Reviewer (/mantis-review)
System Goal
Independent Validator. Reviews consolidated findings against active source code
to verify validity and filter out noise and false positives.
Command Definition
- Command:
- Description: Independently reviews findings and filters out false
positives.
Input/Output Contract
- Reads:
- (finding JSON files, including each finding's optional
provenance stamp).
workspace/.mantis_state.json
(current loop ; and, when
present, = {root, snapshot_id, snapshot_pinned}
for
snapshot provenance).
- Invocation args when passed by the orchestrator: ,
, (and, rarely, ).
- Target source code files at the paths/lines, read under the
resolved (the pinned snapshot root — see Instructions Step 0 /
Block A), never the live tree when a snapshot is pinned.
- Writes:
- Updates findings on disk in-place (sets , ,
, , and appends history).
- Writes helper script
workspace/helpers/append_review.py
.
- Preconditions:
- exists with finding files.
- Target source code files exist.
- Idempotency Guarantee:
- Modifies finding files in-place using the helper script ,
which MUST carry
# MANTIS_HELPER_VERSION = 2
as its first line; regenerate
the helper if that marker is absent or a different integer (see Instructions
step 5).
- Idempotency key is (pass_number, snapshot). Before (re)writing a
finding, scan its array:
- SNAPSHOT MODE OFF (neither was passed NOR is
readable in state): SKIP the review update iff a
entry already exists for the current
(byte-for-byte today's behavior).
- SNAPSHOT MODE ON: SKIP the review update iff a
entry exists whose equals the current pass AND whose
equals . A reviewer entry that lacks
(legacy) or carries a different counts as UNKNOWN → RE-REVIEW
(do NOT skip), so a finding reviewed under the old skill is re-grounded
against the current pinned snapshot.
Instructions
Read and evaluate the deduplicated findings against the actual source code of
the repository. Assume every finding is a false positive by default. Your job
is to disprove the finding using an adversarial stance. Evaluate the claim based
ONLY on the code and the raw claim itself. Explicitly ignore the original
finder's prose reasoning and justification, as they may be hallucinated.
Execute your validation as follows:
Step 0 — Locator Resolution & Snapshot Provenance Gate (do this FIRST, before
reading any finding's code):
0a. Resolve where to read code. Block A — Locator Resolution here:
LOCATOR RESOLUTION (before reading ANY target code or artifact):
0. ROLE: If this skill NEVER reads target source (report, calibrate, reflect),
you are a FINDINGS-ONLY stage: skip steps 2-6; still read active_snapshot from
state for provenance/annotation; NEVER stop merely because a code root is unset.
1. Determine CODE_ROOT, in this priority order:
a. If --target_root is passed on THIS invocation, CODE_ROOT = --target_root.
It is AUTHORITATIVE and OVERRIDES SNAPSHOT_ROOT and the state fallback
(used when a caller hands you a prepared tree, e.g. a patched shadow).
b. Else if --snapshot_root (or SNAPSHOT_ROOT) is passed, use it.
c. Else read state_root/workspace/.mantis_state.json (state_root from
--state_root if passed, else ./workspace/... relative to the current dir)
-> active_snapshot.root / .snapshot_id / .snapshot_pinned.
d. Else (no arg AND no readable active_snapshot): CODE_ROOT = current directory,
treat snapshot_pinned = false (MODE-OFF). Do NOT stop.
2. SENTINEL CHECK (only if snapshot_pinned is true AND you did NOT take path 1a):
verify CODE_ROOT/.mantis_snapshot_id exists and equals SNAPSHOT_ID. If missing
or different -> STOP "snapshot sentinel mismatch". (A --target_root tree (1a) is
deliberately mutated and is sentinel-EXEMPT.)
3. PATH FIELDS:
- SNAPSHOT-RELATIVE (read under CODE_ROOT): code_paths entries; plan target_files
that are file paths. Strip ONLY a trailing ":<digits>". A code_paths entry
containing "://" is a URL/endpoint, NOT a file read. A code_paths entry that is
NOT of the form <existing-path>:<integer> is a non-source LOCATOR
(symbol/offset/endpoint): only check that the artifact/symbol exists; skip ALL
line-range and line-existence logic.
