[!CAUTION]

CRITICAL SAFETY MANDATE: NO AUTO-EXECUTION OF REMEDIATION COMMANDS

NEVER execute any state-modifying, configuration-changing, or remediation commands (such as

gcloud storage buckets add-iam-policy-binding

,

gcloud storage buckets update

, ACL modifications, or object/bucket updates) autonomously or without prior user approval.

RATIONALE & BLAST RADIUS: Cloud Storage security configurations (IAM policy bindings, bucket IP filters, UBLA settings, retention policies) carry an extremely high blast radius. Unapproved modifications can accidentally grant unauthorized public access, leak sensitive data, lock out administrative users, or breach organizational compliance boundaries.

Before executing ANY command that modifies state or configuration: 1. You MUST print the exact command and explain the proposed configuration change to the user. 2. Even when proposing or recommending a remediation command, you MUST explicitly ask the user for confirmation (for example, "Do you approve executing this command? [Y/N]"). 3. You MUST wait for explicit user approval before executing any remediation command. 4. User approval applies ONLY to that single command; EVERY subsequent command execution requires separate explicit user confirmation.

gcloud

run_command

• gcloud commands: Prefix every

  gcloud

  invocation, whatever the subcommand, with the metrics environment variables. Set them inline on each command; shell state may not persist between commands. Use this append form verbatim. It keeps any attribution the host environment already set (for example an IDE plugin tagging agent activity through the same variable) and adds the skill tag after it, so neither value clobbers the other:
  bash

  CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT="${CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT:+$CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT }gcs-skills gcs-skills/1.0 (skill:google-cloud-storage-diagnostic)" \
      gcloud <command> [flags]

  Do not use

  gcloud config set

  for this: it would persist beyond the current task and mislabel unrelated usage.
• curl commands: For direct HTTP calls (such as

  curl

  ), you MUST pass the explicit

  -H "User-Agent: ..."

  header in the shell command syntax exactly like this:
  bash

  curl -H "User-Agent: gcs-skills/1.0 (skill:google-cloud-storage-diagnostic)" ...

• For client libraries, Terraform, and Cloud Storage FUSE, use the user-agent options shown in the corresponding references.

• Clarify the exact principal (

  user:{email}

  or

  serviceAccount:{email}

  ) experiencing the issue.
• Clarify the target resource (

  gs://{bucket_name}

  or

  gs://{bucket_name}/{object_path}

  ).
• Identify the attempted operation (such as read object, write object, list bucket contents, or delete object).
• Identify the authentication mechanism (such as Signed URL, Cookieauth, OAuth token, or Impersonation).

• If the issue involves a 403 Permission Denied error or IAM/ACL denial, immediately consult and execute the step-by-step diagnostic procedures documented in

  references/403_troubleshooting.md

  .
• If running

  gcloud storage buckets get-iam-policy

  returns 403 Permission Denied, DO NOT loop or retry inspection commands on the bucket. First verify that perimeter security controls (such as VPC-SC or IP Filtering) are not blocking access as detailed in

  403_troubleshooting.md

  , because granting IAM roles will not resolve perimeter blocks. If perimeters are not the cause, recognize that the diagnostic caller lacks inspection permissions (

  storage.buckets.getIamPolicy

  ). Recommend granting the least-privilege role

  roles/iam.securityReviewer

  (or a custom role containing

  storage.buckets.getIamPolicy

  ); never recommend

  roles/storage.bucketViewer

  (which does not grant IAM policy access) or

  roles/storage.admin

  . Propose how to remediate inspection access or fallback to project-level IAM policy checks as outlined in

  403_troubleshooting.md

  .

• Synthesize your findings and explain why the access or operation failed (such as missing IAM role, UBLA restriction, legacy ACL mismatch, or VPC-SC block).
• Provide the exact

  gcloud

  remediation command.
• Always include an explicit confirmation prompt (for example, "Do you approve executing this command? [Y/N]") and wait for explicit Y/N confirmation before executing any modification or remediation command on behalf of the user.

• Inputs: User input (principal, bucket/object URI, error text)
• Outputs: Target scope, UBLA vs ACL classification
• Reference Section:

  references/403_troubleshooting.md

  Steps 1-2

• Inputs:

  CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT="${CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT:+$CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT }gcs-skills..." gcloud storage buckets describe / get-iam-policy

• Outputs: Active IAM roles, VPC-SC alerts, Deny policies
• Reference Section:

  references/403_troubleshooting.md

  Steps 3-7

• Inputs: Advanced signals (

  requesterPays

  ,

  retentionPeriod

  , ADC)
• Outputs: Root cause diagnosis
• Reference Section:

  references/403_troubleshooting.md

  Step 8

• Inputs: Root cause diagnosis
• Outputs: Tagged

  gcloud

  remediation command + Y/N prompt
• Reference Section:

  Apply Attribution Tags

  section & Step 8

• Cause: Diagnostic caller lacks

  storage.buckets.getIamPolicy

  permission (such as missing

  roles/iam.securityReviewer

  ), or request is blocked by perimeter security controls (VPC-SC / IP Filtering).
• Fix: DO NOT LOOP OR RETRY. First check whether perimeter security controls (such as VPC-SC or IP Filtering) are blocking access; do not blindly prescribe role grants when perimeters are involved. If perimeters are not the cause, explain that the account executing the check lacks bucket IAM inspection permissions. Recommend granting the least-privilege role

  roles/iam.securityReviewer

  or a custom role containing

  storage.buckets.getIamPolicy

  (never

  roles/storage.bucketViewer

  or

  roles/storage.admin

  ).

