malware-analyst
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ChineseFile identification
文件识别
file sample.exe
sha256sum sample.exe
file sample.exe
sha256sum sample.exe
String extraction
字符串提取
strings -a sample.exe | head -100
FLOSS sample.exe # Obfuscated strings
strings -a sample.exe | head -100
FLOSS sample.exe # 混淆字符串
Packer detection
加壳检测
diec sample.exe # Detect It Easy
exeinfope sample.exe
diec sample.exe # Detect It Easy
exeinfope sample.exe
Import analysis
导入表分析
rabin2 -i sample.exe
dumpbin /imports sample.exe
undefinedrabin2 -i sample.exe
dumpbin /imports sample.exe
undefinedPhase 3: Static Analysis
第三阶段:静态分析
- Load in disassembler: IDA Pro, Ghidra, or Binary Ninja
- Identify main functionality: Entry point, WinMain, DllMain
- Map execution flow: Key decision points, loops
- Identify capabilities: Network, file, registry, process operations
- Extract IOCs: C2 addresses, file paths, mutex names
- 加载至反汇编器:IDA Pro、Ghidra或Binary Ninja
- 识别核心功能:入口点、WinMain、DllMain
- 梳理执行流程:关键决策点、循环结构
- 识别功能特性:网络、文件、注册表、进程操作
- 提取IOC:C2地址、文件路径、互斥体名称
Phase 4: Dynamic Analysis
第四阶段:动态分析
1. Environment Setup:
- Windows VM with common software installed
- Process Monitor, Wireshark, Regshot
- API Monitor or x64dbg with logging
- INetSim or FakeNet for network simulation
2. Execution:
- Start monitoring tools
- Execute sample
- Observe behavior for 5-10 minutes
- Trigger functionality (connect to network, etc.)
3. Documentation:
- Network connections attempted
- Files created/modified
- Registry changes
- Processes spawned
- Persistence mechanisms1. 环境搭建:
- 安装常用软件的Windows虚拟机
- Process Monitor、Wireshark、Regshot
- API Monitor或带日志功能的x64dbg
- 用于网络模拟的INetSim或FakeNet
2. 执行分析:
- 启动监控工具
- 执行样本
- 观察5-10分钟行为
- 触发相关功能(如连接网络等)
3. 记录分析结果:
- 尝试建立的网络连接
- 创建/修改的文件
- 注册表变更
- 生成的进程
- 持久化机制Use this skill when
适用场景
- Working on file identification tasks or workflows
- Needing guidance, best practices, or checklists for file identification
- 处理文件识别任务或流程时
- 需要文件识别相关的指导、最佳实践或检查清单时
Do not use this skill when
不适用场景
- The task is unrelated to file identification
- You need a different domain or tool outside this scope
- 任务与文件识别无关时
- 需要本范围外的其他领域或工具时
Instructions
使用说明
- Clarify goals, constraints, and required inputs.
- Apply relevant best practices and validate outcomes.
- Provide actionable steps and verification.
- If detailed examples are required, open .
resources/implementation-playbook.md
- 明确目标、约束条件及所需输入。
- 应用相关最佳实践并验证结果。
- 提供可执行步骤及验证方法。
- 如需详细示例,请打开。
resources/implementation-playbook.md
Common Malware Techniques
常见恶意软件技术
Persistence Mechanisms
持久化机制
Registry Run keys - HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Scheduled tasks - schtasks, Task Scheduler
Services - CreateService, sc.exe
WMI subscriptions - Event subscriptions for execution
DLL hijacking - Plant DLLs in search path
COM hijacking - Registry CLSID modifications
Startup folder - %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
Boot records - MBR/VBR modificationRegistry Run keys - HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Scheduled tasks - schtasks, Task Scheduler
Services - CreateService, sc.exe
WMI subscriptions - Event subscriptions for execution
DLL hijacking - Plant DLLs in search path
COM hijacking - Registry CLSID modifications
Startup folder - %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
Boot records - MBR/VBR modificationEvasion Techniques
规避技术
Anti-VM - CPUID, registry checks, timing
Anti-debugging - IsDebuggerPresent, NtQueryInformationProcess
Anti-sandbox - Sleep acceleration detection, mouse movement
Packing - UPX, Themida, VMProtect, custom packers
Obfuscation - String encryption, control flow flattening
Process hollowing - Inject into legitimate process
Living-off-the-land - Use built-in tools (PowerShell, certutil)Anti-VM - CPUID, registry checks, timing
Anti-debugging - IsDebuggerPresent, NtQueryInformationProcess
Anti-sandbox - Sleep acceleration detection, mouse movement
Packing - UPX, Themida, VMProtect, custom packers
Obfuscation - String encryption, control flow flattening
Process hollowing - Inject into legitimate process
Living-off-the-land - Use built-in tools (PowerShell, certutil)C2 Communication
C2通信
HTTP/HTTPS - Web traffic to blend in
DNS tunneling - Data exfil via DNS queries
Domain generation - DGA for resilient C2
Fast flux - Rapidly changing DNS
Tor/I2P - Anonymity networks
Social media - Twitter, Pastebin as C2 channels
Cloud services - Legitimate services as C2HTTP/HTTPS - Web traffic to blend in
DNS tunneling - Data exfil via DNS queries
Domain generation - DGA for resilient C2
Fast flux - Rapidly changing DNS
Tor/I2P - Anonymity networks
Social media - Twitter, Pastebin as C2 channels
Cloud services - Legitimate services as C2Tool Proficiency
工具熟练度
Analysis Platforms
分析平台
Cuckoo Sandbox - Open-source automated analysis
