senior-security
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ChineseSenior Security Engineer
高级安全工程师
Security engineering tools for threat modeling, vulnerability analysis, secure architecture design, and penetration testing.
面向威胁建模、漏洞分析、安全架构设计和渗透测试的安全工程工具。
Table of Contents
目录
Threat Modeling Workflow
威胁建模工作流
Identify and analyze security threats using STRIDE methodology.
使用STRIDE方法论识别并分析安全威胁。
Workflow: Conduct Threat Model
工作流:开展威胁建模
- Define system scope and boundaries:
- Identify assets to protect
- Map trust boundaries
- Document data flows
- Create data flow diagram:
- External entities (users, services)
- Processes (application components)
- Data stores (databases, caches)
- Data flows (APIs, network connections)
- Apply STRIDE to each DFD element:
- Spoofing: Can identity be faked?
- Tampering: Can data be modified?
- Repudiation: Can actions be denied?
- Information Disclosure: Can data leak?
- Denial of Service: Can availability be affected?
- Elevation of Privilege: Can access be escalated?
- Score risks using DREAD:
- Damage potential (1-10)
- Reproducibility (1-10)
- Exploitability (1-10)
- Affected users (1-10)
- Discoverability (1-10)
- Prioritize threats by risk score
- Define mitigations for each threat
- Document in threat model report
- Validation: All DFD elements analyzed; STRIDE applied; threats scored; mitigations mapped
- 定义系统范围与边界:
- 识别需要保护的资产
- 绘制信任边界
- 记录数据流
- 创建数据流图(DFD):
- 外部实体(用户、服务)
- 流程(应用组件)
- 数据存储(数据库、缓存)
- 数据流(API、网络连接)
- 对每个DFD元素应用STRIDE分析:
- 仿冒(Spoofing):身份是否可伪造?
- 篡改(Tampering):数据是否可被修改?
- 抵赖(Repudiation):操作是否可被否认?
- 信息泄露(Information Disclosure):数据是否会泄露?
- 拒绝服务(Denial of Service):可用性是否会受影响?
- 权限提升(Elevation of Privilege):访问权限是否可被提升?
- 使用DREAD模型为风险评分:
- 潜在损害(1-10)
- 可复现性(1-10)
- 可利用性(1-10)
- 受影响用户数(1-10)
- 可发现性(1-10)
- 根据风险分数对威胁排序
- 为每个威胁定义缓解措施
- 记录到威胁建模报告中
- 验证标准:所有DFD元素已分析;已应用STRIDE;威胁已评分;已映射缓解措施
STRIDE Threat Categories
STRIDE威胁类别
| Category | Description | Security Property | Mitigation Focus |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Impersonating users or systems | Authentication | MFA, certificates, strong auth |
| Tampering | Modifying data or code | Integrity | Signing, checksums, validation |
| Repudiation | Denying actions | Non-repudiation | Audit logs, digital signatures |
| Information Disclosure | Exposing data | Confidentiality | Encryption, access controls |
| Denial of Service | Disrupting availability | Availability | Rate limiting, redundancy |
| Elevation of Privilege | Gaining unauthorized access | Authorization | RBAC, least privilege |
| 类别 | 描述 | 安全属性 | 缓解重点 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 仿冒 | 冒充用户或系统 | 身份认证 | 多因素认证(MFA)、证书、强认证机制 |
| 篡改 | 修改数据或代码 | 完整性 | 签名、校验和、验证机制 |
| 抵赖 | 否认已执行的操作 | 不可抵赖性 | 审计日志、数字签名 |
| 信息泄露 | 泄露敏感数据 | 保密性 | 加密、访问控制 |
| 拒绝服务 | 破坏系统可用性 | 可用性 | 速率限制、冗余机制 |
| 权限提升 | 获取未授权访问权限 | 授权 | 基于角色的访问控制(RBAC)、最小权限原则 |
STRIDE per Element Matrix
各DFD元素的STRIDE适用矩阵
| DFD Element | S | T | R | I | D | E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| External Entity | X | X | ||||
| Process | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Data Store | X | X | X | X | ||
| Data Flow | X | X | X |
See: references/threat-modeling-guide.md
| DFD元素 | S | T | R | I | D | E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 外部实体 | X | X | ||||
| 流程 | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| 数据存储 | X | X | X | X | ||
| 数据流 | X | X | X |
参考:references/threat-modeling-guide.md
Security Architecture Workflow
安全架构工作流
Design secure systems using defense-in-depth principles.