- STATE-RELATIVE (read/write under state_root/workspace, NEVER prefix CODE_ROOT):
kb_references, repro_file_path, reattack_file_path, helper scripts, report
files, and all state/findings JSON.
4. Never WRITE under CODE_ROOT when snapshot_pinned is true. Any command that
compiles, generates, or writes artifacts MUST run in a PRIVATE SHADOW copy
(mktemp -d from CODE_ROOT), never with cwd=CODE_ROOT. Read-only inspection may
cd into CODE_ROOT.
5. VCS-METADATA CARVE-OUT: history-log extraction and any VCS diff/blame command
run in the LIVE repository root (which still has .git/.hg/.repo), NOT CODE_ROOT
(the snapshot copy strips VCS metadata). Do NOT stop merely because CODE_ROOT
lacks .git/.hg/.repo.
6. Every shell command uses ABSOLUTE paths and sets its own working directory on
that call. Do NOT assume the working directory persists between calls.
The reviewer READS target source, so it is NOT a findings-only stage: run all of
Block A steps 1-6.
is the pinned snapshot root you will read every
entry under. Per Block A step 3, a
entry containing
is a URL (existence check only), and any entry not of the form
<existing-path>:<integer>
is a non-source locator (check the artifact/symbol
exists; skip all line-existence logic). Never STOP merely because
lacks
/
(Block A step 5).
[!NOTE]
CURRENT-PASS CHECK (defensive; the binding guarantee is on the
harness per Scenario 2): if
is
present AND
active_snapshot.pass != state.pass_number
, treat the snapshot as
STALE for this pass — STOP "stale active_snapshot: pass mismatch" or degrade
as HALT (
effectively false: no authoritative verdicts, Block
B NOT_MATCHED, reproduce
). This catches a custom harness that
preserved
across the Stage 15 pass increment without
re-pinning. The reference meta-agent re-pins every pass, so this check never
fires there. Block B itself cannot detect this (it is
-only, not
-aware).
0b.
Determine SNAPSHOT MODE (once, before touching findings): - SNAPSHOT
MODE is
OFF iff
was NOT passed on this invocation AND
workspace/.mantis_state.json
has no readable
. This is a
legacy / non-sync run: do NOT run the Snapshot Provenance Gate below; review
EVERY finding with steps 1-5 exactly as before. - Otherwise SNAPSHOT MODE is
ON. From Block A you now hold
and
. Apply the
Snapshot Provenance Gate (0c) to every finding.
0c. Snapshot Provenance Gate (SNAPSHOT MODE ON only). After Step 1 loads the
findings, apply the match check to EACH finding F via Block B — Snapshot Match
Check, applied to F:
SNAPSHOT MATCH CHECK for finding F (decides MATCHED vs NOT_MATCHED):
1. If snapshot_pinned is false -> NOT_MATCHED. Stop.
2. Read F.discovery_commit:
- missing OR empty OR the literal "MIXED" -> NOT_MATCHED.
- not exactly equal to SNAPSHOT_ID -> NOT_MATCHED.
- exactly equal to SNAPSHOT_ID -> MATCHED.
There is no other route to MATCHED; never fuzzy-compare. The global "default the
field and proceed" backward-compat rule does NOT apply to discovery_commit:
absent = NOT_MATCHED. (There is NO separate "dirty" gate: a dirty tree's
SNAPSHOT_ID already embeds the working-tree content hash, so within-pass findings
MATCH and cross-pass bare-commit findings do not.)
Then, using the idempotency rule (Input/Output Contract → Idempotency Guarantee)
to avoid double-writes:
- MATCHED → F is grounded in the current pinned snapshot. Proceed to steps
2-5 (the full 13-rule review) for F.
- NOT_MATCHED (includes: false / HALT / live-endpoint
pass; missing, empty, or the literal ; or
discovery_commit != SNAPSHOT_ID
) → F was discovered against a different (or
absent/unpinned) snapshot; its line numbers may no longer point
at the same code. DO NOT run the 13 rules on F. DO NOT mark it
FALSE_POSITIVE. Finalize F as a drift via the helper (step
5), writing EXACTLY:
"status": "NEEDS_RESEARCH"
- :
"Snapshot drift: finding discovered against snapshot <F.discovery_commit or 'unknown'>, which does not match the current pinned snapshot <SNAPSHOT_ID>. Not re-validated this pass; routed to re-research."
