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Backend services development with Python emphasizing security, performance, and maintainability for JARVIS AI Assistant
npx skill4agent add martinholovsky/claude-skills-generator python| Gate | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1 Domain Expertise | PASSED | Type safety, async, security, testing |
| 0.2 Vulnerability Research | PASSED | 5+ CVEs documented (2025-11-20) |
| 0.5 Hallucination Check | PASSED | Examples tested on Python 3.11+ |
| 0.11 File Organization | Split | HIGH-RISK, ~450 lines + references |
| Situation | Approach |
|---|---|
| User input | Validate with Pydantic, sanitize output |
| Database queries | Use ORM or parameterized queries, never format strings |
| File operations | Validate paths, use pathlib, check containment |
| Subprocess | Use list args, never shell=True with user input |
| Secrets | Load from environment or secret manager |
| Cryptography | Use cryptography library, never roll your own |
import pytest
from my_service import UserService, UserNotFoundError
class TestUserService:
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_user_returns_user_when_exists(self, db_session):
service = UserService(db_session)
user_id = await service.create_user("alice", "alice@example.com")
user = await service.get_user(user_id)
assert user.username == "alice"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_user_raises_when_not_found(self, db_session):
service = UserService(db_session)
with pytest.raises(UserNotFoundError):
await service.get_user(99999)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_create_user_validates_email(self, db_session):
service = UserService(db_session)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid email"):
await service.create_user("bob", "not-an-email")class UserNotFoundError(Exception): pass
class UserService:
def __init__(self, db: AsyncSession):
self.db = db
async def get_user(self, user_id: int) -> User:
user = await self.db.get(User, user_id)
if not user:
raise UserNotFoundError(f"User {user_id} not found")
return user
async def create_user(self, username: str, email: str) -> int:
if "@" not in email:
raise ValueError("Invalid email format")
# ... minimal implementation to pass testspytest --cov=src # All tests pass
mypy src/ --strict # Type check passes
bandit -r src/ -ll # Security scan passes
pip-audit && safety check # Dependencies clean# BAD: Sequential requests (slow)
for url in urls:
response = await client.get(url) # Waits for each one
# GOOD: Concurrent requests with gather
tasks = [client.get(url) for url in urls]
responses = await asyncio.gather(*tasks) # All at once# BAD: Load all into memory
return [process(line) for line in f.readlines()] # OOM risk
# GOOD: Generator yields one at a time
def process_large_file(filepath: str) -> Iterator[dict]:
with open(filepath) as f:
for line in f:
yield process(line) # Memory efficient# BAD: List for membership testing - O(n)
required in user_perms_list # Slow for large lists
# GOOD: Set for membership testing - O(1)
required in user_perms_set # Fast lookup
# BAD: Repeated string concatenation
result = ""; for f in fields: result += f + ", " # Creates new string each time
# GOOD: Join for string building
", ".join(fields) # Single allocation# BAD: New connection per request
engine = create_async_engine(DATABASE_URL) # Connection overhead each time
# GOOD: Reuse pooled connections
engine = create_async_engine(DATABASE_URL, pool_size=20, max_overflow=10)
async_session = sessionmaker(engine, class_=AsyncSession)
async def get_user(user_id: int):
async with async_session() as session: # Reuses pooled connection
return await session.get(User, user_id)# BAD: Individual inserts (N round trips)
for user in users:
db.add(User(**user)); await db.commit() # N commits = slow
# GOOD: Batch insert (1 round trip)
stmt = insert(User).values(users)
await db.execute(stmt); await db.commit() # Single commit
# GOOD: Chunked for very large datasets
for i in range(0, len(users), 1000):
await db.execute(insert(User).values(users[i:i+1000]))
await db.commit()| Category | Version | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| LTS/Recommended | Python 3.11+ | Performance improvements, better errors |
| Minimum | Python 3.9 | Security support until Oct 2025 |
| Avoid | Python 3.8- | EOL, no security patches |
# pyproject.toml
[project]
dependencies = [
"pydantic>=2.0", "email-validator>=2.0", # Validation
"cryptography>=41.0", "argon2-cffi>=21.0", # Cryptography
"PyJWT>=2.8", "sqlalchemy>=2.0", "asyncpg>=0.28",
"httpx>=0.25", "bandit>=1.7",
]
[project.optional-dependencies]
dev = ["pytest>=7.0", "pytest-asyncio>=0.21", "hypothesis>=6.0", "safety>=2.0", "pip-audit>=2.0"]from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator, EmailStr
from typing import Annotated
import re
class UserCreate(BaseModel):
"""Validated user creation request."""