使用纵深防御原则设计安全系统。
Workflow: Design Secure Architecture
工作流:设计安全架构
- Define security requirements:
- Compliance requirements (GDPR, HIPAA, PCI-DSS)
- Data classification (public, internal, confidential, restricted)
- Threat model inputs
- Apply defense-in-depth layers:
- Perimeter: WAF, DDoS protection, rate limiting
- Network: Segmentation, IDS/IPS, mTLS
- Host: Patching, EDR, hardening
- Application: Input validation, authentication, secure coding
- Data: Encryption at rest and in transit
- Implement Zero Trust principles:
- Verify explicitly (every request)
- Least privilege access (JIT/JEA)
- Assume breach (segment, monitor)
- Configure authentication and authorization:
- Identity provider selection
- MFA requirements
- RBAC/ABAC model
- Design encryption strategy:
- Key management approach
- Algorithm selection
- Certificate lifecycle
- Plan security monitoring:
- Log aggregation
- SIEM integration
- Alerting rules
- Document architecture decisions
- Validation: Defense-in-depth layers defined; Zero Trust applied; encryption strategy documented; monitoring planned
- 定义安全需求:
- 合规要求(GDPR、HIPAA、PCI-DSS)
- 数据分类(公开、内部、机密、受限)
- 威胁建模输入
- 应用纵深防御层级:
- 边界层:Web应用防火墙(WAF)、DDoS防护、速率限制
- 网络层:网络分段、入侵检测/防御系统(IDS/IPS)、双向TLS(mTLS)
- 主机层:补丁管理、终端检测与响应(EDR)、系统加固
- 应用层:输入验证、身份认证、安全编码
- 数据层:静态与传输中数据加密
- 实施零信任原则:
- 持续验证(每个请求都需验证)
- 最小权限访问(JIT/JEA)
- 假设已被入侵(分段、监控)
- 配置身份认证与授权:
- 身份提供商选择
- MFA要求
- RBAC/ABAC模型
- 设计加密策略:
- 密钥管理方案
- 算法选择
- 证书生命周期管理
- 规划安全监控:
- 日志聚合
- 安全信息与事件管理(SIEM)集成
- 告警规则
- 记录架构决策
- 验证标准:已定义纵深防御层级;已应用零信任原则;已记录加密策略;已规划监控方案
Defense-in-Depth Layers
纵深防御层级
Layer 1: PERIMETER
WAF, DDoS mitigation, DNS filtering, rate limiting
Layer 2: NETWORK
Segmentation, IDS/IPS, network monitoring, VPN, mTLS
Layer 3: HOST
Endpoint protection, OS hardening, patching, logging
Layer 4: APPLICATION
Input validation, authentication, secure coding, SAST
Layer 5: DATA
Encryption at rest/transit, access controls, DLP, backupLayer 1: PERIMETER
WAF, DDoS mitigation, DNS filtering, rate limiting
Layer 2: NETWORK
Segmentation, IDS/IPS, network monitoring, VPN, mTLS
Layer 3: HOST
Endpoint protection, OS hardening, patching, logging
Layer 4: APPLICATION
Input validation, authentication, secure coding, SAST
Layer 5: DATA
Encryption at rest/transit, access controls, DLP, backupAuthentication Pattern Selection
身份认证模式选择
| Use Case | Recommended Pattern |
|---|---|
| Web application | OAuth 2.0 + PKCE with OIDC |
| API authentication | JWT with short expiration + refresh tokens |
| Service-to-service | mTLS with certificate rotation |
| CLI/Automation | API keys with IP allowlisting |
| High security | FIDO2/WebAuthn hardware keys |
See: references/security-architecture-patterns.md
| 用例 | 推荐模式 |
|---|---|
| Web应用 | OAuth 2.0 + PKCE 搭配 OIDC |
| API身份认证 | 短过期时间JWT + 刷新令牌 |
| 服务间认证 | 带证书轮换的mTLS |
| CLI/自动化 | 带IP白名单的API密钥 |
| 高安全场景 | FIDO2/WebAuthn硬件密钥 |
参考:references/security-architecture-patterns.md
Vulnerability Assessment Workflow
漏洞评估工作流
Identify and remediate security vulnerabilities in applications.
