moai-security-zero-trust

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moai-security-zero-trust: Zero-Trust Architecture & Micro-Segmentation

moai-security-zero-trust:零信任架构与微分段

Enterprise Zero-Trust with eBPF, Micro-Segmentation & mTLS
Trust Score: 9.9/10 | Version: 4.0.0 | Enterprise Mode | Last Updated: 2025-11-12

基于eBPF、微分段和mTLS的企业级零信任方案
信任评分:9.9/10 | 版本:4.0.0 | 企业模式 | 最后更新:2025-11-12

Overview

概述

Zero-Trust Architecture (ZTA) implementation with eBPF-based network policies, micro-segmentation, and mutual TLS (mTLS) enforcement. Kubernetes NetworkPolicy with Cilium 1.18+, Teleport BeyondCorp implementation, device trust verification. 2025 standard: 50% of enterprises now use service mesh for zero-trust enforcement.
When to use this Skill:
  • Implementing zero-trust security model
  • Kubernetes microservices security
  • Enforcing network micro-segmentation
  • BeyondCorp device trust architecture
  • mTLS enforcement between services
  • Service mesh deployment (Cilium/Istio)
  • Cloud-native zero-trust implementation

基于eBPF的网络策略、微分段和双向TLS(mTLS)强制管控的零信任架构(ZTA)实现方案。兼容Cilium 1.18+的Kubernetes NetworkPolicy、Teleport BeyondCorp实现、设备信任校验能力。2025年行业标准:目前已有50%的企业使用服务网格落地零信任管控。
适用场景:
  • 实现零信任安全模型
  • Kubernetes微服务安全防护
  • 落地网络微分段策略
  • 构建BeyondCorp设备信任架构
  • 服务间mTLS强制管控
  • 服务网格部署(Cilium/Istio)
  • 云原生零信任方案落地

Level 1: Foundations

1级:基础

Zero-Trust Principles

零信任原则

Traditional Security Model (Perimeter-based):
Network Edge
    ├─ Firewall (allow/deny external)
    └─ Internal trust: ANY communication allowed
    
Zero-Trust Model (Never trust, always verify):
Every Request
    ├─ Identity: WHO is making request?
    ├─ Device: IS device trusted?
    ├─ Network: IS source authorized?
    ├─ Application: IS request legitimate?
    └─ Decision: ALLOW or DENY

Key Principles:
1. Never trust, always verify
2. Least privilege access
3. Assume breach (defense in depth)
4. Verify every transaction
5. Encrypt all traffic
6. Monitor all activity
传统安全模型(基于边界):
网络边界
    ├─ 防火墙(允许/拒绝外部访问)
    └─ 内部信任:允许任意内部通信
    
零信任模型(永不信任,始终验证):
每一次请求
    ├─ 身份:谁发起了请求?
    ├─ 设备:设备是否可信?
    ├─ 网络:来源是否已授权?
    ├─ 应用:请求是否合法?
    └─ 决策:允许或拒绝

核心原则:
1. 永不信任,始终验证
2. 最小权限访问
3. 假设已被攻破(深度防御)
4. 校验每一笔交易
5. 加密所有流量
6. 监控所有活动

Zero-Trust Architecture Layers

零信任架构层级

Layer 1: Identity & Authentication
├─ Multi-factor authentication (MFA)
├─ Passwordless authentication
└─ Continuous authentication

Layer 2: Device Security
├─ Device posture assessment
├─ Endpoint detection & response (EDR)
├─ Device certificate (PKI)
└─ Hardware security modules (HSM)

Layer 3: Network Segmentation
├─ Micro-segmentation policies
├─ Application-aware firewalling
├─ Encrypted tunnels (mTLS)
└─ Service mesh enforcement

Layer 4: Application & Data
├─ Fine-grained access control
├─ Data encryption (at-rest, in-transit)
├─ Sensitive data masking
└─ Audit logging of all access

第一层:身份与认证
├─ 多因素认证(MFA)
├─ 无密码认证
└─ 持续认证

第二层:设备安全
├─ 设备状态评估
├─ 端点检测与响应(EDR)
├─ 设备证书(PKI)
└─ 硬件安全模块(HSM)