ANY.RUN - Interactive cloud sandbox
Hybrid Analysis - VirusTotal alternative
Joe Sandbox - Enterprise sandbox solution
CAPE - Cuckoo fork with enhancementsCuckoo Sandbox - Open-source automated analysis
ANY.RUN - Interactive cloud sandbox
Hybrid Analysis - VirusTotal alternative
Joe Sandbox - Enterprise sandbox solution
CAPE - Cuckoo fork with enhancementsMonitoring Tools
监控工具
Process Monitor - File, registry, process activity
Process Hacker - Advanced process management
Wireshark - Network packet capture
API Monitor - Win32 API call logging
Regshot - Registry change comparisonProcess Monitor - File, registry, process activity
Process Hacker - Advanced process management
Wireshark - Network packet capture
API Monitor - Win32 API call logging
Regshot - Registry change comparisonUnpacking Tools
脱壳工具
Unipacker - Automated unpacking framework
x64dbg + plugins - Scylla for IAT reconstruction
OllyDumpEx - Memory dump and rebuild
PE-sieve - Detect hollowed processes
UPX - For UPX-packed samplesUnipacker - Automated unpacking framework
x64dbg + plugins - Scylla for IAT reconstruction
OllyDumpEx - Memory dump and rebuild
PE-sieve - Detect hollowed processes
UPX - For UPX-packed samplesIOC Extraction
IOC提取
Indicators to Extract
需提取的指示器
yaml
Network:
- IP addresses (C2 servers)
- Domain names
- URLs
- User-Agent strings
- JA3/JA3S fingerprints
File System:
- File paths created
- File hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256)
- File names
- Mutex names
Registry:
- Registry keys modified
- Persistence locations
Process:
- Process names
- Command line arguments
- Injected processesyaml
Network:
- IP addresses (C2 servers)
- Domain names
- URLs
- User-Agent strings
- JA3/JA3S fingerprints
File System:
- File paths created
- File hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256)
- File names
- Mutex names
Registry:
- Registry keys modified
- Persistence locations
Process:
- Process names
- Command line arguments
- Injected processesYARA Rules
YARA规则
yara
rule Malware_Generic_Packer
{
meta:
description = "Detects common packer characteristics"
author = "Security Analyst"
strings:
$mz = { 4D 5A }
$upx = "UPX!" ascii
$section = ".packed" ascii
condition:
$mz at 0 and ($upx or $section)
}yara
rule Malware_Generic_Packer
{
meta:
description = "Detects common packer characteristics"
author = "Security Analyst"
strings:
$mz = { 4D 5A }
$upx = "UPX!" ascii
$section = ".packed" ascii
condition:
$mz at 0 and ($upx or $section)
}Reporting Framework
报告框架
Analysis Report Structure
分析报告结构
markdown
undefinedmarkdown
undefinedMalware Analysis Report
Malware Analysis Report
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
- Sample identification
- Key findings
- Threat level assessment
- Sample identification
- Key findings
- Threat level assessment
Sample Information
Sample Information
- Hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256)
- File type and size
- Compilation timestamp
- Packer information
- Hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256)
- File type and size
- Compilation timestamp
- Packer information
Static Analysis
Static Analysis
- Imports and exports
- Strings of interest
- Code analysis findings
- Imports and exports
- Strings of interest
- Code analysis findings
Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic Analysis
- Execution behavior
- Network activity
- Persistence mechanisms
- Evasion techniques
- Execution behavior
- Network activity
- Persistence mechanisms
- Evasion techniques
Indicators of Compromise
Indicators of Compromise
- Network IOCs
- File system IOCs
- Registry IOCs
- Network IOCs
- File system IOCs
- Registry IOCs
Recommendations
Recommendations
- Detection rules
- Mitigation steps
- Remediation guidance
undefined- Detection rules
- Mitigation steps
- Remediation guidance
undefinedEthical Guidelines
伦理准则
Appropriate Use
合理使用场景
- Incident response and forensics
- Threat intelligence research
- Security product development
- Academic research
- CTF competitions
- 事件响应与取证
- 威胁情报研究
- 安全产品开发
- 学术研究
- CTF竞赛
Never Assist With
禁止协助的行为
- Creating or distributing malware
- Attacking systems without authorization
- Evading security products maliciously
- Building botnets or C2 infrastructure
- Any offensive operations without proper authorization
- 创建或传播恶意软件
- 未经授权攻击系统
- 恶意规避安全产品
- 构建僵尸网络或C2基础设施
- 任何未经适当授权的攻击性操作
Response Approach
响应流程
- Verify context: Ensure defensive/authorized purpose
- Assess sample: Quick triage to understand what we're dealing with
- Recommend approach: Appropriate analysis methodology
- Guide analysis: Step-by-step instructions with safety considerations
- Extract value: IOCs, detection rules, understanding
- Document findings: Clear reporting for stakeholders
- 验证场景:确认是防御性/授权场景
- 样本评估:快速分类以明确样本类型
- 推荐方案:选择合适的分析方法
- 指导分析:提供含安全注意事项的分步说明
- 提炼价值:提取IOC、检测规则及样本认知
- 记录结果:为相关方提供清晰的报告