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| Skill | Focus | Approach |
|---|---|---|
| cloud-security (this) | Cloud configuration risk | Preventive — assess before exploitation |
| incident-response | Active cloud incidents | Reactive — triage confirmed cloud compromise |
| threat-detection | Behavioral anomalies | Proactive — hunt for attacker activity in cloud logs |
| security-pen-testing | Application vulnerabilities | Offensive — actively exploit found weaknesses |
| 技能 | 关注点 | 方法 |
|---|---|---|
| cloud-security(本技能) | 云配置风险 | 预防性——在被利用前进行评估 |
| incident-response | 活跃云事件 | 响应式——分类处理已确认的云入侵 |
| threat-detection | 行为异常 | 前瞻性——在云日志中搜寻攻击者活动 |
| security-pen-testing | 应用漏洞 | 攻击性——主动利用已发现的弱点 |
cloud_posture_check.pyiams3sg--checkundefinedcloud_posture_check.pyiams3sg--checkundefinedundefinedundefined| Code | Meaning | Required Action |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | No high/critical findings | No action required |
| 1 | High-severity findings | Remediate within 24 hours |
| 2 | Critical findings | Remediate immediately — escalate to incident-response if active |
| 代码 | 含义 | 必要操作 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 无高/严重风险发现 | 无需操作 |
| 1 | 高风险发现 | 24小时内完成修复 |
| 2 | 严重风险发现 | 立即修复——若存在活跃入侵,升级至事件响应流程 |
| Pattern | Severity | Key Action Combination | MITRE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lambda PassRole escalation | Critical | iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction | T1078.004 |
| EC2 instance profile abuse | Critical | iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances | T1078.004 |
| CloudFormation PassRole | Critical | iam:PassRole + cloudformation:CreateStack | T1078.004 |
| Self-attach policy escalation | Critical | iam:AttachUserPolicy + sts:GetCallerIdentity | T1484.001 |
| Inline policy self-escalation | Critical | iam:PutUserPolicy + sts:GetCallerIdentity | T1484.001 |
| Policy version backdoor | Critical | iam:CreatePolicyVersion + iam:ListPolicies | T1484.001 |
| Credential harvesting | High | iam:CreateAccessKey + iam:ListUsers | T1098.001 |
| Group membership escalation | High | iam:AddUserToGroup + iam:ListGroups | T1098 |
| Password reset attack | High | iam:UpdateLoginProfile + iam:ListUsers | T1098 |
| Service-level wildcard | High | iam:* or s3:* or ec2:* | T1078.004 |
| 模式 | 风险等级 | 关键操作组合 | MITRE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lambda PassRole提升 | 严重 | iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction | T1078.004 |
| EC2实例配置文件滥用 | 严重 | iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances | T1078.004 |
| CloudFormation PassRole | 严重 | iam:PassRole + cloudformation:CreateStack | T1078.004 |
| 自附加策略提升 | 严重 | iam:AttachUserPolicy + sts:GetCallerIdentity | T1484.001 |
| 内联策略自提升 | 严重 | iam:PutUserPolicy + sts:GetCallerIdentity | T1484.001 |
| 策略版本后门 | 严重 | iam:CreatePolicyVersion + iam:ListPolicies | T1484.001 |
| 凭证窃取 | 高 | iam:CreateAccessKey + iam:ListUsers | T1098.001 |
| 组成员提升 | 高 | iam:AddUserToGroup + iam:ListGroups | T1098 |
| 密码重置攻击 | 高 | iam:UpdateLoginProfile + iam:ListUsers | T1098 |
| 服务级通配符 | 高 | iam:* 或 s3:* 或 ec2:* | T1078.004 |
| Finding Type | Condition | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Full admin wildcard | Action=* Resource=* | Critical |
| Public principal | Principal: '*' | Critical |
| Dangerous action combo | Two-action escalation path | Critical |
| Individual priv-esc actions | On wildcard resource | High |
| Data exfiltration actions | s3:GetObject, secretsmanager:GetSecretValue on * | High |
| Service wildcard | service:* action | High |