识别并修复应用中的安全漏洞。
Workflow: Conduct Vulnerability Assessment
工作流:开展漏洞评估
- Define assessment scope:
- In-scope systems and applications
- Testing methodology (black box, gray box, white box)
- Rules of engagement
- Gather information:
- Technology stack inventory
- Architecture documentation
- Previous vulnerability reports
- Perform automated scanning:
- SAST (static analysis)
- DAST (dynamic analysis)
- Dependency scanning
- Secret detection
- Conduct manual testing:
- Business logic flaws
- Authentication bypass
- Authorization issues
- Injection vulnerabilities
- Classify findings by severity:
- Critical: Immediate exploitation risk
- High: Significant impact, easier to exploit
- Medium: Moderate impact or difficulty
- Low: Minor impact
- Develop remediation plan:
- Prioritize by risk
- Assign owners
- Set deadlines
- Verify fixes and document
- Validation: Scope defined; automated and manual testing complete; findings classified; remediation tracked
- 定义评估范围:
- 纳入范围的系统与应用
- 测试方法(黑盒、灰盒、白盒)
- 参与规则
- 收集信息:
- 技术栈清单
- 架构文档
- 历史漏洞报告
- 执行自动化扫描:
- 静态应用安全测试(SAST)
- 动态应用安全测试(DAST)
- 依赖扫描
- 密钥检测
- 开展手动测试:
- 业务逻辑缺陷
- 身份认证绕过
- 授权问题
- 注入漏洞
- 按严重程度分类发现的问题:
- 关键:可被立即利用的风险
- 高:影响重大,易被利用
- 中:影响中等或利用难度较高
- 低:影响轻微
- 制定修复计划:
- 按风险优先级排序
- 分配负责人
- 设置截止日期
- 验证修复并记录
- 验证标准:已定义范围;自动化与手动测试已完成;发现的问题已分类;修复进度已跟踪
OWASP Top 10 Mapping
OWASP Top 10 映射
| Rank | Vulnerability | Testing Approach |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Manual IDOR testing, authorization checks |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Algorithm review, key management audit |
| A03 | Injection | SAST + manual payload testing |
| A04 | Insecure Design | Threat modeling, architecture review |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | Configuration audit, CIS benchmarks |
| A06 | Vulnerable Components | Dependency scanning, CVE monitoring |
| A07 | Authentication Failures | Password policy, session management review |
| A08 | Software/Data Integrity | CI/CD security, code signing verification |
| A09 | Logging Failures | Log review, SIEM configuration check |
| A10 | SSRF | Manual URL manipulation testing |
| 排名 | 漏洞 | 测试方法 |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | 访问控制失效 | 手动IDOR测试、授权检查 |
| A02 | 加密失败 | 算法审查、密钥管理审计 |
| A03 | 注入 | SAST + 手动载荷测试 |
| A04 | 不安全设计 | 威胁建模、架构审查 |
| A05 | 安全配置错误 | 配置审计、CIS基准检查 |
| A06 | 易受攻击的组件 | 依赖扫描、CVE监控 |
| A07 | 身份认证失败 | 密码策略、会话管理审查 |
| A08 | 软件/数据完整性问题 | CI/CD安全、代码签名验证 |
| A09 | 日志记录失败 | 日志审查、SIEM配置检查 |
| A10 | 服务器端请求伪造(SSRF) | 手动URL操纵测试 |
Vulnerability Severity Matrix
漏洞严重程度矩阵
| Impact / Exploitability | Easy | Moderate | Difficult |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | Critical | Critical | High |
| High | Critical | High | Medium |
| Medium | High | Medium | Low |
| Low | Medium | Low | Low |
| 影响 / 可利用性 | 易 | 中等 | 难 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 关键 | 关键 | 关键 | 高 |
| 高 | 关键 | 高 | 中 |
| 中 | 高 | 中 | 低 |
| 低 | 中 | 低 | 低 |
Secure Code Review Workflow
安全代码审查工作流
Review code for security vulnerabilities before deployment.