- omit (and, if F carried stale from a prior
pass, leave them — they are ignored downstream because status is not
VALID/PROVISIONALLY_VALID).
- : all 13 constraints set to (paste the object
below verbatim). This object is REQUIRED: appending a history
entry makes mandatory on a non-chain finding
( lines 365-398), and for a finding every
entry MUST avoid / ( lines 418-470).
Setting
ensure_source_code_coherence
and
verify_attacker_control_of_source
to (never ) is the whole
point: a line/path mismatch caused by DRIFT is NOT evidence of
hallucination, so Rules 12/13 must NOT fire on it.
- append the entry (with , per step 5 / the
history JSON below). Then STOP processing F — skip steps 2-5 for it.
Drift
(paste verbatim; all 13 keys, all
):
json
{
"ignore_hypothetical_misuse": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: not re-validated against the current pinned snapshot" },
"ignore_missing_hygiene": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: not re-validated against the current pinned snapshot" },
"require_strict_reproducibility": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: not re-validated against the current pinned snapshot" },
"avoid_pedantic_linting": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: not re-validated against the current pinned snapshot" },
"no_security_flaw_stretching": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: not re-validated against the current pinned snapshot" },
"evaluate_questionable_file_paths": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: not re-validated against the current pinned snapshot" },
"ignore_resource_exhaustion_dos": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: not re-validated against the current pinned snapshot" },
"intrinsic_security_flaws": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: not re-validated against the current pinned snapshot" },
"verify_mitigations_pragmatically": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: not re-validated against the current pinned snapshot" },
"refine_code_paths_strictly": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: not re-validated against the current pinned snapshot" },
"ignore_simd_vector_padding": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: not re-validated against the current pinned snapshot" },
"ensure_source_code_coherence": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: line/path mismatch may be caused by drift, not hallucination; not re-validated" },
"verify_attacker_control_of_source": { "outcome": "UNKNOWN", "reason": "snapshot drift: trust-boundary path not re-traced against the current pinned snapshot" }
}
Findings finalized as drift
in Step 0c are DONE — do not
process them again in steps 2-5. Only MATCHED findings (SNAPSHOT MODE ON) or all
findings (SNAPSHOT MODE OFF) flow into steps 2-5 below.
-
Load Clustered Findings: Read the JSON files in the
directory. If the directory is empty or missing, notify the user.
-
Source Code Inspection: For each finding that reached this step (in
SNAPSHOT MODE ON, only findings that were
MATCHED in Step 0c; findings
finalized there as drift
are already done and are skipped),
read the file
under (the pinned snapshot root resolved in
Step 0 / Block A — resolve every
path relative to
,
never the live tree) to inspect the exact files and line numbers listed in
and confirm the finding is grounded in the actual snapshot
state. Do not make assumptions about the validity of a path without
inspecting the source code first.
-
Strict Validation Filtering (Apply the 13 Negative Constraints): Evaluate
each finding against these strict criteria. Mark a finding as
FALSE_POSITIVE if it violates any of the following rules:
- Ignore Hypothetical Misuse: Do not flag security flaws that rely on a
calling API hypothetically misusing a function, writing bad fallback
logic, or sending invalid parameters if the function itself behaves
safely.
- Ignore Missing Hygiene / Defense-In-Depth: Do not report missing HTTP
security headers (e.g., ), missing authentication
on local-only test functions, or hardcoded mock databases as security
flaws.
- Require Strict Reproducibility: Only mark a finding as VALID if a
direct, unambiguous, and triggerable flaw exists within the boundaries of
the code logic. If the finding is extremely fragile (e.g., relies on
unstable timing that cannot be automated or brute-forced, or requires
unrealistic environmental conditions to trigger), mark it as
FALSE_POSITIVE. Note on Race Conditions: Do NOT dismiss race conditions
or timing bugs simply because they have a low success probability (e.g.,
1 in a million), provided the attack path can be automated and repeatedly
attempted by an attacker to eventually trigger the exploit.
- Avoid Pedantic Linting: If the code uses standard safe libraries
(such as , parameterised SQL queries, or secure standard
library hashes) but lacks extreme paranoia, mark it as FALSE_POSITIVE.
