┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  CODE PROPERTY GRAPH = AST + CFG + CDG + DDG + PDG             │
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────│
│  AST  = Abstract Syntax Tree (structure)                       │
│  CFG  = Control Flow Graph (execution paths)                   │
│  CDG  = Control Dependency Graph (conditional dependencies)    │
│  DDG  = Data Dependency Graph (data flow between statements)   │
│  PDG  = Program Dependency Graph (CDG + DDG combined)          │
│                                                                │
│  Tier 2 (Joern): Full CPG with 40+ query tools                │
│  Tier 3 (CodeQL): Interprocedural taint + security queries     │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Simple symbol lookup, dependency trace, blast radius?
  → Tier 1: codebase-memory-mcp (always on, sub-ms)

Control flow paths, data flow, dead code, complex refactoring?
  → Tier 2: Joern CPG (on-demand, seconds)

Security audit, taint analysis, vulnerability detection?
  → Tier 3: CodeQL (on-demand, seconds to minutes)

Full security review before release?
  → All three tiers in sequence

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "codebadger": {
      "url": "http://localhost:4242/mcp",
      "type": "http"
    }
  }
}

// Find all methods that handle user input
cpg.method.where(_.parameter.name(".*input.*|.*request.*")).name.l

// Trace data flow from parameter to return
cpg.method("processPayment").parameter.reachableBy(cpg.method("processPayment").methodReturn).l

// Find methods with high cyclomatic complexity
cpg.method.where(_.controlStructure.size > 10).name.l

// Dead code: methods with no callers
cpg.method.where(_.callIn.size == 0).filter(_.name != "main").name.l

// Exception flow: methods that can throw but callers don't catch
cpg.method.where(_.ast.isThrow.size > 0).callIn.method.filter(_.ast.isTry.size == 0).name.l

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "codeql": {
      "command": "codeql-mcp",
      "args": ["--database", ".code-graph/codeql-db"]
    }
  }
}

// SQL injection: user input flows to SQL query
import python
from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
where TaintTracking::hasFlowPath(source, sink)
  and source instanceof RemoteFlowSource
  and sink instanceof SqlExecution
select sink, source, sink, "SQL injection from $@.", source, "user input"

// Unvalidated redirect
from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
where source instanceof RemoteFlowSource
  and sink instanceof RedirectSink
select sink, "Unvalidated redirect from user input"

1. SCOPE       → Tier 1: detect_changes / get_architecture
                 Identify files and modules in scope

2. STRUCTURE   → Tier 1: search_graph / trace_call_path
                 Map the call graph and dependencies

3. FLOW        → Tier 2: get_cfg / run_cpgql_query
                 Analyze control flow and data flow paths

4. SECURITY    → Tier 3: run_query with taint analysis
                 Check for vulnerabilities in data paths

5. REPORT      → Combine findings from all tiers
                 Prioritize: Critical > High > Medium > Low