| Data actions on named resource | Appropriate scope | Low/Clean |
| 发现类型 | 条件 | 风险等级 |
|---|---|---|
| 完全管理员通配符 | Action=* Resource=* | 严重 |
| 公开主体 | Principal: '*' | 严重 |
| 危险操作组合 | 双操作提升路径 | 严重 |
| 单个权限提升操作 | 作用于通配符资源 | 高 |
| 数据泄露操作 | s3:GetObject、secretsmanager:GetSecretValue 作用于* | 高 |
| 服务通配符 | service:* 操作 | 高 |
| 针对指定资源的数据操作 | 范围合理 | 低/合规 |
least_privilege_suggestionAction: *Resource: *least_privilege_suggestionAction: *Resource: *| Check | Finding Condition | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Public access block | Any of four flags missing/false | High |
| Bucket ACL | public-read-write | Critical |
| Bucket ACL | public-read or authenticated-read | High |
| Bucket policy Principal | "Principal": "*" with Allow | Critical |
| Default encryption | No ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration | High |
| Default encryption | Non-standard SSEAlgorithm | Medium |
| No PublicAccessBlockConfiguration | Status unknown | Medium |
| 检查项 | 发现条件 | 风险等级 |
|---|---|---|
| 公开访问块 | 四个标志中有缺失/设为false | 高 |
| 存储桶ACL | public-read-write | 严重 |
| 存储桶ACL | public-read 或 authenticated-read | 高 |
| 存储桶策略主体 | "Principal": "*" 且为Allow | 严重 |
| 默认加密 | 无ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration | 高 |
| 默认加密 | 非标准SSEAlgorithm | 中 |
| 无PublicAccessBlockConfiguration | 状态未知 | 中 |
{
"PublicAccessBlockConfiguration": {
"BlockPublicAcls": true,
"BlockPublicPolicy": true,
"IgnorePublicAcls": true,
"RestrictPublicBuckets": true
},
"ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration": {
"Rules": [{
"ApplyServerSideEncryptionByDefault": {
"SSEAlgorithm": "aws:kms",
"KMSMasterKeyID": "arn:aws:kms:region:account:key/key-id"
},
"BucketKeyEnabled": true
}]
},
"ACL": "private"
}{
"PublicAccessBlockConfiguration": {
"BlockPublicAcls": true,
"BlockPublicPolicy": true,
"IgnorePublicAcls": true,
"RestrictPublicBuckets": true
},
"ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration": {
"Rules": [{
"ApplyServerSideEncryptionByDefault": {
"SSEAlgorithm": "aws:kms",
"KMSMasterKeyID": "arn:aws:kms:region:account:key/key-id"
},
"BucketKeyEnabled": true
}]
},
"ACL": "private"
}| Port | Service | Finding Severity | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | SSH | Critical | Restrict to VPN CIDR or use AWS Systems Manager Session Manager |
| 3389 | RDP | Critical | Restrict to VPN CIDR or use AWS Fleet Manager |
| 0–65535 (all) | All traffic | Critical | Remove rule; add specific required ports only |
| 端口 | 服务 | 发现风险等级 | 修复建议 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | SSH | 严重 | 限制为VPN CIDR,或使用AWS Systems Manager Session Manager |
| 3389 | RDP | 严重 | 限制为VPN CIDR,或使用AWS Fleet Manager |
| 0–65535(所有) | 所有流量 | 严重 | 删除规则;仅添加所需的特定端口 |
| Port | Service | Finding Severity | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1433 | MSSQL | High | Allow from application tier SG only — move to private subnet |
| 3306 | MySQL | High | Allow from application tier SG only — move to private subnet |
| 5432 | PostgreSQL | High | Allow from application tier SG only — move to private subnet |
| 27017 | MongoDB | High | Allow from application tier SG only — move to private subnet |
| 6379 | Redis | High | Allow from application tier SG only — move to private subnet |
| 9200 | Elasticsearch | High | Allow from application tier SG only — move to private subnet |
| 端口 | 服务 | 发现风险等级 | 修复建议 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1433 | MSSQL | 高 | 仅允许来自应用层安全组的访问——迁移至私有子网 |
| 3306 | MySQL | 高 | 仅允许来自应用层安全组的访问——迁移至私有子网 |
| 5432 | PostgreSQL | 高 | 仅允许来自应用层安全组的访问——迁移至私有子网 |
| 27017 | MongoDB | 高 | 仅允许来自应用层安全组的访问——迁移至私有子网 |