第三层:网络分段
├─ 微分段策略
├─ 应用感知防火墙
├─ 加密隧道(mTLS)
└─ 服务网格管控

第四层:应用与数据
├─ 细粒度访问控制
├─ 数据加密(静态、传输中)
├─ 敏感数据脱敏
└─ 所有访问的审计日志

Level 2: Core Patterns

2级:核心模式

Pattern 1: Kubernetes NetworkPolicy with Cilium

模式1:基于Cilium的Kubernetes NetworkPolicy

yaml
undefined
yaml
undefined

Default: Deny All (Zero-Trust Default)

Default: Deny All (Zero-Trust Default)


apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: default-deny-all spec: podSelector: {} policyTypes:
  • Ingress
  • Egress


apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: default-deny-all spec: podSelector: {} policyTypes:
  • Ingress
  • Egress

Allow Frontend -> Backend traffic

Allow Frontend -> Backend traffic

apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: frontend-to-backend spec: podSelector: matchLabels: tier: backend policyTypes:
  • Ingress ingress:
  • from:
    • podSelector: matchLabels: tier: frontend ports:
    • protocol: TCP port: 8080

apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: frontend-to-backend spec: podSelector: matchLabels: tier: backend policyTypes:
  • Ingress ingress:
  • from:
    • podSelector: matchLabels: tier: frontend ports:
    • protocol: TCP port: 8080

Cilium CiliumNetworkPolicy (Layer 7 - application layer)

Cilium CiliumNetworkPolicy (Layer 7 - application layer)

apiVersion: cilium.io/v2 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy metadata: name: api-gateway-policy spec: description: "L7 policy for API Gateway"

Select pods this policy applies to

endpointSelector: matchLabels: app: api-gateway

Ingress rules (who can talk to API Gateway)

ingress:
  • fromEndpoints:
    • matchLabels: app: frontend toPorts:
    • ports:
      • port: "443" protocol: TCP

      L7 rules (HTTP methods & paths)

      rules: http:
      • method: "GET" path: "/api/v1/users"
      • method: "POST" path: "/api/v1/users"

Egress rules (where API Gateway can talk to)

egress:
  • toEndpoints:
    • matchLabels: app: backend-service toPorts:
    • ports:
      • port: "8080" protocol: TCP rules: http:
        • method: "GET" path: "/internal/.*"

```javascript
// Cilium integration in Node.js
const k8s = require('@kubernetes/client-node');

class CiliumNetworkPolicyManager {
  constructor() {
    this.kc = new k8s.KubeConfig();
    this.kc.loadFromDefault();
    this.k8sApi = this.kc.makeApiClient(k8s.CustomObjectsApi);
  }
  
  async applyZeroTrustPolicy(namespace, serviceName) {
    // Create default deny-all policy
    const denyPolicy = {
      apiVersion: 'networking.k8s.io/v1',
      kind: 'NetworkPolicy',
      metadata: {
        name: `${serviceName}-default-deny`,
        namespace,
      },
      spec: {
        podSelector: {
          matchLabels: {
            app: serviceName,
          },
        },
        policyTypes: ['Ingress', 'Egress'],
        ingress: [],  // Empty = deny all
        egress: [],   // Empty = deny all
      },
    };
    
    // Create Cilium Layer 7 policy for specific allowed traffic
    const l7Policy = {
      apiVersion: 'cilium.io/v2',
      kind: 'CiliumNetworkPolicy',
      metadata: {
        name: `${serviceName}-l7-allow`,
        namespace,
      },
      spec: {
        endpointSelector: {
          matchLabels: {
            app: serviceName,
          },
        },
        ingress: [
          {
            fromEndpoints: [
              {
                matchLabels: {
                  tier: 'frontend',
                },
              },
            ],
            toPorts: [
              {
                ports: [
                  {
                    port: '443',
                    protocol: 'TCP',
                  },
                ],
                rules: {
                  http: [
                    {
                      method: 'GET',
                      path: '/api/.*',
                    },
                  ],
                },
              },
            ],
          },
        ],
      },
    };
    
    // Apply policies
    await this.k8sApi.createNamespacedCustomObject(
      'networking.k8s.io',
      'v1',
      namespace,
      'networkpolicies',
      denyPolicy
    );
    
    await this.k8sApi.createNamespacedCustomObject(
      'cilium.io',
      'v2',
      namespace,
      'ciliumnetworkpolicies',
      l7Policy
    );
    
    console.log(`Zero-trust policy applied to ${serviceName}`);
  }
}
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy metadata: name: api-gateway-policy spec: description: "L7 policy for API Gateway"

Select pods this policy applies to

endpointSelector: matchLabels: app: api-gateway

Ingress rules (who can talk to API Gateway)

ingress:
  • fromEndpoints:
    • matchLabels: app: frontend toPorts:
    • ports:
      • port: "443" protocol: TCP

      L7 rules (HTTP methods & paths)

      rules: http:
      • method: "GET" path: "/api/v1/users"
      • method: "POST" path: "/api/v1/users"

Egress rules (where API Gateway can talk to)

egress:
  • toEndpoints:
    • matchLabels: app: backend-service toPorts:
    • ports:
      • port: "8080" protocol: TCP rules: http:
        • method: "GET" path: "/internal/.*"