- No Security Flaw Stretching on Mitigations: If you are reviewing a
mitigation or a safe variant of a function that successfully blocks the
original security flaw class, do NOT invent complex protocol-level
bypasses or adjacent security flaw classes (e.g., SSRF when reviewing
Command Injection fixes). If the primary security flaw is successfully
blocked, mark it as FALSE_POSITIVE.
- Evaluate Questionable File Paths: Do NOT instantly dismiss a finding
simply because its path contains , , or .
Code in these paths is sometimes compiled into production targets or
reachable via production endpoints. Do not blindly assume it is safe;
instead, take reasonable measures to trace its usage to confirm whether
it is actually exposed in production.
- Ignore Resource Exhaustion DoS: Do not flag functions for lacking
recursion limits, input size boundaries, or cycle constraints unless the
primary stated purpose of the module is to defend against DoS attacks.
- Intrinsic Security Flaws: If a function uses a fundamentally broken
algorithm (such as MD5, SHA1), hardcodes static secrets, or contains
direct injection paths in its own logic, mark it as VALID even if it is
not currently called anywhere in the codebase.
- Verify Mitigations Pragmatically: Do not hallucinate flaws in active
mitigations. If the code adds trailing validation slashes or configures
safe parsing flags, accept that the mitigation works.
- Refine Strictly: The field should only
include the exact of the flawed code block. Strip
out any helper files, test harnesses, or correct caller files from
.
- Ignore SIMD/Vector Padding Violations: If a finding represents an
out-of-bounds read or write inside optimized vector routines (e.g., NEON,
SSE, AVX, VSX), verify if the library employs a global memory allocation
contract (such as trailing safety padding, like ). If the
out-of-bounds access is mathematically guaranteed to reside entirely
within this pre-allocated padding buffer under all execution paths, mark
the finding as a FALSE_POSITIVE (By Design).
- Ensure Source Code Coherence (Anti-Hallucination): Verify that every
file path listed in exists in the repository, and that
function names, variable names, or line numbers actually exist at those
locations. If references are missing or incorrect, immediately mark the
finding as a FALSE_POSITIVE to prevent downstream agents from wasting
resources on hallucinated bugs.
- Verify Attacker Control of the Source (Trust-Boundary Tracing):
Before marking a data-flow finding VALID, identify and cite the file:line
where untrusted data enters the analyzed codebase (the "Ingress Point")
from which the specific tainted field's value flows to the sink, OR where
that field is populated by an untrusted writer.
- If you have access to the untrusted-side code (e.g. Guest/Client in a
multi-component repo), cite the writer.
- If you only have access to the trusted-side code, cite the Host/Server
ingress point on the data-flow path (e.g., reads from shared memory,
IPC handlers, HTTP request parameter retrieval).
- If the source data is proven to originate solely from trusted-side
origins (server-authored static config, host-plane internal state),
mark FALSE_POSITIVE.
- Exception: Do not apply this rule to Intrinsic Security Flaws (Rule 08)
where the vulnerability exists in library code independent of active
callers.
-
Status Resolution:
- Mark as FALSE_POSITIVE if it violates any of the 13 rules above.
- Mark as VALID if it passes all rules and has a clear, triggerable
flaw.
- Mark as PROVISIONALLY_VALID if it passes the rules, but you are
uncertain of its feasibility without dynamic verification (e.g. requires
complex heap grooming or precise timing).
- Mark as NEEDS_RESEARCH if the review is inconclusive due to high
complexity, unresolved external APIs, or massive call graphs — OR because
the finding was NOT_MATCHED by the Step 0c Snapshot Provenance Gate
(snapshot drift). Drift findings are finalized in Step 0c and never reach
these 13 rules; do NOT re-classify a drift finding as .
- SCHEMA-CRITICAL: is the ONLY status for which a
entry may be (or ). For any
, , or finding, EVERY
checklist entry must be / / — never
— or (lines 418-470) will reject the finding. If a
rule looks failed but you are NOT setting status to
(e.g. Rule 12/13 references look off only because of snapshot drift), use
with a , not .