在部署前审查代码中的安全漏洞。
Workflow: Conduct Security Code Review
工作流:开展安全代码审查
- Establish review scope:
- Changed files and functions
- Security-sensitive areas (auth, crypto, input handling)
- Third-party integrations
- Run automated analysis:
- SAST tools (Semgrep, CodeQL, Bandit)
- Secret scanning
- Dependency vulnerability check
- Review authentication code:
- Password handling (hashing, storage)
- Session management
- Token validation
- Review authorization code:
- Access control checks
- RBAC implementation
- Privilege boundaries
- Review data handling:
- Input validation
- Output encoding
- SQL query construction
- File path handling
- Review cryptographic code:
- Algorithm selection
- Key management
- Random number generation
- Document findings with severity
- Validation: Automated scans passed; auth/authz reviewed; data handling checked; crypto verified; findings documented
- 确定审查范围:
- 变更的文件与函数
- 安全敏感区域(认证、加密、输入处理)
- 第三方集成
- 运行自动化分析:
- SAST工具(Semgrep、CodeQL、Bandit)
- 密钥扫描
- 依赖漏洞检查
- 审查身份认证代码:
- 密码处理(哈希、存储)
- 会话管理
- 令牌验证
- 审查授权代码:
- 访问控制检查
- RBAC实现
- 权限边界
- 审查数据处理代码:
- 输入验证
- 输出编码
- SQL查询构建
- 文件路径处理
- 审查加密代码:
- 算法选择
- 密钥管理
- 随机数生成
- 记录带严重程度的发现
- 验证标准:自动化扫描已通过;认证/授权已审查;数据处理已检查;加密已验证;发现已记录
Security Code Review Checklist
安全代码审查检查清单
| Category | Check | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Input Validation | All user input validated and sanitized | Injection |
| Output Encoding | Context-appropriate encoding applied | XSS |
| Authentication | Passwords hashed with Argon2/bcrypt | Credential theft |
| Session | Secure cookie flags set (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite) | Session hijacking |
| Authorization | Server-side permission checks on all endpoints | Privilege escalation |
| SQL | Parameterized queries used exclusively | SQL injection |
| File Access | Path traversal sequences rejected | Path traversal |
| Secrets | No hardcoded credentials or keys | Information disclosure |
| Dependencies | Known vulnerable packages updated | Supply chain |
| Logging | Sensitive data not logged | Information disclosure |
| 类别 | 检查项 | 风险 |
|---|---|---|
| 输入验证 | 所有用户输入已验证与清理 | 注入攻击 |
| 输出编码 | 已应用上下文适配的编码 | XSS攻击 |
| 身份认证 | 密码使用Argon2/bcrypt哈希 | 凭证窃取 |
| 会话 | 已设置安全Cookie标记(HttpOnly、Secure、SameSite) | 会话劫持 |
| 授权 | 所有端点已执行服务器端权限检查 | 权限提升 |
| SQL | 仅使用参数化查询 | SQL注入 |
| 文件访问 | 已拒绝路径遍历序列 | 路径遍历攻击 |
| 密钥 | 无硬编码凭证或密钥 | 信息泄露 |
| 依赖 | 已知漏洞包已更新 | 供应链攻击 |
| 日志 | 未记录敏感数据 | 信息泄露 |
Secure vs Insecure Patterns
安全与不安全模式对比
| Pattern | Issue | Secure Alternative |
|---|---|---|
| SQL string formatting | SQL injection | Use parameterized queries with placeholders |
| Shell command building | Command injection | Use subprocess with argument lists, no shell |
| Path concatenation | Path traversal | Validate and canonicalize paths |
| MD5/SHA1 for passwords | Weak hashing | Use Argon2id or bcrypt |
| Math.random for tokens | Predictable values | Use crypto.getRandomValues |
| 模式 | 问题 | 安全替代方案 |
|---|---|---|
| SQL字符串格式化 | SQL注入 | 使用带占位符的参数化查询 |
| Shell命令构建 | 命令注入 | 使用带参数列表的subprocess,不调用shell |
| 路径拼接 | 路径遍历 | 验证并规范化路径 |
| MD5/SHA1用于密码 | 弱哈希 | 使用Argon2id或bcrypt |
| Math.random生成令牌 | 值可预测 | 使用crypto.getRandomValues |
Incident Response Workflow
事件响应工作流
Respond to and contain security incidents.