```javascript
// Cilium integration in Node.js
const k8s = require('@kubernetes/client-node');

class CiliumNetworkPolicyManager {
  constructor() {
    this.kc = new k8s.KubeConfig();
    this.kc.loadFromDefault();
    this.k8sApi = this.kc.makeApiClient(k8s.CustomObjectsApi);
  }
  
  async applyZeroTrustPolicy(namespace, serviceName) {
    // Create default deny-all policy
    const denyPolicy = {
      apiVersion: 'networking.k8s.io/v1',
      kind: 'NetworkPolicy',
      metadata: {
        name: `${serviceName}-default-deny`,
        namespace,
      },
      spec: {
        podSelector: {
          matchLabels: {
            app: serviceName,
          },
        },
        policyTypes: ['Ingress', 'Egress'],
        ingress: [],  // Empty = deny all
        egress: [],   // Empty = deny all
      },
    };
    
    // Create Cilium Layer 7 policy for specific allowed traffic
    const l7Policy = {
      apiVersion: 'cilium.io/v2',
      kind: 'CiliumNetworkPolicy',
      metadata: {
        name: `${serviceName}-l7-allow`,
        namespace,
      },
      spec: {
        endpointSelector: {
          matchLabels: {
            app: serviceName,
          },
        },
        ingress: [
          {
            fromEndpoints: [
              {
                matchLabels: {
                  tier: 'frontend',
                },
              },
            ],
            toPorts: [
              {
                ports: [
                  {
                    port: '443',
                    protocol: 'TCP',
                  },
                ],
                rules: {
                  http: [
                    {
                      method: 'GET',
                      path: '/api/.*',
                    },
                  ],
                },
              },
            ],
          },
        ],
      },
    };
    
    // Apply policies
    await this.k8sApi.createNamespacedCustomObject(
      'networking.k8s.io',
      'v1',
      namespace,
      'networkpolicies',
      denyPolicy
    );
    
    await this.k8sApi.createNamespacedCustomObject(
      'cilium.io',
      'v2',
      namespace,
      'ciliumnetworkpolicies',
      l7Policy
    );
    
    console.log(`Zero-trust policy applied to ${serviceName}`);
  }
}

Pattern 2: mTLS Enforcement (Service Mesh)

模式2:mTLS强制管控(服务网格)

javascript
// Service mesh (Cilium, Istio) enforces mTLS between services
const { Issuer } = require('openid-client');

class mTLSEnforcement {
  constructor() {
    this.certs = new Map();
    this.trustStore = [];
  }
  
  // Issue certificate to service
  async issueCertificate(serviceName, namespace) {
    const cert = {
      subject: `/CN=${serviceName}.${namespace}.svc.cluster.local`,
      validity: {
        notBefore: new Date(),
        notAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
      },
      keySize: 4096,
      algorithm: 'RSA',
    };
    
