DMA attacks exploit the ability of PCIe devices to directly access
system memory without CPU involvement. An attacker can:
- Read arbitrary physical memory
- Write to physical memory
- Bypass software-based protections
- Remain invisible to OS-level detection

- FPGA development board (Xilinx/Altera)
- PCIe interface capability
- Sufficient logic resources
- Development environment

- Screamer PCIe (Xilinx Artix-7)
- PCIe Squirrel
- AC701 (Xilinx Artix-7)
- SP605 (Xilinx Spartan-6)
- Custom FPGA boards

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- Vivado (Xilinx)
- Quartus (Intel/Altera)
- Open-source toolchains

- TLP packet generation
- Configuration space emulation
- MSI/MSI-X interrupt handling
- DMA read/write implementation

- Device ID spoofing
- Vendor ID masquerading
- Serial number randomization
- Capability structure emulation

- Network adapters (Intel I210/I226)
- Storage controllers
- USB controllers
- Sound cards

1. Correct PCI configuration space
2. Proper capability structures
3. BAR (Base Address Register) setup
4. Interrupt handling

- Emulate Intel I210 NIC
- Proper device/vendor ID
- PHY register emulation
- Minimal functionality for detection evasion

// Typical pcileech API usage
HANDLE hDevice;
BYTE buffer[0x1000];

// Read physical memory
pcileech_read_phys(hDevice, physAddr, buffer, sizeof(buffer));

// Walk page tables to translate VA to PA
PHYSICAL_ADDRESS TranslateVA(UINT64 cr3, UINT64 virtualAddr) {
    // PML4 -> PDPT -> PD -> PT -> Physical
    UINT64 pml4e = ReadPhys(cr3 + PML4_INDEX(virtualAddr) * 8);
    UINT64 pdpte = ReadPhys(PFN(pml4e) + PDPT_INDEX(virtualAddr) * 8);
    UINT64 pde = ReadPhys(PFN(pdpte) + PD_INDEX(virtualAddr) * 8);
    UINT64 pte = ReadPhys(PFN(pde) + PT_INDEX(virtualAddr) * 8);
    return PFN(pte) + PAGE_OFFSET(virtualAddr);
}

- Scan physical memory for valid CR3 values
- Look for kernel structures
- Use signature scanning
- Validate page table entries

- CE server for DMA access
- Process memory reading via DMA
- Remote debugging capability

- Structure reconstruction
- Live memory viewing
- Pointer scanning

- DMA libraries (DMALib)
- Minimal VM libraries
- Game-specific cheats

1. No process attachment
2. No suspicious API calls
3. No kernel driver needed
4. No code injection
5. Operates below OS level

- Read-only for some implementations
- Timing-based detection possible
- Hardware fingerprinting
- Memory encryption (on newer systems)

- PCIe device enumeration
- IOMMU/VT-d monitoring
- DMA buffer analysis
- Performance counter anomalies

- pcileech-wifi: Wireless card emulation
- Remote memory access
- Extended range operation

- Ring -2 execution
- Highest privilege level
- Extremely stealthy
- Complex implementation

- Virtual Management Device
- Hide behind Intel VMD
- Complex detection evasion

/firmware
├── src/
│   ├── pcie_core.v       # PCIe core
│   ├── tlp_handler.v     # TLP processing
│   ├── dma_engine.v      # DMA implementation
│   └── config_space.v    # Config emulation
├── constraints/
│   └── board.xdc         # Pin constraints
└── scripts/
    └── build.tcl         # Build script

// TLP packet handling
module tlp_handler (
    input wire clk,
    input wire [127:0] rx_data,
    output reg [127:0] tx_data,
    // DMA interface
    output reg [63:0] dma_addr,
    output reg [31:0] dma_data,
    output reg dma_read,
    output reg dma_write
);

- Security research only
- Authorized testing environments
- Responsible disclosure
- Legal compliance

- Physical hardware access required
- Potential system instability
- Detection by advanced anti-cheat
- Legal implications

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/gmh5225/awesome-game-security/refs/heads/main/README.md