• Cause:

  requesterPays: true

  enabled on target bucket
• Fix: DO NOT LOOP OR RETRY. Even with full

  objectViewer

  roles, requests must pass billing project. Prescribe

  --billing-project=PROJECT_ID

  or

  -u PROJECT_ID

  .

• Cause: Request blocked by VPC Service Controls (VPC-SC) service perimeter
• Fix: Inform user that adding IAM roles cannot bypass a VPC-SC perimeter. Direct user to Organization/Project Administrator to update ingress/egress rules.

• Cause: Organization Policy constraint (such as

  constraints/storage.publicAccessPrevention

  or

  constraints/gcp.resourceLocations

  ) or a VPC-SC perimeter block without a logged UUID
• Fix: Inspect active Organization Policy constraints (

  gcloud org-policies list --project=PROJECT_ID

  ) or check Cloud Audit Logs for perimeter rejections, and direct the user to the Organization/Project Administrator.

• Cause: Organization, Folder, or Project IAM Deny policy (

  iam.googleapis.com/DenyPolicy

  ) explicitly denies the permission
• Fix: Explain that explicit IAM Deny policies take absolute precedence over standard allow roles (including

  roles/storage.admin

  ) and cannot be bypassed. Advise checking Deny policies (

  gcloud iam policies list --attachment-point=cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com/projects/PROJECT_ID --kind=denypolicies

  , and

  --attachment-point=organizations/ORG_ID

  if needed) and contacting the Organization Administrator.

• Cause: Legacy GCE VM Access Scopes (

  devstorage.read_only

  ) restrict OAuth token scopes
• Fix: DO NOT RUN LIVE INSPECTION COMMANDS ON FICTIONAL VMS. Explain immediately that GCE access scopes throttle OAuth tokens regardless of IAM roles. Advise stopping the VM (

  gcloud compute instances stop INSTANCE

  ), setting scopes to

  cloud-platform

  (

  gcloud compute instances set-service-account INSTANCE --scopes=cloud-platform

  ), and restarting the VM (

  gcloud compute instances start INSTANCE

  ).

• Cause: Bucket has an active Retention Policy (

  retention_policy

  )
• Fix: Explain that retention locks act as un-bypassable data protection holds and cannot be overridden by IAM until the retention timestamp expires.

• Cause: Account deleted and recreated generates a new underlying Unique ID
• Fix: Instruct user to remove the old IAM policy binding and re-add the exact same binding so IAM registers the new Unique ID.

• Cause: The bucket has

  ip_filter_config

  configured with

  mode: "Enabled"

  , blocking the caller's IP address and preventing live metadata checks.
• Fix: Route diagnostic queries through Cloud Audit Logs to confirm the IP filter violation:
  bash

  CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT="${CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT:+$CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT }gcs-skills gcs-skills/1.0 (skill:google-cloud-storage-diagnostic)" \
      gcloud logging read "resource.type=gcs_bucket AND resource.labels.bucket_name=\"{bucket_name}\" AND protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail=\"{principal_email}\"" --project="{project_id}" --limit=5 --format=json

  If

  gcloud logging read

  returns permission errors (

  403

  ),

  Project not found or deleted

  , an empty array

  []

  , or only unrelated Admin Activity entries (

  cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity

  ) with zero Data Access entries (

  cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Fdata_access

  ) for the failing operation, do not loop or retry. Immediately halt technical diagnosis, inform the user that they lack visibility into the Cloud Audit Logs (due to permissions, disabled Data Access logging, or log exclusions) and cannot definitively diagnose advanced network denials, suggest that Bucket-Level IP Filtering or VPC Service Controls may be blocking access, and direct them to ask a Project/Organization Administrator to check the Cloud Audit Logs (including

  protoPayload.status.code=7

  and

  vpcServiceControlsUniqueIdentifier

  ) or enable Data Access Audit Logs.
  Remediation: Do not write ad-hoc CLI commands. Refer to Step 8 in

  references/403_troubleshooting.md

  for proper instructions to fetch the existing

  ip_filter_config

  , append the caller's CIDR to

  allowedIpCidrRanges

  in

  ALLOWED_IPS.json

  without overwriting existing ranges, and apply it via the

  gcloud storage buckets update

  command.

• Cause: Browser downloads via the

  storage.cloud.google.com

  domain use Google Account cookie authentication, also known as

  Cookieauth

  . Having Data Access Audit Logging (

  DATA_READ

  /

  DATA_WRITE

  for

  storage.googleapis.com

  ) enabled on the project conflicts with Cookieauth and causes consistent 403 errors in the browser (or multiple logged-in Google Accounts send the wrong identity cookie).
• Fix: Inspect the bucket IAM policy/configuration and check the project's audit log configuration using:
  bash

  CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT="${CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT:+$CLOUDSDK_METRICS_ENVIRONMENT }gcs-skills gcs-skills/1.0 (skill:google-cloud-storage-diagnostic)" \
      gcloud projects get-iam-policy {project_id} --format="json(auditConfigs)"

  Explain that Data Access Logging conflicts with Cookieauth when accessing objects via

  storage.cloud.google.com

  in the browser. Advise accessing objects via

  gcloud

  , API endpoints (

  storage.googleapis.com

  ), or Signed URLs to bypass browser cookie authentication limitations (or testing in an Incognito window / adjusting Data Access Audit Logging if browser access is required).

• Cause: Target bucket does not exist or was deleted
• Fix: DO NOT LOOP OR RETRY. Stop trying to execute live commands on the missing bucket. Acknowledge the bucket is missing, but proceed to explain your diagnosis hypothetically based on the provided scenario context.