    // Store in secret
    await this.storeInK8sSecret(serviceName, namespace, cert);
    
    this.certs.set(`${serviceName}.${namespace}`, cert);
    
    return cert;
  }
  
  // Verify mutual TLS handshake
  async verifyMutualTLS(clientCert, serverCert) {
    // 1. Verify client certificate signature
    if (!this.verifyCertificateChain(clientCert)) {
      throw new Error('Invalid client certificate chain');
    }
    
    // 2. Verify server certificate signature
    if (!this.verifyCertificateChain(serverCert)) {
      throw new Error('Invalid server certificate chain');
    }
    
    // 3. Verify certificates are in trust store
    if (!this.isInTrustStore(clientCert)) {
      throw new Error('Client certificate not trusted');
    }
    
    if (!this.isInTrustStore(serverCert)) {
      throw new Error('Server certificate not trusted');
    }
    
    // 4. Check certificate validity
    const now = new Date();
    if (now < new Date(clientCert.notBefore) || now > new Date(clientCert.notAfter)) {
      throw new Error('Client certificate expired');
    }
    
    if (now < new Date(serverCert.notBefore) || now > new Date(serverCert.notAfter)) {
      throw new Error('Server certificate expired');
    }
    
    return {
      valid: true,
      clientName: clientCert.subject,
      serverName: serverCert.subject,
    };
  }
  
  verifyCertificateChain(cert) {
    // Verify signature using CA public key
    return true;  // Implementation detail
  }
  
  isInTrustStore(cert) {
    // Check if certificate is in trusted CA store
    return this.trustStore.some(ca => ca.subject === cert.issuer);
  }
}
javascript
// Service mesh (Cilium, Istio) enforces mTLS between services
const { Issuer } = require('openid-client');

class mTLSEnforcement {
  constructor() {
    this.certs = new Map();
    this.trustStore = [];
  }
  
  // Issue certificate to service
  async issueCertificate(serviceName, namespace) {
    const cert = {
      subject: `/CN=${serviceName}.${namespace}.svc.cluster.local`,
      validity: {
        notBefore: new Date(),
        notAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
      },
      keySize: 4096,
      algorithm: 'RSA',
    };
    
    // Store in secret
    await this.storeInK8sSecret(serviceName, namespace, cert);
    
    this.certs.set(`${serviceName}.${namespace}`, cert);
    
    return cert;
  }
  
  // Verify mutual TLS handshake
  async verifyMutualTLS(clientCert, serverCert) {
    // 1. Verify client certificate signature
    if (!this.verifyCertificateChain(clientCert)) {
      throw new Error('Invalid client certificate chain');
    }
    
    // 2. Verify server certificate signature
    if (!this.verifyCertificateChain(serverCert)) {
      throw new Error('Invalid server certificate chain');
    }
    
    // 3. Verify certificates are in trust store
    if (!this.isInTrustStore(clientCert)) {
      throw new Error('Client certificate not trusted');
    }
    
    if (!this.isInTrustStore(serverCert)) {
      throw new Error('Server certificate not trusted');
    }
    
    // 4. Check certificate validity
    const now = new Date();
    if (now < new Date(clientCert.notBefore) || now > new Date(clientCert.notAfter)) {
      throw new Error('Client certificate expired');
    }
    
    if (now < new Date(serverCert.notBefore) || now > new Date(serverCert.notAfter)) {
      throw new Error('Server certificate expired');
    }
    
    return {
      valid: true,
      clientName: clientCert.subject,
      serverName: serverCert.subject,
    };
  }
  
  verifyCertificateChain(cert) {
    // Verify signature using CA public key
    return true;  // Implementation detail
  }
  
  isInTrustStore(cert) {
    // Check if certificate is in trusted CA store
    return this.trustStore.some(ca => ca.subject === cert.issuer);
  }
}

Pattern 3: Device Trust Verification (BeyondCorp)

模式3:设备信任校验(BeyondCorp)

javascript
class DeviceTrustAssessment {
  async assessDeviceTrust(device) {
    const assessment = {
      deviceId: device.id,
      timestamp: new Date(),
      score: 0,
      checks: {},
    };
    
    // Check 1: Operating System
    const osCheck = await this.checkOS(device);
    assessment.checks.os = osCheck;
    assessment.score += osCheck.trusted ? 25 : 0;
    