响应并遏制安全事件。
Workflow: Handle Security Incident
工作流:处理安全事件
- Identify and triage:
- Validate incident is genuine
- Assess initial scope and severity
- Activate incident response team
- Contain the threat:
- Isolate affected systems
- Block malicious IPs/accounts
- Disable compromised credentials
- Eradicate root cause:
- Remove malware/backdoors
- Patch vulnerabilities
- Update configurations
- Recover operations:
- Restore from clean backups
- Verify system integrity
- Monitor for recurrence
- Conduct post-mortem:
- Timeline reconstruction
- Root cause analysis
- Lessons learned
- Implement improvements:
- Update detection rules
- Enhance controls
- Update runbooks
- Document and report
- Validation: Threat contained; root cause eliminated; systems recovered; post-mortem complete; improvements implemented
- 识别与分类:
- 验证事件是否真实
- 评估初始范围与严重程度
- 启动事件响应团队
- 遏制威胁:
- 隔离受影响系统
- 阻止恶意IP/账户
- 禁用已泄露凭证
- 根除根本原因:
- 移除恶意软件/后门
- 修复漏洞
- 更新配置
- 恢复运营:
- 从干净备份恢复
- 验证系统完整性
- 监控是否复发
- 开展事后复盘:
- 重建时间线
- 根本原因分析
- 经验总结
- 实施改进措施:
- 更新检测规则
- 增强控制措施
- 更新运行手册
- 记录与报告
- 验证标准:威胁已遏制;根本原因已消除;系统已恢复;事后复盘已完成;改进措施已实施
Incident Severity Levels
事件严重程度等级
| Level | Description | Response Time | Escalation |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 - Critical | Active breach, data exfiltration | Immediate | CISO, Legal, Executive |
| P2 - High | Confirmed compromise, contained | 1 hour | Security Lead, IT Director |
| P3 - Medium | Potential compromise, under investigation | 4 hours | Security Team |
| P4 - Low | Suspicious activity, low impact | 24 hours | On-call engineer |
| 等级 | 描述 | 响应时间 | 升级对象 |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 - 关键 | 正在发生的数据泄露、数据外渗 | 立即响应 | CISO、法务、高管 |
| P2 - 高 | 已确认的入侵,已被遏制 | 1小时内 | 安全负责人、IT总监 |
| P3 - 中 | 潜在入侵,正在调查 | 4小时内 | 安全团队 |
| P4 - 低 | 可疑活动,影响轻微 | 24小时内 | 值班工程师 |
Incident Response Checklist
事件响应检查清单
| Phase | Actions |
|---|---|
| Identification | Validate alert, assess scope, determine severity |
| Containment | Isolate systems, preserve evidence, block access |
| Eradication | Remove threat, patch vulnerabilities, reset credentials |
| Recovery | Restore services, verify integrity, increase monitoring |
| Lessons Learned | Document timeline, identify gaps, update procedures |
| 阶段 | 行动 |
|---|---|
| 识别 | 验证告警、评估范围、确定严重程度 |
| 遏制 | 隔离系统、保存证据、阻止访问 |
| 根除 | 移除威胁、修复漏洞、重置凭证 |
| 恢复 | 恢复服务、验证完整性、增强监控 |
| 经验总结 | 记录时间线、识别差距、更新流程 |
Security Tools Reference
安全工具参考
Recommended Security Tools
推荐安全工具
| Category | Tools |
|---|---|
| SAST | Semgrep, CodeQL, Bandit (Python), ESLint security plugins |
| DAST | OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite, Nikto |
| Dependency Scanning | Snyk, Dependabot, npm audit, pip-audit |
| Secret Detection | GitLeaks, TruffleHog, detect-secrets |
| Container Security | Trivy, Clair, Anchore |
| Infrastructure | Checkov, tfsec, ScoutSuite |
| Network | Wireshark, Nmap, Masscan |
| Penetration | Metasploit, sqlmap, Burp Suite Pro |
| 类别 | 工具 |
|---|---|
| SAST | Semgrep、CodeQL、Bandit(Python)、ESLint安全插件 |
| DAST | OWASP ZAP、Burp Suite、Nikto |
| 依赖扫描 | Snyk、Dependabot、npm audit、pip-audit |
| 密钥检测 | GitLeaks、TruffleHog、detect-secrets |
| 容器安全 | Trivy、Clair、Anchore |
| 基础设施 | Checkov、tfsec、ScoutSuite |
| 网络 | Wireshark、Nmap、Masscan |
| 渗透测试 | Metasploit、sqlmap、Burp Suite Pro |
Cryptographic Algorithm Selection
加密算法选择
| Use Case | Algorithm | Key Size |
|---|---|---|
| Symmetric encryption | AES-256-GCM | 256 bits |
| Password hashing | Argon2id | N/A (use defaults) |
| Message authentication | HMAC-SHA256 | 256 bits |
| Digital signatures | Ed25519 | 256 bits |
| Key exchange | X25519 | 256 bits |
| TLS | TLS 1.3 | N/A |
See: references/cryptography-implementation.md
