule 27b).
Do NOT call
roles update
with only the flag you want to change. Re-fetch first; the upsert body overwrites omitted fields (Rule 12).
Do NOT present authz results without provenance — role name,
```
scopeType
```
,
```
ownerServiceName
```
, tenant-binding (names not UUIDs). Detail: authorization-commands.md → Provenance contract.
Do NOT conflate provisioned services with the available catalog.
```
services list
```
returns provisioned with status;
```
services list-available
```
is the catalog. Present them as separate sections.
Do NOT run an OMS mutation without naming the target. Echo org name / tenant name + UUID / service type + region before running.
Do NOT pass the next day as
--to-date
on audit
export
to "include the final day" — export bounds are already whole-day inclusive (Rule 30); the next-day trick is for
```
events
```
only and would export an extra day.

Quick Start

One row per common goal. Per-area workflows are in the reference files.

Goal	Entry command(s)
Invite a user → assign to group	user-management.md + group-management.md
Create a custom role	`uip admin authorization roles create --scope <Organization\|TenantGlobal\|Tenant\|Project> --name "<NAME>" --file ./actions.json --output json` (actions.json = `["STUDIO.X.Y", ...]` )
Grant permission(s) to a principal ("grant me X", "give alice Y, Z")	grant-permissions.md — intersection-and-menu flow
Assign a role to a principal	(1) Resolve principal per Rule 5. (2) `roles get <ROLE_ID>` → echo `ownerServiceName` + verify scope-path service segment matches (Rule 17). (3) `roles assignments create --role-id <ROLE_ID> --identity-id <ID> --identity-type <User\|Group\|Robot\|ExternalApplication> --output json`
See what a principal can do	`uip admin authorization check-access <USER_GUID_OR_EMAIL> --scope <Tenant\|Folder> --output json` (Rule 15)
Create a tenant	tenant-management.md — region + default-services resolution, file-body shape, operation polling (Rule 18)
Add a tenant service	`tenants services list-available --region <R>` → `tenants services add --tenant-id <TID> --service <SVC>` (verify post-state per Rule 22)
Look up my public IP ("what's my IP?", "what public IP does the platform see for me?")	`ip-restriction my-ip --output json` → return `Data.ipAddress` . Standalone — no enforcement context required
Enable IP allowlist enforcement	`ip-restriction my-ip` → verify covered by `ip-ranges list` → `ip-restriction enforcement enable --confirm` (Rule 31)
Query audit events / export	audit-workflow-guide.md — scope disambiguation + 4 investigation playbooks (who-did-X, login history, date-range dump, overview)

Key Concepts

Organization hierarchy

Organization (org)
  └── Partition (= org in most cases)
        ├── Users           ← human identities
        ├── Groups          ← role containers (BuiltIn + Custom)
        ├── Robot Accounts  ← unattended automation identities
        └── External Apps   ← OAuth2 clients (Client ID + Secret)

Robot accounts vs external apps

Concept	Purpose	Managed by
Robot account	Identity — who the robot is	Identity Server ( `uip admin` )
Robot credentials	Per-robot Client ID + Secret for machine auth	Orchestrator (machine connection)
External app	OAuth2 client for API integrations, CI/CD	Identity Server ( `uip admin` )

Robot credentials are provisioned automatically by Orchestrator on machine connect — not by creating external apps.

Output Etiquette

What to surface after each verb. Per-area detail in the reference files; this is the contract.

Area	Always surface
Identity mutations	Result + new resource id; for external-app create / `generate-secret` , highlight the secret + warn to save; offer a next step (assign to group, generate another secret, etc.).
Authz reads + mutations	Provenance: role name, `scopeType` , `ownerServiceName` (read directly from response — translate to display name per Rule 17, e.g., `Reinfer` →"IXP"), tenant binding (resolve UUID → name). `check-access` : label each row as `direct` or `inherited from <Group name>` by inspecting the nested `roleAssignments[].securityPrincipalType` . Full contract: authorization-commands.md → Provenance contract.
OMS reads	Separate provisioned (with status) from available catalog (no status). Lead with `Organization: <ORG_NAME>` (and tenant name + UUID + lifecycle status for tenant reads).
OMS mutations	Echo the resolved target before running (Anti-pattern 13). Async: auto-poll 3× at 5 s, then numbered menu (Rule 18). Sync services: re-list to verify post-state (Rule 22).
Audit queries	Disambiguate `org` vs `tenant` first (Rule 23). Discover via `sources` (Rule 26). Bound the window (Rule 27). Operation summary (count, scope, time window, filters, cursor state). Wait for the user's next-step choice; do not chain mutations. Investigation playbooks: audit-workflow-guide.md.
IP Restriction mutations	Before `enforcement enable` : state the impact, require explicit user confirmation (Rule 31). After: confirm caller's IP is still covered (re-run `my-ip` + `ip-ranges list` ). Never use the internal name "APMS" in user-facing output.

For per-area full checklists, follow the table's inline links: Identity → identity-commands.md; Authz → authorization-commands.md; Audit → audit-workflow-guide.md.

Task Navigation

I need to...	Read first
Identity CLI reference	references/identity-commands.md
Manage users (list / create / invite / update / delete)	references/user-management.md
Manage groups (CRUD + membership)	references/group-management.md
Manage robot accounts	references/robot-account-management.md
Manage external apps (OAuth2 + secrets + federated credentials)	references/external-app-management.md
Manage personal access tokens (PATs)	references/pat-management.md
Configure SMTP email settings	references/smtp-management.md
Authorization CLI reference	references/authorization/authorization-commands.md
Manage custom roles	references/authorization/role-management.md
Grant permission(s) to a principal — scope/service intersection flow	references/authorization/grant-permissions.md
Manage role assignments (incl. role-service vs scope-path validation, Rule 17)	references/authorization/role-assignment-management.md
List permission definitions	references/authorization/permission-catalog.md
Check effective access for a principal	references/authorization/check-access.md
Organizations CLI reference	references/organizations-commands.md
Tenants CLI reference	references/tenants-commands.md
Manage the organization (read + update, polling, regions, org services read-only)	references/organization-management.md
Manage tenants (CRUD, enable/disable, tenant services)	references/tenant-management.md
IP-restriction CLI reference	references/ip-restriction/ip-restriction-commands.md
Manage IP allowlist entries	references/ip-restriction/ip-range-management.md
Toggle enforcement (+ `my-ip` safety check)	references/ip-restriction/enforcement-management.md
Manage bypass rules	references/ip-restriction/bypass-rule-management.md
Audit CLI reference	references/audit-commands.md
Audit investigation workflows (scope disambiguation, who-did-X, login history, date-range dump, overview)	references/audit-workflow-guide.md
Paginate audit events beyond 200	references/audit-commands.md + Rule 25
Troubleshoot access denied, login failures, role misconfig, IP lockout, PAT/app auth	references/identity-troubleshoot-guide.md
Diagnose capability index (structured)	references/diagnose/CAPABILITY.md
Failure mode lookup (12 named patterns)	references/diagnose/references/failure-modes.md
Diagnostic priority ladder (sequential triage)	references/diagnose/references/troubleshooting-guide.md

uipath-admin

NPX Install

Tags

SKILL.md Content

UiPath Admin

When to Use This Skill

Identity

Authz

OMS

IP Restriction

Audit

Troubleshoot

Critical Rules

Universal

Identity

Authz

OMS

Audit

IP Restriction

What NOT to Do

Quick Start

Key Concepts

Organization hierarchy

Robot accounts vs external apps

Output Etiquette

Task Navigation