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Found 13 Skills
Create, manage, and execute agent tools (claude, codex) inside Docker sandboxes for isolated code execution. Use when running agent loops, spawning tool subprocesses, or any task requiring process isolation. Triggers on "sandbox", "isolated execution", "docker sandbox", "safe agent execution", or when working on agent loop infrastructure.
Use this skill when authoring, validating, packaging, signing, or composing a Docker Sandboxes kit `spec.yaml` (`sbx kit add/inspect/pack/pull/push/sign/validate/verify`), even if the user just says they want to "add a tool to a sandbox agent", "build a reusable sandbox extension", "publish a kit to a registry", or "give a mixin its own credentials and network access". Covers the kit-spec v2 grammar (`kind: sandbox` vs `kind: mixin`, the `sandbox:` block, `permissions.network`, `ports`, `credentials` apiKey/oauth, `environment`, `setup` install/startup/files, `volumes`, `args`, `extends`, `mixins`, `requires.agent`), composition via `--kit`/`sbx kit add`, and distribution (pack/push/pull/sign/verify/provenance).
Use this skill when authoring, planning, or running a declarative `sbxenv.yaml` file for Docker Sandboxes (`sbx env create/run/plan/exec/rm`), even if the user just says they want to "check in a sandbox config", "make onboarding reproducible for a sandbox", "run a setup script before the agent starts", or "define arguments for a shared sandbox environment". Covers the sbxenv.yaml schema (schemaVersion, agent, kits, workspace/additionalWorkspaces, args, env, secrets, registries, bindings, mcp, ports, sandboxOptions), host `lifecycle:` commands (initialize/postCreate/preRemove) and their approval-plan model, multi-file merge (`-f`-style deep merge and the user-level `.sbxenv.yaml` base layer), and file-write-protection (`sandboxOptions.writableEnvFiles`).
Use this skill when creating, running, reattaching to, listing, stopping, or removing Docker Sandboxes (the standalone `sbx` CLI that runs AI coding agents in isolated microVMs), even if the user just says they want to "run claude in a sandbox", "isolate an agent from my repo", "give an agent its own git clone", or "clean up old sandboxes". Covers `sbx run`/`sbx create` (including the built-in agents claude, codex, cursor, devin, docker-agent, gemini, opencode, shell), workspace bind-mount vs `--clone` isolation, additional read-only workspaces, reattaching by `--name`, `sbx ls`/`stop`/`rm`/`prune`, `sbx exec`, `sbx cp`, and `sbx ports`.
Use this skill when configuring what a Docker Sandboxes (`sbx`) sandbox can reach on the network or which credentials it authenticates with, even if the user just says they want to "let the agent call an internal API", "block all network access", "give the agent a GitHub token", or "use a private registry image for a sandbox". Covers `sbx policy init/allow/deny/ls/inspect/log/check/rm network` (global and per-sandbox egress rules, deny-over-allow precedence) and `sbx secret set/set-custom/ls/rm/import` (service secrets, dynamic secrets via --ref/--command, and registry pull credentials with their host-pulls-only-by-default injection scope).
Execute research code inside isolated Docker containers for safe replication, experiments, and benchmarks. Use when the user selects Docker as the execution environment or asks to run code safely, in isolation, or in a sandbox.
Generate Docker sandbox configurations for safely running untrusted OpenClaw skills. Isolates filesystem, network, and process access.
Autonomous PRD implementation loop — turns GitHub issues into shipped code using TDD, code review gates, and Docker sandbox isolation. The execution engine for the grill-me → write-a-prd → prd-to-issues → ralph pipeline.
AI-powered autonomous penetration testing framework with multi-agent system, real security tool execution, and compliance reporting
Install npm packages in a Docker sandbox environment. Use this skill whenever you need to install, reinstall, or update node_modules inside a container where the workspace is mounted via virtiofs. Native binaries (esbuild, lightningcss, rollup) crash on virtiofs, so packages must be installed on the local ext4 filesystem and symlinked back.
Securely execute untrusted Python, Node.js, Bun, Deno, and Bash code in sandboxed Docker containers.
Local-first AI coding agent powered by llama.cpp with zero tokens costs, Docker sandboxing, 20 built-in tools, LSP/Roslyn intelligence, and MCP integration