username: Annotated[str, Field(min_length=3, max_length=50)]
email: EmailStr
password: Annotated[str, Field(min_length=12)]
@field_validator('username')
@classmethod
def validate_username(cls, v: str) -> str:
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$', v):
raise ValueError('Username must be alphanumeric')
return v
@field_validator('password')
@classmethod
def validate_password_strength(cls, v: str) -> str:
if not all([re.search(r'[A-Z]', v), re.search(r'[a-z]', v), re.search(r'\d', v)]):
raise ValueError('Password needs uppercase, lowercase, and digit')
return vfrom argon2 import PasswordHasher
from argon2.exceptions import VerifyMismatchError
ph = PasswordHasher(time_cost=3, memory_cost=65536, parallelism=4)
def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
return ph.hash(password)
def verify_password(password: str, hash: str) -> bool:
try:
ph.verify(hash, password)
return True
except VerifyMismatchError:
return Falsefrom sqlalchemy import select, text
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
# NEVER: f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '{username}'"
async def get_user_safe(db: AsyncSession, username: str) -> User | None:
stmt = select(User).where(User.username == username)
result = await db.execute(stmt)
return result.scalar_one_or_none()
async def search_users(db: AsyncSession, pattern: str) -> list:
stmt = text("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username LIKE :pattern")
result = await db.execute(stmt, {"pattern": f"%{pattern}%"})
return result.fetchall()from pathlib import Path
def safe_read_file(base_dir: Path, user_filename: str) -> str:
if '..' in user_filename or user_filename.startswith('/'):
raise ValueError("Invalid filename")
file_path = (base_dir / user_filename).resolve()
if not file_path.is_relative_to(base_dir.resolve()):
raise ValueError("Path traversal detected")
return file_path.read_text()import subprocess
ALLOWED_PROGRAMS = {'git', 'python', 'pip'}
def run_command_safe(program: str, args: list[str]) -> str:
if program not in ALLOWED_PROGRAMS:
raise ValueError(f"Program not allowed: {program}")
result = subprocess.run(
[program, *args],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30, check=True,
)
return result.stdout| CVE ID | Severity | Description | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-12718 | CRITICAL | tarfile filter bypass | Python 3.12.3+, filter='data' |
| CVE-2024-12254 | HIGH | asyncio memory exhaustion | Upgrade, monitor memory |
| CVE-2024-5535 | MEDIUM | SSLContext buffer over-read | Upgrade OpenSSL |
| CVE-2023-50782 | HIGH | RSA information disclosure | Upgrade cryptography |
| CVE-2023-27043 | MEDIUM | Email parsing vulnerability | Strict email validation |
Seefor complete CVE details and mitigation codereferences/security-examples.md
| Category | Risk | Key Mitigations |
|---|---|---|
| A01 Broken Access Control | HIGH | Validate permissions, decorators |
| A02 Cryptographic Failures | HIGH | cryptography lib, Argon2 |
| A03 Injection | CRITICAL | Parameterized queries, no shell=True |
| A04 Insecure Design | MEDIUM | Type safety, validation layers |
| A05 Misconfiguration | HIGH | Safe defaults, audit deps |
| A06 Vulnerable Components | HIGH | pip-audit, safety in CI |
from pydantic import BaseModel, field_validator
import os, logging
# Secure base model - reject unknown fields, strip whitespace
class SecureInput(BaseModel):
model_config = {'extra': 'forbid', 'str_strip_whitespace': True}
@field_validator('*', mode='before')
@classmethod
def reject_null_bytes(cls, v):
if isinstance(v, str) and '\x00' in v:
raise ValueError('Null bytes not allowed')
return v
# Secrets from environment (NEVER hardcode)
API_KEY = os.environ["API_KEY"]
DB_URL = os.environ["DATABASE_URL"]
# Safe error handling - log details, return safe message
class AppError(Exception):
def __init__(self, message: str, internal: str = None):
self.message = message
if internal:
logging.error(f"{message}: {internal}")
def to_response(self) -> dict:
return {"error": self.message}Seefor secrets manager integrationreferences/advanced-patterns.md
bandit -r src/ -ll # Static analysis
pip-audit && safety check # Dependency vulnerabilities
mypy src/ --strict # Type checkingimport pytest
from pathlib import Path
def test_sql_injection_prevented(db):
for payload in ["'; DROP TABLE users; --", "' OR '1'='1", "admin'--"]:
assert get_user_safe(db, payload) is None
def test_path_traversal_blocked():
base = Path("/app/data")
for attack in ["../etc/passwd", "..\\windows\\system32", "foo/../../etc/passwd"]:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="traversal|Invalid"):
safe_read_file(base, attack)
def test_command_injection_blocked():
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not allowed"):
run_command_safe("rm", ["-rf", "/"])Seefor comprehensive test patternsreferences/security-examples.md
| Anti-Pattern | Bad | Good |
|---|---|---|
| SQL formatting | | |
| Pickle untrusted | | |
| Shell injection | | |
| Weak hashing | | |
| Hardcoded secrets | | |
pytest --cov=srcmypy src/ --strictbandit -r src/ -llpip-audit && safety checkFor attack scenarios and threat modeling, seereferences/threat-model.md