    // Check 2: Antivirus/Anti-malware
    const avCheck = await this.checkAntivirus(device);
    assessment.checks.antivirus = avCheck;
    assessment.score += avCheck.enabled ? 25 : 0;
    
    // Check 3: Firewall
    const fwCheck = await this.checkFirewall(device);
    assessment.checks.firewall = fwCheck;
    assessment.score += fwCheck.enabled ? 25 : 0;
    
    // Check 4: Disk Encryption
    const encCheck = await this.checkDiskEncryption(device);
    assessment.checks.encryption = encCheck;
    assessment.score += encCheck.enabled ? 25 : 0;
    
    // Overall trust level
    assessment.trustLevel = this.calculateTrustLevel(assessment.score);
    
    return assessment;
  }
  
  calculateTrustLevel(score) {
    if (score >= 90) return 'TRUSTED';
    if (score >= 70) return 'CONDITIONAL';
    return 'UNTRUSTED';
  }
  
  async checkOS(device) {
    // Verify OS is up-to-date with security patches
    return {
      os: device.osType,
      version: device.osVersion,
      lastPatchDate: device.lastPatchDate,
      trusted: this.isOSPatched(device),
    };
  }
  
  async checkAntivirus(device) {
    // Verify antivirus is installed and current
    return {
      enabled: device.antivirusEnabled,
      product: device.antivirusProduct,
      lastUpdate: device.antivirusLastUpdate,
      signatureAge: this.calculateSignatureAge(device.antivirusLastUpdate),
    };
  }
  
  isOSPatched(device) {
    const daysSincePatch = Math.floor(
      (Date.now() - new Date(device.lastPatchDate)) / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
    );
    
    // Consider patched if updated within 30 days
    return daysSincePatch <= 30;
  }
  
  calculateSignatureAge(lastUpdate) {
    return Math.floor(
      (Date.now() - new Date(lastUpdate)) / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
    );
  }
}

// Usage
const deviceTrust = new DeviceTrustAssessment();

app.use(async (req, res, next) => {
  const device = req.deviceInfo;  // From device management agent
  
  const assessment = await deviceTrust.assessDeviceTrust(device);
  
  if (assessment.trustLevel === 'UNTRUSTED') {
    return res.status(403).json({
      error: 'Device does not meet security requirements',
      assessment,
    });
  }
  
  if (assessment.trustLevel === 'CONDITIONAL') {
    // Allow with MFA requirement
    req.requiresMFA = true;
  }
  
  next();
});

javascript
class DeviceTrustAssessment {
  async assessDeviceTrust(device) {
    const assessment = {
      deviceId: device.id,
      timestamp: new Date(),
      score: 0,
      checks: {},
    };
    
    // Check 1: Operating System
    const osCheck = await this.checkOS(device);
    assessment.checks.os = osCheck;
    assessment.score += osCheck.trusted ? 25 : 0;
    
    // Check 2: Antivirus/Anti-malware
    const avCheck = await this.checkAntivirus(device);
    assessment.checks.antivirus = avCheck;
    assessment.score += avCheck.enabled ? 25 : 0;
    
    // Check 3: Firewall
    const fwCheck = await this.checkFirewall(device);
    assessment.checks.firewall = fwCheck;
    assessment.score += fwCheck.enabled ? 25 : 0;
    
    // Check 4: Disk Encryption
    const encCheck = await this.checkDiskEncryption(device);
    assessment.checks.encryption = encCheck;
    assessment.score += encCheck.enabled ? 25 : 0;
    
    // Overall trust level
    assessment.trustLevel = this.calculateTrustLevel(assessment.score);
    
    return assessment;
  }
  
  calculateTrustLevel(score) {
    if (score >= 90) return 'TRUSTED';
    if (score >= 70) return 'CONDITIONAL';
    return 'UNTRUSTED';
  }
  
  async checkOS(device) {
    // Verify OS is up-to-date with security patches
    return {
      os: device.osType,
      version: device.osVersion,
      lastPatchDate: device.lastPatchDate,
      trusted: this.isOSPatched(device),
    };
  }
  
  async checkAntivirus(device) {
    // Verify antivirus is installed and current
    return {
      enabled: device.antivirusEnabled,
      product: device.antivirusProduct,
      lastUpdate: device.antivirusLastUpdate,
      signatureAge: this.calculateSignatureAge(device.antivirusLastUpdate),
    };
  }
  
  isOSPatched(device) {
    const daysSincePatch = Math.floor(
      (Date.now() - new Date(device.lastPatchDate)) / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
    );
    
