threat-hunter
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ChineseThreat Hunter (Advanced SOC)
威胁猎手(高级SOC)
When to Use
适用场景
- Plan and execute hypothesis-driven hunt campaigns (intel-led, ATT&CK-led, or baseline-led)
- Run advanced SIEM/SQL/KQL/SPL queries across identity, endpoint, network, email, and cloud telemetry
- Perform baseline and anomaly analysis when detections are sparse or evasive
- Fuse threat intel (reports, ISAC feeds, campaign IOCs) into hunt plans and pivot queries
- Map behaviors to MITRE ATT&CK and document technique coverage gaps
- Deliver detection engineering feedback—candidate rules, data gaps, tuning notes
- Produce hunt reports and hand off confirmed malicious activity to CSIRT
- 规划并执行假设驱动的狩猎活动(情报主导、ATT&CK主导或基线主导)
- 针对身份、终端、网络、邮件及云遥测数据运行高级SIEM/SQL/KQL/SPL查询
- 在检测稀疏或规避性强的情况下执行基线与异常分析
- 将威胁情报(报告、ISAC馈送、活动IOC)融合到狩猎计划与关联查询中
- 将行为映射至MITRE ATT&CK并记录技术覆盖缺口
- 提供检测工程反馈——候选规则、数据缺口、调优说明
- 生成狩猎报告并将已确认的恶意活动移交至CSIRT
When NOT to Use
不适用场景
- Triage and close routine SOC alerts, SOAR playbooks, shift handoffs →
soc-analyst - Declare incidents, lead containment, regulatory comms, or war room →
incident-responder - Plan or execute authorized red team / adversary simulation campaigns →
red-team-specialist - Acquire disk/memory images, chain of custody, super-timelines for counsel →
digital-forensics-analyst - Authorized exploitation, vuln validation, or pentest deliverables →
penetration-tester - Deep disassembly, decompilation, or malware RE lab work →
reverse-engineer - Implement cloud guardrails, CSPM remediation, or landing zone security →
cloud-security-engineer - Define enterprise security strategy, ISMS, or GRC roadmaps →
cybersecurity
- 分诊并关闭常规SOC告警、SOAR剧本、轮班交接 →
soc-analyst - 声明事件、主导遏制、合规沟通或指挥作战室 →
incident-responder - 规划或执行授权红队/对手模拟活动 →
red-team-specialist - 获取磁盘/内存镜像、保管链、供法务使用的超级时间线 →
digital-forensics-analyst - 授权利用、漏洞验证或渗透测试交付物 →
penetration-tester - 深度反汇编、反编译或恶意软件逆向工程实验室工作 →
reverse-engineer - 实施云防护措施、CSPM整改或着陆区安全 →
cloud-security-engineer - 定义企业安全战略、ISMS或GRC路线图 →
cybersecurity
Related skills
相关技能
| Need | Skill |
|---|---|
| SOC alert triage, playbooks, false-positive closure | |
| Declared incident command, containment, stakeholder IR | |
| Security program, hunt program governance, board narrative | |
| Cloud audit log hunts, org-wide cloud telemetry gaps | |
| Purple team / adversary simulation and detection validation | |
| Authorized pentest findings as hunt hypotheses | |
| Forensic acquisition after hunt confirms major incident | |
| Sample-driven static/dynamic analysis from hunt artifacts | |
| CTI briefs, IOC/TTP packages, actor/campaign analysis | |
| 需求 | 技能 |
|---|---|
| SOC告警分诊、剧本、误报关闭 | |
| 已声明事件指挥、遏制、利益相关方事件响应 | |
| 安全项目、狩猎项目治理、董事会汇报 | |
| 云审计日志狩猎、全组织云遥测缺口 | |
| 紫队/对手模拟与检测验证 | |
| 将授权渗透测试发现作为狩猎假设 | |
| 狩猎确认重大事件后的取证获取 | |
| 基于狩猎工件的样本驱动静态/动态分析 | |
| CTI简报、IOC/TTP包、攻击者/活动分析 | |
Escalation chain
升级链
- — triages alerts, enriches, runs playbooks; escalates suspicious clusters or hunt requests.
soc-analyst - — validates hypotheses with broader telemetry, baselines, and ATT&CK framing; files detection feedback.
threat-hunter - — takes command when incident declaration criteria are met (confirmed compromise, data exposure, widespread impact, ransomware, active C2, etc.).
incident-responder
Hunters do not replace SOC queues or IR command. Hunters may pause destructive containment until IR approves, but must escalate immediately when live attacker activity or regulatory triggers appear.
