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Scans Cosmos SDK blockchains for 9 consensus-critical vulnerabilities including non-determinism, incorrect signers, ABCI panics, and rounding errors. Use when auditing Cosmos chains or CosmWasm contracts.
npx skill4agent add trailofbits/skills cosmos-vulnerability-scanner.go.proto.rs// Cosmos SDK indicators
import (
"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/types"
sdk "github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/types"
"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/x/..."
)
// Common patterns
keeper.Keeper
sdk.Msg, GetSigners()
BeginBlocker, EndBlocker
CheckTx, DeliverTx
protobuf service definitions// CosmWasm indicators
use cosmwasm_std::*;
#[entry_point]
pub fn execute(deps: DepsMut, env: Env, info: MessageInfo, msg: ExecuteMsg)x/modulename/keeper/keeper.gotypes/msgs.goabci.gohandler.go=== COSMOS SDK VULNERABILITY SCAN RESULTS ===
Project: my-cosmos-chain
Files Scanned: 6 (.go)
Vulnerabilities Found: 2
---
[CRITICAL] Incorrect GetSigners()
---
## 5. Vulnerability Patterns (9 Patterns)
I check for 9 critical vulnerability patterns unique to CosmWasm. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).
### Pattern Summary:
1. **Missing Denom Validation** ⚠️ CRITICAL - Accepting arbitrary token denoms
2. **Insufficient Authorization** ⚠️ CRITICAL - Missing sender/admin validation
3. **Missing Balance Check** ⚠️ HIGH - Not verifying sufficient balances
4. **Improper Reply Handling** ⚠️ HIGH - Unsafe submessage reply processing
5. **Missing Reply ID Check** ⚠️ MEDIUM - Not validating reply IDs
6. **Improper IBC Packet Validation** ⚠️ CRITICAL - Unvalidated IBC packets
7. **Unvalidated Execute Message** ⚠️ HIGH - Missing message validation
8. **Integer Overflow** ⚠️ HIGH - Unchecked arithmetic operations
9. **Reentrancy via Submessages** ⚠️ MEDIUM - State changes before submessages
For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).
## 5. Scanning Workflow
### Step 1: Platform Identification
1. Identify Cosmos SDK version (`go.mod`)
2. Locate custom modules (`x/*/`)
3. Find ABCI methods (`abci.go`, BeginBlocker, EndBlocker)
4. Identify message types (`types/msgs.go`, `.proto`)
### Step 2: Critical Path Analysis
Focus on consensus-critical code:
- BeginBlocker / EndBlocker implementations
- Message handlers (execute, DeliverTx)
- Keeper methods that modify state
- CheckTx priority logic
### Step 3: Non-Determinism Sweep
**This is the highest priority check for Cosmos chains.**
```bash
# Search for non-deterministic patterns
grep -r "range.*map\[" x/
grep -r "\bint\b\|\buint\b" x/ | grep -v "int32\|int64\|uint32\|uint64"
grep -r "float32\|float64" x/
grep -r "go func\|go routine" x/
grep -r "select {" x/
grep -r "time.Now()" x/
grep -r "rand\." x/## [CRITICAL] Non-Deterministic Map Iteration in EndBlocker
**Location**: `x/dex/abci.go:45-52`
**Description**:
The EndBlocker iterates over an unordered map to distribute rewards, causing different validators to process users in different orders and produce different state roots. This will halt the chain when validators fail to reach consensus.
**Vulnerable Code**:
```go
// abci.go, line 45
func EndBlocker(ctx sdk.Context, k keeper.Keeper) {
rewards := k.GetPendingRewards(ctx) // Returns map[string]sdk.Coins
for user, amount := range rewards { // NON-DETERMINISTIC ORDER
k.bankKeeper.SendCoins(ctx, moduleAcc, user, amount)
}
}func EndBlocker(ctx sdk.Context, k keeper.Keeper) {
rewards := k.GetPendingRewards(ctx)
// Collect and sort keys for deterministic iteration
users := make([]string, 0, len(rewards))
for user := range rewards {
users = append(users, user)
}
sort.Strings(users) // Deterministic order
// Process in sorted order
for _, user := range users {
k.bankKeeper.SendCoins(ctx, moduleAcc, user, rewards[user])
}
}
---
## 7. Priority Guidelines
### Critical - CHAIN HALT Risk
- Non-determinism (any form)
- ABCI method panics
- Slow ABCI methods
- Incorrect GetSigners (allows unauthorized actions)
### High - Fund Loss Risk
- Missing error handling (bankKeeper.SendCoins)
- Broken bookkeeping (accounting mismatch)
- Missing message priority (oracle/emergency messages)
### Medium - Logic/DoS Risk
- Rounding errors (protocol value leakage)
- Unregistered message handlers (functionality broken)
---
## 8. Testing Recommendations
### Non-Determinism Testing
```bash
# Build for different architectures
GOARCH=amd64 go build
GOARCH=arm64 go build
# Run same operations, compare state roots
# Must be identical across architectures
# Fuzz test with concurrent operations
go test -fuzz=FuzzEndBlocker -parallel=10func BenchmarkBeginBlocker(b *testing.B) {
ctx := setupMaximalState() // Worst-case state
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
BeginBlocker(ctx, keeper)
}
// Must complete in < 1 second
require.Less(b, b.Elapsed()/time.Duration(b.N), time.Second)
}// Run invariants in integration tests
func TestInvariants(t *testing.T) {
app := setupApp()
// Execute operations
app.DeliverTx(...)
// Check invariants
_, broken := keeper.AllInvariants()(app.Ctx)
require.False(t, broken, "invariant violation detected")
}building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/cosmos/