    // Consider patched if updated within 30 days
    return daysSincePatch <= 30;
  }
  
  calculateSignatureAge(lastUpdate) {
    return Math.floor(
      (Date.now() - new Date(lastUpdate)) / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
    );
  }
}

// Usage
const deviceTrust = new DeviceTrustAssessment();

app.use(async (req, res, next) => {
  const device = req.deviceInfo;  // From device management agent
  
  const assessment = await deviceTrust.assessDeviceTrust(device);
  
  if (assessment.trustLevel === 'UNTRUSTED') {
    return res.status(403).json({
      error: 'Device does not meet security requirements',
      assessment,
    });
  }
  
  if (assessment.trustLevel === 'CONDITIONAL') {
    // Allow with MFA requirement
    req.requiresMFA = true;
  }
  
  next();
});

Level 3: Advanced

3级:高级内容

Advanced: Context7 MCP Network Policy Validation

高级特性:Context7 MCP网络策略校验

javascript
const { Context7Client } = require('context7-mcp');

class NetworkPolicyValidator {
  constructor(apiKey) {
    this.context7 = new Context7Client(apiKey);
  }
  
  // Validate network policy against threat intelligence
  async validatePolicy(policy) {
    const validation = await this.context7.query({
      type: 'network_policy_validation',
      policy,
      tags: ['zero_trust', 'micro_segmentation'],
    });
    
    return {
      valid: validation.isValid,
      issues: validation.issues,
      recommendations: validation.recommendations,
    };
  }
  
  // Detect policy conflicts
  async detectConflicts(policies) {
    const conflicts = await this.context7.query({
      type: 'policy_conflict_detection',
      policies,
    });
    
    return conflicts.detectedConflicts;
  }
}

javascript
const { Context7Client } = require('context7-mcp');

class NetworkPolicyValidator {
  constructor(apiKey) {
    this.context7 = new Context7Client(apiKey);
  }
  
  // Validate network policy against threat intelligence
  async validatePolicy(policy) {
    const validation = await this.context7.query({
      type: 'network_policy_validation',
      policy,
      tags: ['zero_trust', 'micro_segmentation'],
    });
    
    return {
      valid: validation.isValid,
      issues: validation.issues,
      recommendations: validation.recommendations,
    };
  }
  
  // Detect policy conflicts
  async detectConflicts(policies) {
    const conflicts = await this.context7.query({
      type: 'policy_conflict_detection',
      policies,
    });
    
    return conflicts.detectedConflicts;
  }
}

Checklist

检查清单

  • Default deny-all NetworkPolicy implemented
  • Explicit allow rules for service-to-service communication
  • Cilium L7 policies for HTTP methods/paths
  • mTLS enforced between all services
  • Service certificates issued and managed
  • Device trust assessment process implemented
  • BeyondCorp device verification working
  • Continuous monitoring of network traffic
  • Hubble observability enabled
  • Zero-trust validated against threat intelligence

  • 已实现默认拒绝所有的NetworkPolicy
  • 已为服务间通信配置显式允许规则
  • 已为HTTP方法/路径配置Cilium 7层策略
  • 所有服务之间已强制启用mTLS
  • 已发放并管理服务证书
  • 已实现设备信任评估流程
  • BeyondCorp设备验证功能正常运行
  • 已实现网络流量持续监控
  • 已启用Hubble可观测性能力
  • 零信任方案已通过威胁情报校验

Quick Reference

速查表

ComponentPurposeTool
IdentityVerify WHOMFA, Passwordless
DeviceVerify DEVICE HEALTHEDR, Certificate
NetworkVerify PATHCilium, Istio
ApplicationVerify REQUESTmTLS, RBAC
组件用途工具
身份认证验证访问者身份MFA、无密码认证
设备验证设备健康状态EDR、证书
网络验证访问路径Cilium、Istio
应用验证请求合法性mTLS、RBAC