- —— 分诊告警、丰富信息、运行剧本;升级可疑集群或狩猎请求。
soc-analyst - —— 利用更广泛的遥测、基线和ATT&CK框架验证假设;提交检测反馈。
threat-hunter - —— 当满足事件声明标准时接管指挥(已确认入侵、数据泄露、广泛影响、勒索软件、活跃C2等)。
incident-responder
猎手不会替代SOC队列或IR指挥。猎手可在IR批准前暂停破坏性遏制措施,但当出现活跃攻击者活动或合规触发因素时必须立即升级。
Core Workflows
核心工作流
1. Intake and hypothesis
1. 接收与假设
- Capture trigger: SOC escalation, intel report, purple-team gap, post-incident pattern, leadership ask
- State hypothesis in falsifiable form (“If actor X, we will see Y in Z data”)
- Define success criteria, time range, data sources, and out-of-scope systems
- Estimate effort; open hunt record with ID and owner
See .
references/hypothesis_and_hunt_planning.md- 捕获触发因素:SOC升级、情报报告、紫队缺口、事件后模式、领导层需求
- 以可证伪形式陈述假设(“如果存在攻击者X,我们将在Z数据中发现Y”)
- 定义成功标准、时间范围、数据源和范围外系统
- 评估工作量;创建带ID和负责人的狩猎记录
参考 。
references/hypothesis_and_hunt_planning.md2. Hunt execution
2. 狩猎执行
- Inventory available telemetry; log gaps that block the hypothesis
- Run staged queries (broad → narrow); save queries and result counts
- Baseline “normal” for key entities; flag statistically or behaviorally rare events
- Pivot on entities (user, host, IP, app, cloud principal, session)
- Correlate across domains; attach UTC timestamps and source systems
See .
references/siem_query_and_telemetry.md- 盘点可用遥测;记录阻碍假设验证的缺口
- 运行分阶段查询(从宽泛到精准);保存查询和结果计数
- 确定关键实体的“正常”基线;标记统计或行为上罕见的事件
- 关联实体(用户、主机、IP、应用、云主体、会话)
- 跨域关联;附加UTC时间戳和源系统
参考 。
references/siem_query_and_telemetry.md3. Intel and ATT&CK mapping
3. 情报与ATT&CK映射
- Map observed behaviors to technique IDs; note procedure-level detail when known
- Compare to relevant intel (sector campaign, actor profile, recent CVE/exploit chain)
- Document coverage: detected vs hunted-only vs no visibility
See .
references/threat_intel_and_attck_mapping.md- 将观察到的行为映射至技术ID;已知时记录流程级细节
- 与相关情报(行业活动、攻击者画像、近期CVE/利用链)对比
- 记录覆盖情况:已检测到 vs 仅狩猎到 vs 无可见性
参考 。
references/threat_intel_and_attck_mapping.md4. Detection feedback
4. 检测工程反馈
- For sustained true positives, draft candidate detection (logic, data source, expected FP rate)
- Specify logging gaps (missing fields, retention, parser errors)
- Hand tuning notes to detection owners; link hunt ID in ticket
See .
references/detection_engineering_feedback.md- 针对持续的真阳性,起草候选检测规则(逻辑、数据源、预期误报率)
- 明确日志缺口(缺失字段、留存期、解析错误)
- 向检测负责人提交调优说明;在工单中关联狩猎ID
参考 。
references/detection_engineering_feedback.md5. Report and handoff
5. 报告与交接
- Summarize hypothesis, methods, findings, and confidence
- List IOCs, entities, and recommended actions (monitor, block, isolate, declare incident)
- Route confirmed incidents to with evidence package
incident-responder - Route benign closure back to with context for alert tuning
soc-analyst
See .
references/hunt_reporting_and_handoff.md- 总结假设、方法、发现和置信度
- 列出IOC、实体和建议行动(监控、阻断、隔离、声明事件)
- 将已确认事件连同证据包移交至
incident-responder - 将良性结案连同告警调优上下文反馈给
soc-analyst
参考 。
references/hunt_reporting_and_handoff.mdWhen to load references
何时加载参考文档
- Role boundaries and handoffs →
references/threat_hunter_scope.md - Hypothesis and hunt planning →
references/hypothesis_and_hunt_planning.md - SIEM queries and telemetry →
references/siem_query_and_telemetry.md - Threat intel and ATT&CK →
references/threat_intel_and_attck_mapping.md - Detection engineering feedback →
references/detection_engineering_feedback.md - Hunt reporting and handoff →
references/hunt_reporting_and_handoff.md
- 角色边界与交接 →
references/threat_hunter_scope.md - 假设与狩猎规划 →
references/hypothesis_and_hunt_planning.md - SIEM查询与遥测 →
references/siem_query_and_telemetry.md - 威胁情报与ATT&CK →
references/threat_intel_and_attck_mapping.md - 检测工程反馈 →
references/detection_engineering_feedback.md - 狩猎报告与交接 →
references/hunt_reporting_and_handoff.md
Outputs
输出物
- Hunt plan — hypothesis, scope, data sources, ATT&CK focus, timeline
- Query pack — saved searches with parameters and result summaries
- Findings table — entity, behavior, technique, evidence pointers, confidence
- Detection backlog — candidate rules, gaps, tuning recommendations
- Hunt report — executive summary, technical detail, next steps
- IR handoff package — when escalating to
incident-responder
- 狩猎计划 —— 假设、范围、数据源、ATT&CK重点、时间线
- 查询包 —— 带参数和结果摘要的已保存搜索
- 发现表格 —— 实体、行为、技术、证据指向、置信度
- 检测待办项 —— 候选规则、缺口、调优建议
- 狩猎报告 —— 执行摘要、技术细节、后续步骤
- IR交接包 —— 升级至时使用
incident-responder