-
Checklist Construction:
- Construct the object evaluating all 13 negative
constraints. For each rule, set to:
- : if the finding satisfies the constraint (does not violate the
rule, meaning the bug remains potentially valid).
- : if the finding violates the rule. Setting ANY entry to
REQUIRES the finding's to be
( lines 418-470 reject on /
/). A entry also REQUIRES a
( lines 788-797).
- : if the rule applicability is unresolved/needs research
(REQUIRES a ). Use this — not — whenever the finding
is not being marked , including all rules on a drift
finding (Step 0c).
- : if this rule is entirely irrelevant to this class
of bug (REQUIRES a ).
- Consistency rule: if is , every entry must be or
(no , no ) per lines
471-507.
-
Construct Reproduction Script Hints: For every finding marked as
VALID or
PROVISIONALLY_VALID, provide high-signal
explaining how a reproducer agent can trigger the bug, what inputs or payload
parameters are required, and what crash condition, sanitizer trace
(ASan/UBSan/MSan/TSan), or functional validation result (e.g., an unexpected
HTTP 200 OK) is expected to confirm the security flaw.
-
Token-Optimized File Updates: To minimize LLM output tokens,
do not
re-emit or manually rewrite the entire JSON object in your output. Instead,
write a reusable helper script (e.g.,
workspace/helpers/append_review.py
)
during your first finding update. For all subsequent findings, do not
regenerate the script; simply execute the existing helper script with the new
parameters to append the required fields.
Helper version guard (mechanical): the helper's FIRST line MUST be the
comment
# MANTIS_HELPER_VERSION = 2
. Before reusing an existing
workspace/helpers/append_review.py
, check that first line (a one-line
grep): if the marker is ABSENT or a DIFFERENT integer, REGENERATE the helper
(an old persisted helper would silently omit the
provenance field
and mishandle the drift path). The regenerated helper MUST:
- accept parameters for , , optional ,
(JSON), , , and
(write it under key , never );
- write the reviewer entry INCLUDING (the current
; omit or write only in SNAPSHOT MODE OFF, where no
snapshot is in play);
- enforce the (pass_number, snapshot) idempotency check (Idempotency
Guarantee): do nothing if a matching reviewer entry already exists.
You must append the following to the existing object:
-
A
field (one of
,
,
, or
).
-
-
A
field (optional for
or
).
-
A
object containing evaluations for all 13 negative
constraints (each key in the object maps to the constraint of the matching
name from Section 3 above):
json
{
"ignore_hypothetical_misuse": { "outcome": "PASS" },
"ignore_missing_hygiene": { "outcome": "PASS" },
"require_strict_reproducibility": { "outcome": "FAIL", "reason": "Requires unstable 1-in-a-million race condition that cannot be automated." },
"avoid_pedantic_linting": { "outcome": "PASS" },
"no_security_flaw_stretching": { "outcome": "PASS" },
"evaluate_questionable_file_paths": { "outcome": "PASS" },
"ignore_resource_exhaustion_dos": { "outcome": "PASS" },
"intrinsic_security_flaws": { "outcome": "PASS" },
"verify_mitigations_pragmatically": { "outcome": "PASS" },
"refine_code_paths_strictly": { "outcome": "PASS" },
"ignore_simd_vector_padding": { "outcome": "PASS" },
"ensure_source_code_coherence": { "outcome": "PASS" },
"verify_attacker_control_of_source": { "outcome": "PASS" }
}
For backward compatibility, the schema also permits
as
an alternative to
, but
is preferred. The
must be provided if the outcome is
,
, or
(or if
is
) to explain the evaluation; it should be omitted
for
/
to save tokens.
-
An entry to the
array (now carrying the snapshot the review was
performed against, for
idempotency):
json
{
"stage": "reviewer",
"action": "reviewed",
"details": "Determined status as [VALID/FALSE_POSITIVE/PROVISIONALLY_VALID/NEEDS_RESEARCH] because [reason]",
"pass_number": <current_pass_number>,
"snapshot": "<SNAPSHOT_ID>",
"timestamp": "<current_iso8601_timestamp>"
}
In SNAPSHOT MODE OFF (no snapshot in play), set
(or omit the
field).
's
has no
additionalProperties:false
,
so this extra field validates unchanged.
When complete, notify the user.