offensive-bluetooth-classic

Original：🇺🇸 English

Translated

Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) attack methodology — device discovery, service enumeration via SDP, LMP/L2CAP layer attacks, legacy PIN cracking (BlueBorne / KNOB), Bluetooth file-transfer abuse (BlueSnarfing legacy), unauthenticated profile abuse (HSP, HFP, OPP), and modern relevance against older industrial / automotive / accessory targets. Use when in-scope devices use Bluetooth Classic (Bluetooth ≤ 4.0 BR/EDR) — common in legacy car kits, industrial sensors, older medical devices, and audio accessories.

3installs

Sourcesnailsploit/claude-red

Added on2026-10-25

NPX Install

npx skill4agent add snailsploit/claude-red offensive-bluetooth-classic

SKILL.md Content

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Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) Attacks

Older than BLE, less commonly attacked today, but still present in cars, industrial sensors, audio gear, and legacy enterprise hardware. Many of the well-known historic attacks (BlueSnarf, BlueBug) are mitigated; KNOB and the BlueBorne family remain relevant against unpatched devices.

Quick Workflow

Discover devices with
```
hcitool
```
/
```
bluetoothctl
```
/
```
redfang
```
Enumerate exposed services via SDP
Test each service profile for unauth access
Check pairing crypto (KNOB applicability)
Proximity-physical attacks for legacy / unpatched

Discovery

bash

# Modern adapter (built-in or USB Bluetooth 4.0+)
sudo hciconfig hci0 up
sudo hcitool inq                       # inquiry
sudo hcitool scan --length=12          # 12-second scan

# bluetoothctl interactive
bluetoothctl
> scan on
> devices

# Discoverable-mode-only devices appear; non-discoverable need address brute
sudo redfang -r 00:00:00:00:00:00-FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF
# (very slow — ~7 hours per OUI prefix)

Service Discovery (SDP)

bash

# List all services on a device
sdptool browse AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
sdptool records AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF

Common profiles and their attack relevance:

Profile	UUID	Attack
OBEX Object Push (OPP)	0x1105	BlueSnarf/BlueBug on legacy phones (mostly extinct)
OBEX File Transfer (FTP)	0x1106	Browse / write filesystem on legacy devices
Headset (HSP/HFP)	0x1108 / 0x111E	Eavesdrop active call audio
Serial Port Profile (SPP)	0x1101	Industrial/IoT debug ports — often unauthenticated
HID	0x1124	Keyboard/mouse impersonation
Audio Sink/Source (A2DP)	0x110B / 0x110A	Audio injection/eavesdrop

SPP Abuse

The Serial Port Profile (SPP) tunnels arbitrary data over Bluetooth as a virtual COM port. Industrial / IoT devices use it for debug or telemetry, often without authentication.

bash

# Connect to SPP service, channel typically 1
sudo rfcomm bind /dev/rfcomm0 AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF 1
sudo screen /dev/rfcomm0 9600
# Then interact with the device's CLI / debug menu

KNOB (CVE-2019-9506)

Forces Bluetooth pairing to negotiate a 1-byte encryption key — making the link key trivially brute-forceable.

bash

# Test with internalblue (requires Broadcom firmware patch)
git clone https://github.com/seemoo-lab/internalblue
internalblue
> log keys
# Patch firmware to allow 1-byte key; pair with target; observe weak key

Patched in firmware on most modern devices. Still works against:

Older Broadcom-based devices (pre-2019 BCM chipsets)
Embedded automotive Bluetooth stacks
Cheap consumer audio gear

BlueBorne (CVE-2017-1000251 et al.)

A family of buffer overflows / info leaks in major Bluetooth stacks (Linux BlueZ, Android, Windows, iOS). Mostly patched 2017–2018, but unpatched embedded Linux devices are common.

bash

# Armis blueborne-scanner — checks for patch-level
git clone https://github.com/ArmisSecurity/blueborne
python blueborne_scanner.py AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF

HID Spoofing (PoC)

If pairing succeeds via Just Works or weak PIN, you can register as a HID device — keystroke injection on an unattended Bluetooth-paired host.

bash

# bdaddr + HID example — register custom HID on rfcomm
hcitool dev
hciconfig hci0 class 0x000540   # HID device class
sdptool add HID
# Use a HID descriptor crafted as keyboard, send keystrokes

Audio Eavesdropping

If a target has Bluetooth headset paired and active, and you can re-pair (PIN brute or KNOB):

HSP/HFP profiles let you become the peer and receive audio
Some firmware allows simultaneous peer connections — eavesdrop without disrupting

Engagement Cheatsheet

bash

# 1. Discover
sudo hcitool inq

# 2. Enumerate services per device
sdptool browse <MAC>

# 3. SPP (industrial/IoT) — connect and explore
sudo rfcomm bind /dev/rfcomm0 <MAC> 1
sudo screen /dev/rfcomm0 9600

# 4. Patch-level scan
python blueborne_scanner.py <MAC>

# 5. KNOB testing (with adapter that supports internalblue)
internalblue → log keys → re-pair target

# 6. Document profiles, auth state, exposed commands per device

Detection

No native Bluetooth Classic IDS in most environments
Active inquiry visible to nearby Bluetooth-aware monitoring (rare)
Re-pairing prompts on target devices may surface to users

Reporting

Identify chipset + firmware version per device (often visible in service records)
Map CVE applicability (BlueBorne, KNOB, BlueFrag, et al.)
Document specific profile abuses (SPP exposed without auth, HID spoofing successful, etc.)

Key References

internalblue: github.com/seemoo-lab/internalblue
KNOB attack: knobattack.com
BlueBorne: armis.com/blueborne
Bluetooth Core Spec — Volume 2 (BR/EDR Controller)
Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/wireless.md

offensive-bluetooth-classic

NPX Install

Tags

SKILL.md Content

Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) Attacks

Quick Workflow

Discovery

Service Discovery (SDP)

SPP Abuse

KNOB (CVE-2019-9506)

BlueBorne (CVE-2017-1000251 et al.)

HID Spoofing (PoC)

Audio Eavesdropping

Engagement Cheatsheet

Detection

Reporting

Key References