| 用例 | 算法 | 密钥长度 |
|---|---|---|
| 对称加密 | AES-256-GCM | 256位 |
| 密码哈希 | Argon2id | 无(使用默认配置) |
| 消息认证 | HMAC-SHA256 | 256位 |
| 数字签名 | Ed25519 | 256位 |
| 密钥交换 | X25519 | 256位 |
| TLS | TLS 1.3 | 无 |
参考:references/cryptography-implementation.md
Tools and References
工具与参考资料
Scripts
脚本
| Script | Purpose | Usage |
|---|---|---|
| threat_modeler.py | STRIDE threat analysis with risk scoring | |
| secret_scanner.py | Detect hardcoded secrets and credentials | |
Threat Modeler Features:
- STRIDE analysis for any system component
- DREAD risk scoring
- Mitigation recommendations
- JSON and text output formats
- Interactive mode for guided analysis
Secret Scanner Features:
- Detects AWS, GCP, Azure credentials
- Finds API keys and tokens (GitHub, Slack, Stripe)
- Identifies private keys and passwords
- Supports 20+ secret patterns
- CI/CD integration ready
| 脚本 | 用途 | 使用方法 |
|---|---|---|
| threat_modeler.py | 带风险评分的STRIDE威胁分析 | |
| secret_scanner.py | 检测硬编码密钥与凭证 | |
威胁建模器特性:
- 对任意系统组件进行STRIDE分析
- DREAD风险评分
- 缓解措施建议
- JSON与文本输出格式
- 交互式引导分析模式
密钥扫描器特性:
- 检测AWS、GCP、Azure凭证
- 查找API密钥与令牌(GitHub、Slack、Stripe)
- 识别私钥与密码
- 支持20+种密钥模式
- 可集成到CI/CD
References
参考资料
| Document | Content |
|---|---|
| security-architecture-patterns.md | Zero Trust, defense-in-depth, authentication patterns, API security |
| threat-modeling-guide.md | STRIDE methodology, attack trees, DREAD scoring, DFD creation |
| cryptography-implementation.md | AES-GCM, RSA, Ed25519, password hashing, key management |
| 文档 | 内容 |
|---|---|
| security-architecture-patterns.md | 零信任、纵深防御、身份认证模式、API安全 |
| threat-modeling-guide.md | STRIDE方法论、攻击树、DREAD评分、DFD创建 |
| cryptography-implementation.md | AES-GCM、RSA、Ed25519、密码哈希、密钥管理 |
Security Standards Reference
安全标准参考
Compliance Frameworks
合规框架
| Framework | Focus | Applicable To |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP ASVS | Application security | Web applications |
| CIS Benchmarks | System hardening | Servers, containers, cloud |
| NIST CSF | Risk management | Enterprise security programs |
| PCI-DSS | Payment card data | Payment processing |
| HIPAA | Healthcare data | Healthcare applications |
| SOC 2 | Service organization controls | SaaS providers |
| 框架 | 重点 | 适用对象 |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP ASVS | 应用安全 | Web应用 |
| CIS基准 | 系统加固 | 服务器、容器、云环境 |
| NIST CSF | 风险管理 | 企业安全项目 |
| PCI-DSS | 支付卡数据 | 支付处理系统 |
| HIPAA | 医疗数据 | 医疗应用 |
| SOC 2 | 服务组织控制 | SaaS提供商 |
Security Headers Checklist
安全头检查清单
| Header | Recommended Value |
|---|---|
| Content-Security-Policy | default-src self; script-src self |
| X-Frame-Options | DENY |
| X-Content-Type-Options | nosniff |
| Strict-Transport-Security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| Referrer-Policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| Permissions-Policy | geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=() |
| 头字段 | 推荐值 |
|---|---|
| Content-Security-Policy | default-src self; script-src self |
| X-Frame-Options | DENY |
| X-Content-Type-Options | nosniff |
| Strict-Transport-Security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| Referrer-Policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| Permissions-Policy | geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=() |
Related Skills
相关技能
| Skill | Integration Point |
|---|---|
| senior-devops | CI/CD security, infrastructure hardening |
| senior-secops | Security monitoring, incident response |
| senior-backend | Secure API development |
| senior-architect | Security architecture decisions |
| 技能 | 集成点 |
|---|---|
| senior-devops | CI/CD安全、基础设施加固 |
| senior-secops | 安全监控、事件响应 |
| senior-backend | 安全API开发 |
| senior-architect | 安全架构决策 |