| 6379 | Redis | 高 | 仅允许来自应用层安全组的访问——迁移至私有子网 |
| 9200 | Elasticsearch | 高 | 仅允许来自应用层安全组的访问——迁移至私有子网 |
--severity-modifier internet-facing--severity-modifier regulated-data--severity-modifier internet-facing--severity-modifier regulated-data| Tool | Check Types | When to Run |
|---|---|---|
| Terraform | Resource-level checks (aws_s3_bucket_acl, aws_security_group, aws_iam_policy_document) | Pre-plan, pre-apply, PR gate |
| CloudFormation | Template property validation (PublicAccessBlockConfiguration, SecurityGroupIngress) | Template lint, deploy gate |
| Kubernetes manifests | Container privileges, network policies, secret exposure | PR gate, admission controller |
| Helm charts | Same as Kubernetes | PR gate |
| 工具 | 检查类型 | 运行时机 |
|---|---|---|
| Terraform | 资源级检查(aws_s3_bucket_acl、aws_security_group、aws_iam_policy_document) | 预规划、预应用、PR门禁 |
| CloudFormation | 模板属性验证(PublicAccessBlockConfiguration、SecurityGroupIngress) | 模板校验、部署门禁 |
| Kubernetes清单 | 容器权限、网络策略、密钥暴露 | PR门禁、准入控制器 |
| Helm图表 | 与Kubernetes相同 | PR门禁 |
undefinedundefined
Full CSPM check reference: `references/cspm-checks.md`
---
完整CSPM检查参考:`references/cspm-checks.md`
---| Check Type | AWS | Azure | GCP |
|---|---|---|---|
| IAM privilege escalation | Full (IAM policies, trust policies, ESCALATION_COMBOS) | Partial (RBAC assignments, service principal risks) | Partial (IAM bindings, workload identity) |
| Storage public access | Full (S3 bucket policies, ACLs, public access block) | Partial (Blob SAS tokens, container access levels) | Partial (GCS bucket IAM, uniform bucket-level access) |
| Network exposure | Full (Security Groups, NACLs, port-level analysis) | Partial (NSG rules, inbound port analysis) | Partial (Firewall rules, VPC firewall) |
| IaC scanning | Full (Terraform, CloudFormation) | Partial (ARM templates, Bicep) | Partial (Deployment Manager) |
| 检查类型 | AWS | Azure | GCP |
|---|---|---|---|
| IAM权限提升 | 完整支持(IAM策略、信任策略、ESCALATION_COMBOS) | 部分支持(RBAC分配、服务主体风险) | 部分支持(IAM绑定、工作负载身份) |
| 存储公开访问 | 完整支持(S3存储桶策略、ACL、公开访问块) | 部分支持(Blob SAS令牌、容器访问级别) | 部分支持(GCS存储桶IAM、统一存储桶级访问) |
| 网络暴露 | 完整支持(安全组、NACL、端口级分析) | 部分支持(NSG规则、入站端口分析) | 部分支持(防火墙规则、VPC防火墙) |
| IaC扫描 | 完整支持(Terraform、CloudFormation) | 部分支持(ARM模板、Bicep) | 部分支持(Deployment Manager) |
undefinedundefined
**Decision**: Exit code 2 = block deployment and remediate. Exit code 1 = schedule remediation within 24 hours.
**决策**:退出码2 = 阻止部署并修复;退出码1 = 24小时内安排修复。references/cspm-checks.mdreferences/cspm-checks.mdundefinedundefined
---
---iam:PassRoleiam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction--severity-modifier internet-facing--severity-modifier internet-facing--severity-modifier regulated-dataiam:PassRoleiam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction--severity-modifier internet-facing--severity-modifier internet-facing--severity-modifier regulated-data| Skill | Relationship |
|---|---|
| incident-response | Critical findings (public S3, privilege escalation confirmed active) may trigger incident classification |
| threat-detection | Cloud posture findings create hunting targets — over-permissioned roles are likely lateral movement destinations |
| red-team | Red team exercises specifically test exploitability of cloud misconfigurations found in posture assessment |
| security-pen-testing | Cloud posture findings feed into the infrastructure security section of pen test assessments |
| 技能 | 关系 |
|---|---|
| incident-response | 严重风险发现(公开S3、已确认的活跃权限提升)可能触发事件分类 |
| threat-detection | 云态势发现结果可作为狩猎目标——过度授权角色很可能是横向移动的目的地 |
| red-team | 红队演练专门测试态势评估中发现的云配置错误的可利用性 |
| security-pen-testing | 云态势发现结果会纳入渗透测试评估的基础设施安全部分 |